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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

IRAQ

PART 6

January to December 1952

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING

IRAQ—PART 6

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

EQ 1011/1

No. 1

IRAQ: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1951

Sir J. Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received 31st January)

(No. 12. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
Sir, *28th January, 1952.*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a review of events in Iraq during the year 1951. I am indebted to Mr. Gamble for the section on economic affairs, and for the rest of the report to Mr. Donald Maitland.

2. It may not be out of place for me to add a few comments of my own. I suggest that the first outstanding point to be recorded of Iraq in 1951 is that while most of the Middle Eastern countries were beset by turmoils of a greater or lesser magnitude, Iraq remained comparatively stable. Opinions may differ as to the reasons for this phenomenon and as to the likelihood of its continuance, but it is at least a fact to be noted. Another item to be recorded on the credit side of the account is that while Persia appears to be on the verge of bankruptcy, Egypt to be faced with grave economic strains, and Jordan to be maintaining a precarious existence on the basis of British subsidies, Iraq's economic future should be assured on the financial side by vast increases in her revenue from oil. Thirdly, there are no signs that communism is gaining any serious hold in the country. Iraq may contain many neutralists, but their motive is not any love for Soviet Russia or for communism but rather the conviction that the Western Powers could not prevent Iraq from being overrun in a major war.

3. There are grounds therefore both for thankfulness and for hope. At the same time there are undoubtedly causes for anxiety. The Government is popular neither abroad nor at home. It is at loggerheads with most of the other States of the Middle East, not excluding Jordan despite, or perhaps in a measure because of, the family relationship of the two ruling houses. At home it is probably true to say that the man in the street has equally little confidence in the Government and in the opposition parties.

He regards all the political leaders as equally self-seeking. As a result there seems to be a tendency on the part of the Government (and it would probably apply to any alternative Government) to despair of goodwill and co-operation on the part of the population and to rely on the army and the police to keep it in order. Iraq could therefore hardly be described as a country at unity in itself. Meanwhile one hears on all sides that the standard of administration has never been so low. In such conditions I feel bound to sound a note of warning against hopes of any spectacular advance in the field of economic and social development. The money, indeed, may be available, but money alone cannot make much headway against an ingrained corruption and inefficiency in the administration and against a ruling class sadly lacking in social conscience. I think we should therefore be unwise to expect any radical change in Iraq as a result of her newly-acquired riches. Change is more likely to come as the result of the Shias gradually usurping the predominant position hitherto occupied by the Sunnis, and it may not be to our benefit. But for the moment, though one would never guess it from reading the local press, the general feeling towards our own country seems to be one of respect and even friendliness. And if we build up our strength in the Middle East and extend to Iraq sympathy in deeds as well as words, e.g., by supplying her with the arms she needs, there should be a reasonable hope of keeping Iraq fundamentally on our side in the cold war.

I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Tehran, Ankara, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Head of the British Middle East Office, His Majesty's Consular Officers in Iraq and the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

Enclosure in No. 1

General

There was no change of Government in Iraq in 1951 and, in spite of events in Persia and Egypt, the Prime Minister, Nuri Said, was able to resist pressure to embark on rash policies. At times he was unusually sensitive to the Nationalist Opposition's attacks on his conduct of affairs and he may in future be less able or willing to implement the policies he believes in.

2. The agreement drawn up between the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Iraq Government will, if ratified by the Iraqi Parliament, give the Development Board sufficient funds to execute its programme, which became law during the year. But, in spite of the energy of the Minister of Social Affairs, no real steps were taken to bring about the social reform which must accompany the economic development of the country unless poverty is to be multiplied.

3. Internally some progress was made. Security remained good throughout the country and the formation by Saleh Jabr of a new political party to rival Nuri Pasha's Constitutional Union Party gave rise to hopes that true parliamentary democracy might eventually develop in Iraq. While the parties agree on major issues such as support of the Monarchy and co-operation with the West, they have a different approach to domestic problems.

4. The Royal Family had scarcely emerged from mourning for Queen Aliyah when King Abdullah was murdered. This and indifferent health kept the Regent out of the public eye for much of the year. When he did appear he seemed less willing than usual to deal firmly with the politicians and he was clearly unnerved by the series of assassinations of leaders of Muslim States.

Domestic Affairs

5. Early in the year there were signs that the enthusiasm which Nuri brings to his work at the outset of a term of office was beginning to be consumed. The plans for providing employment by executing small-scale development projects had failed to achieve their object and, with the prices of food-stuffs rising, the poor and unemployed were facing increased hardships. Nuri himself was showing signs of strain and of an unaccustomed sensitivity to criticism. His choice of Mustafa al Umari and Taufiq Suwaidi (the latter had joined the Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Minister in February) as his principal lieutenants had weakened rather than strengthened his position, as both were

notorious for their venality. Rumours of a change of government were rife and the opposition parties increased the intensity of their attacks in Parliament and in the press. The group influenced by Muzahim al Pachachi and Ali Jaudat al Aiyubi, which consisted largely of the Opposition Deputies who had resigned from Parliament in March 1950, together with the National Democratic Party, were meanwhile attempting in a series of articles in the press to propagate the conception of neutrality in the world conflict. Public opinion had been impressed by the Chinese successes in Korea and resented the part the Western Powers had played in the establishment of Israel with undiminished bitterness. The desire for neutrality was also strengthened by the belief that the Western Powers would be unable to protect Iraq should she be invaded from Russia. The idea accordingly gained some popularity, but the stabilisation of the military situation in Korea stimulated more reasoned discussion of Iraq's rôle. The followers of Hikmat Sulaiman and Nasrat al Farisi joined in the fray and criticised the Government for its failure to control the prices of essential commodities and to deal with the problem of land taxation.

6. The Government was seriously weakened by these attacks, but it seemed that it could survive the summer provided Nuri remained in good health and Saleh Jabr did not come out into open opposition. The latter had returned from Europe in January and had been preparing to form a new political party which would contain some of the younger elements opposed to Nuri as well as his own Shia supporters in Basra and on the Euphrates. Saleh Jabr had no immediate intention of forming the party since he felt that such a step would be tantamount to an open breach with Nuri. The followers of Muzahim al Pachachi had no such inhibitions and on 16th April they applied for permission to form an association to be called the United Popular Front. The leaders of the National Democratic Party were amongst the signatories of the application and the Minister of the Interior was correct in refusing the application on the grounds that under Iraqi law an association could only consist of persons and could not embrace other parties. A new application, which none of the National Democratic Party leaders signed, was submitted in May and permission for the party to form was granted.

7. Meanwhile, the problem of the Iraqi Jews had arisen again. The law permitting them to emigrate to Israel provided they

renounced their Iraqi nationality expired in March and the Chamber of Deputies rushed through a law freezing the assets of all those who had applied to leave the country. A few weeks later another law was passed freezing the assets of those Jews who had left Iraq illegally or who, having left legally, did not return within a specified period. A total of over 105,000 Jews had applied to leave the country when the first of these laws was passed. The air-lift of Jews to Israel, which was the monopoly of an American charter company, was suddenly speeded up and by the end of August almost all the denationalised Jews had left Iraq.

8. The murder of General Razmara on 7th March and subsequent events in Tehran and Abadan caused a flutter of excitement and anxiety in Iraq. The Opposition parties, aware that the Government were discussing the future of the oil industry in Iraq with the Iraq Petroleum Company, were quick to seize their opportunity. The Istiqlal Party demanded the nationalisation of Iraqi oil and the National Democratic Party took up the cry. The Lake Huleh incident added to the general restiveness and by the middle of April, when the debate in the Chamber of Deputies on the budget estimates for the following year began, tension was rising throughout the country. The Istiqlal Deputies' attacks on the Government's policy were bitter and sustained. They were helped by the allegations of corruption and nepotism against two members of the Cabinet made by the well-meaning but inept Saad Umar, a former Minister of Education. But, when challenged by the Prime Minister, he failed to substantiate his charges and was suspended for the rest of the session, the advantage lay with the Government. In his reply to the debate Nuri Pasha exposed the basic fallacy in the doctrine of neutrality, reiterated that it was his policy to revise the Treaty of 1930 and tried to show that many of the promises of domestic reform made in the Speech from the Throne had already been fulfilled. In spite of the more constructive criticism of its policy by Saleh Jabr's supporters and of a growing demand for the reform of the electoral system to provide for direct elections, the Government emerged well from the debate. Thanks to the energy of Fadhil Jamali, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, the two remaining weeks of the session were the most productive of legislation. The Civil Code, which had been in committee for seventeen years, the Development Board's programme and the Law for the Exploitation of State Domains, were passed by both Chambers

after exhaustive debates. No action was taken on a proposal to nationalise the oil industry and, on electoral reform, it was agreed to review the past working of the two-stage system of elections. The despatch of units of the Royal Iraqi Air Force to Syria at the latter's request strengthened the Government's position and, when Parliament was prorogued on 1st June after its most active session on record, Nuri Pasha was again master of the situation.

9. On the day Parliament was prorogued the United Popular Front announced that it had formed a Provisional Executive Committee. Taha al Hashimi, a former Prime Minister, was elected President of the Front and Ridha al Shabibi, Vice-President. Muzahim al Pachachi was a conspicuous absentee from the committee; the other leaders were presumably reluctant to prejudice their immediate future by too close identification with a person whom the Regent was known to hold in contempt. When the committee was formed it was made clear that the front would co-operate with the National Democratic Party and particularly in propagating the idea of neutrality. The United Popular Front had now emerged as a gathering of "Old Guard" politicians resentful of Nuri's success which means their own exclusion from the Cabinet and the fruits of office.

10. Of more significance for Iraq was the announcement on 19th June that Saleh Jabr had requested permission to form a political party called the Popular Socialist Party. Numerous attempts had been made to effect a reconciliation between Nuri and Saleh Jabr before Parliament went into recess. But it seemed that the extreme Sunnis amongst Nuri's supporters and the extreme Shias amongst Saleh's were loath to see these efforts bear fruit. Nuri was in any case preoccupied with events abroad and it was not altogether a surprise when Saleh went ahead with the formation of his party. The party held its first meeting on 20th July. The composition of its Central Committee indicated Saleh Jabr's concern to secure as much Sunni support as possible and to strengthen his position in the north. The absence of politicians of the first rank from membership of the party suggested that such known supporters of Saleh Jabr as Abdul Karim al Uzri and Fadhil Jamali were not yet prepared to lose their freedom of action by siding openly with him.

11. Meanwhile, a Cabinet crisis had suddenly flared up. On 15th July, Taufiq Suwaidi threatened to resign unless the

Cabinet agreed to appoint his brother President of the Court of Cassation in succession to Judge Prichard. The Cabinet, who suspected Arif Suwaidi's integrity and dreaded the use to which the Suwaidi brothers might put their combined influence as Deputy Prime Minister and head of the highest judicial authority, were adamant and, after a discussion in the small hours of the morning with the Regent, who was to leave the following day for London to arrange King Faisal's summer holiday, Taufiq Suwaidi was obliged to resign. Shakir al Wadi again became Acting Foreign Minister and Hassan Sami Tatar was appointed President of the Court of Cassation, being replaced as Minister of Justice by Jamil Abdul Wahab.

12. Real progress was at last being made in the Government's negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company and in the middle of August the Prime Minister announced the main heads of the agreement which had been reached. This news roused the opposition to a fury and calls for the nationalisation of the oil industry by the Istiqlal Party, the United Popular Front and the National Democratic Party gave way to a series of slanderous attacks in the press on the Government and the British connexion which continued until the end of the year. Nuri again visited London and did not return until a few days after the Egyptian Government abrogated the 1936 Treaty of Alliance. The opposition's attacks on his lukewarm support for Egypt convinced him of the need to broaden his Cabinet but, although he invited Taha al Hashimi and Ridha al Shabibi of the United Popular Front and one of the leaders of the Istiqlal Party to join the Government he was unable to agree to the conditions which they put forward. He was only willing to drop Abdul Wahab Murjan, who had handled the country's finances with neither competence nor imagination. The fact that Nuri Pasha did not approach any of Saleh Jabr's supporters was indicative of the extent to which he had been influenced by the more extreme Sunnis amongst his own following.

13. Soon afterwards Nuri began to fulfil his promise to discuss electoral reform with the political leaders. He insisted, however, that any amendment of the existing system should preserve the principle of two-stage elections. As all the opposition parties had publicly declared for direct elections, they could not of course discuss the subject on these terms. These two abortive attempts at negotiations caused the Opposition unusual irritation. Unfortunately this coincided

with the Egyptian Government's rejection of the Four-Power defence proposals. It thus happened that the Opposition newspapers vented their spite by attacks on the principle of joint defence and by calls for active support of Egypt in her "heroic struggle." The news from Egypt that 14th November was to be celebrated as National Struggle Day gave the Opposition parties a golden opportunity for mischief-making. One by one they announced that their followers would observe the day with a strike. Nuri's party alone made no comment, thereby inviting further criticism from the Opposition. In the event the strike passed off peaceably and the excitement in the country began to subside. Parliament was prorogued for a month a few days after it was opened at the beginning of December, ostensibly because the Government had not finished preparing the legislation which was to be laid before it. The Opposition acquiesced in this move with unusual timidity and at the end of the year the internal situation was quieter than at any other time.

Foreign Affairs

14. If in 1951 Iraq made some progress in domestic affairs, in the field of foreign affairs the year was one of disappointments.

15. Disagreements over the conservancy of the Shatt-al-Arab and the status of the Arab tribes in Khuzistan had for long soured Iraq's relations with Persia. The latter's recognition of Israel and the facilities given by the Persian authorities to the Jews who had smuggled themselves out of Iraq in 1949 and 1950 had caused a further estrangement, and the Persian Government's efforts to expropriate the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were not observed by the Iraq Government with complete sympathy, more particularly when the Persian press embarked on vicious attacks upon the Iraq Government for their alleged acquiescence in the massing of British forces near the Persian frontier. This touched the Iraq Government on a sensitive spot and they were indeed highly nervous lest His Majesty's Government might decide to use Iraqi territory for a descent on Abadan. The "anti-imperialist" nature of Dr. Musaddiq's policy naturally appealed to the opposition parties in Iraq; similarly the holy struggle proclaimed by Abul Qassim Kashani caused a flutter in the holy cities of the Shias. But Nuri Pasha succeeded in resisting pressure to embark on such adventures as the nationalisation of Iraqi oil. Nonetheless, he kept the Iraq Petroleum Company hanging on a string until he was

certain that Dr. Musaddiq's policy had failed to bring Persia either economic prosperity or the fulfilment of her "national aspirations." Throughout the summer the attitude of the Iraqi authorities at Basra was sympathetic, and the expeditious way in which Abadan was evacuated can be attributed largely to their co-operation.

16. An event which made a deeper impression on the minds of Iraqis was the murder in July of King Abdullah, following a few days after that of Riad al-Solh. Most Iraqis were horrified by the circumstances of the murder and were apprehensive of the effect which two assassinations of major political importance would have on Arab prestige. The murder at once gave rise to speculation about the succession in Jordan and all political parties agreed that it afforded an opportunity to bring about Iraqi-Jordan union. The Government, however, were in no hurry to take action. Nuri Pasha, who attended the late King's funeral, was convinced by what he had seen and heard in Jordan that no decision could be taken about the succession until after the Jordanian elections at the end of August. He was prepared to insist, however, that the throne should be occupied by a Hashemite. At the same time he doubted whether any of King Abdullah's descendants was fit for the throne and he had let it be known in Jordan that, if the same conclusion should be reached there, the two countries could always fall back on King Abdullah's own proposal that King Faisal should become King of Jordan also. As time went by it became clear to the Iraq Government that the opportunity for bringing about the union of Iraq and Jordan was slipping away. Nuri Pasha again visited Amman after Talal had been proclaimed King and on his return he seemed prepared not to press for union so long as Jordan remained stable. Unfortunately, towards the end of the year, relations between the two countries began to deteriorate as a result of misunderstandings between King Talal and the Regent of Iraq, who resented the fact that one of his cousin's first acts had been to visit King Ibn Saud without even informing him of his intention in advance.

17. Iraq's relations with Syria also worsened towards the end of the year. Hopes of a union of the two countries had been revived in the spring when the Iraq Government seized the opportunity presented by the outbreak of fighting at Lake Huleh to offer military assistance to Syria. The bombing of Syrian territory by Israel

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aircraft persuaded the Syrian Government to accept the offer, and in May, in a scene of rare enthusiasm, the Prime Minister informed the Chamber of Deputies that an Iraqi force of aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery had been despatched to share in the defence of Damascus. Three months later, however, when the danger had receded, the Syrian Government requested the withdrawal of the force. Relations between the two countries thereupon returned to normal, but Colonel Shishakli's *coup d'état* in November changed the situation. The Government and the Opposition parties alike condemned the *coup*; and Saleh Jabr's party suggested in a manifesto that all measures, peaceful or otherwise, should be taken to restore the rule of law in Syria. The Iraq Government declared that it would continue to recognise the deposed Cabinet as the lawful Government of Syria and called on the other Arab Governments to boycott the new régime. This move met with no success. Damascus radio was meanwhile pouring abuse on Iraqi leaders, but when tempers had died down a party of Syrian officers visited Bagdad to see whether relations between the two countries could not be improved. They were courteously received but were firmly told that no change was possible for the time being in Iraq's attitude to Colonel Shishakli. At the end of the year the Iraqi Minister in Damascus was still virtually a prisoner in his own legation.

18. Iraq's traditional resentment of Egypt's domination of the Arab League was less in evidence than usual throughout most of 1951. By paying lip-service to support of Egypt's national aspirations, the Iraq Government hoped to manoeuvre Egypt into a position in which she would find it difficult to oppose the union of Iraq and Jordan or Iraq and Syria which it was hoped might be effected during the year. The abrogation of the 1936 Treaty of Alliance between Egypt and Britain faced Iraq with a new problem. Inevitably the Opposition parties came out in praise of Egypt and called for the abrogation of Iraq's treaty with Britain. The Government were compelled to declare their support for Egypt, but in doing so they left undefined the nature of the help which Iraq would offer. The Egyptian Government's rejection of the four-Power defence proposals was generally regarded as a hasty step, and the Iraq Government were relieved when they learned they were not required to make up their minds at once about the plan. In Paris, however, Fadhil Jamali, the

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leader of the Iraqi Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations, on instructions from Nuri Pasha, took a more positive line. He refused to associate his Government with the joint declaration of unqualified support for Egypt and rejection of the defence proposals which the Egyptian Foreign Minister tried so hard to persuade his Arab League colleagues to issue. Having thus prevented the Egyptians from closing the door on negotiations with the Western Powers, Nuri Pasha began to evolve suggestions which might form the basis of new discussions between Egypt and Britain. Impracticable though many of his proposals were, his concern to bring about a settlement was evidence that the Iraq Government regarded co-operation with the West as more important than nationalistic policies which could only increase the instability of the Middle East.

19. During most of the year Anglo-Iraqi relations were coloured by the negotiations for a new agreement between the Iraq Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company, which are described in a later paragraph of this review. The provision of arms and the delay in settling claims for the use of the Iraqi railways during the war were also matters of constant concern to the Iraq Government. No other problems of major importance arose until the abrogation of the Egyptian Treaty. Nuri Pasha considered the reaction in Iraq to be so strong that he could not avoid making some public reference to the future of Anglo-Iraqi relations. He accordingly issued two statements. In the first he reminded the country that at the end of 1950 he had described the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty as out of date and had expressed the view that there should be no foreign bases on Iraqi territory in time of peace; he added that he proposed to submit some modification of the present relationship to Parliament during its next session. In the second statement he announced that he intended to discuss Anglo-Iraqi relations with political leaders. Although this latter promise was reiterated in the Speech from the Throne, no discussions had been held by the end of the year.

20. The position of the British experts serving the Iraq Government improved during the year. At first it seemed possible that the dissatisfaction which some of them felt with their terms of service and increasing public criticism of the presence of these officials in Government departments might lead to a reduction in their number. In the event, however, the Iraq Government continued to rely on British specialists of all

kinds, both in the Administration and in the Development Board. They realised that if experts were to be attracted to Iraq, they had to be offered more generous terms. The number of British officials had increased—there are now over 200 in the country—and they have continued to make an important contribution to the economic and social development of the country while earning goodwill for the British connexion.

21. In the field of defence, co-operation with Britain has also improved. The Iraq army benefited from visits by General Sir Brian Robertson (through whose encouragement important changes in the higher command of the army took place) and by a training team which assisted in the conduct of the autumn manoeuvres. Close relations have also been established between Air Chief Marshal Sir John Baker and the Royal Iraqi Air Force, whose morale has improved steadily. Supplies of military equipment from the United Kingdom were arriving at a more satisfactory rate by the end of the year.

Economic Affairs

22. Iraq's ordinary and capital works budgets for the year ending 31st March, 1951, showed a surplus of nearly 4 million dinars. This, compared with a deficit of 2½ million dinars in the year ending 31st March, 1950, and of over 8 million dinars in the year ending 31st March, 1949, is a measure of the improvement which has taken place in Iraq's financial position during the last three years and now enables her, instead of borrowing from outside sources, to meet her expenditure with comparative ease. The improvement has been due, on the one hand, to a policy of strict economy in expenditure and on the other to increased revenue from indirect taxes, notably customs and excise receipts, which in 1950-51 accounted for nearly 50 per cent. of the total ordinary revenue, and from oil royalties. In 1950, oil royalties amounted to over 6 million dinars as compared with 3½ million dinars in 1949. They amounted to approximately 15 million dinars in 1951 but the major part of this amount will go to the Development Board. In accordance with the law which established the Development Board, the Government's entire earnings from oil, as from 1st April, 1951, were to be paid to the Development Board and from that date the Government's capital works' budget, into which they were previously paid, ceased to exist. It is likely that this law will soon be amended to

provide that 70 per cent. of the earnings will go to the Development Board and 30 per cent. to the Government. This should provide a better balance between the board and the Government and enable the latter to cover the expenditure which should properly belong to it.

23. With the future of Iraq depending so much on revenue from oil, it was not surprising that much of the Government's time and energy was taken up with discussions with the Iraq Petroleum Company group, and with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company regarding the future of its two subsidiaries, the Khanaqin Oil Company and the Rafidain Oil Company. Once the 50/50 agreement between the Saudi Arabian Government and ARAMCO was signed in December 1950, it was clear that the agreement which had been reached in August 1950, between the Iraq Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company, whereby the rate of royalty on Kirkuk oil was raised from 4 shillings gold to 6 shillings gold per ton, was a dead letter. In spite of the demands from certain sections of the Opposition for nationalisation of Iraq's oil, which had been inspired by events in Persia, the Government were cautious about committing themselves and Nuri Pasha took his stand on a policy of ensuring that Iraq's revenue per ton of oil would not be less than that of neighbouring countries. After prolonged negotiations between representatives of the Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company, agreement on a 50/50 profit-sharing basis, covering the Kirkuk, Basra and Mosul concessions, was reached in Baghdad in August. In accordance with this agreement, the company guaranteed a minimum rate of output of 22 million tons of crude oil per annum by the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Mosul Petroleum Company as from 1954 and thereafter, and of 8 million tons by the Basra Petroleum at the end of 1955 and thereafter. The company also guaranteed that Iraq's minimum rate of oil revenue would be 20 million dinars for the years 1953 and 1954 and 25 million dinars in 1955 and thereafter. It was calculated that on present prices and costs, Iraq's revenue per ton of oil would be 35½ shillings in 1951, increasing to 39½ shillings in 1953 and thereafter, and that her oil revenue would increase from 15 million dinars in 1951 to approximately 50 million dinars at the end of 1955, making a total revenue for the five years of approximately 200 million dinars. Since agreement was reached in principle in August, there have been further discussions

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about the final text of the agreement which it is hoped will be submitted to Parliament for ratification early in 1952.

24. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister was giving his attention to the future of the Khanaqin Oil Company and the Rafidain Oil Company, and he made it clear that unless he reached a satisfactory settlement with them he would not be prepared to submit the Iraq Petroleum Company agreement to Parliament. On 25th December an agreement was signed with representatives of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company whereby the Iraq Government assumed control, which had hitherto been held by the Rafidain Oil Company, of the supply of oil for the internal market. They acquired against an agreed payment of 870,000 dinars the installations and equipment of the Khanaqin Oil Company, including the Alwand refinery, and of the Rafidain Oil Company. The Khanaqin Oil Company were appointed distributing agents for the Government until 1961 and were also to manage the Alwand refinery until the new Government refinery at Bagdad, for the construction of which a contract had been given in June to M. W. Kellogg Company of New Jersey, United States, was erected. It was also agreed that the Khanaqin Oil Company would, if requested by the Government, manage the Bagdad refinery until 1961. Finally, it was agreed that the Khanaqin Oil Company could continue to search for oil in the territory of their concession, but that if they had not begun the export of oil at the end of seven years they would be obliged to surrender the concession.

25. The first general programme of the projects of the Development Board which became law in June covered five years, 1951 to 1955, and provided for a total expenditure of 65,674,000 dinars against total estimated revenue of 95,075,000 dinars. In presenting the programme to Parliament the Board explained that it only contained those projects which could be begun without delay and that the surplus revenue amounting to 29,401,000 dinars would be employed on schemes which would be included in an additional programme after the studies connected with them had been completed. As a result of the increased rate of royalty provided for under the new agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company and of the new arrangement for apportioning oil revenue between the Government and the board referred to in paragraph 22 above, it is likely that the board's total revenue for the five years will be approximately

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145 million dinars and that the surplus over the existing programme of expenditure will thus be approximately 80 million dinars. In the existing programme a sum of 30 million dinars has been allocated to various irrigation projects, including nearly 10 million dinars for the Wadi Tharthar scheme which will control the floods on the River Tigris. Nearly 16 million dinars has been allocated to roads and bridges and nearly 13 million dinars to buildings, including schools and hospitals.

26. It is not yet possible to say how far the Development Board will be guided in its future plans by the report of the International Bank Survey Mission which, under the leadership of Mr. Ivar Rooth, visited Iraq from February to May. Full details of the report are not yet available but it is understood that it recommends a five-year programme costing 145 million dinars of which 56½ million dinars would be given to irrigation, drainage and agriculture; 37 million to industry; 27½ million to transport and communications and 18½ million to various community facilities such as water, sewage, housing, &c.

27. Although the Development Board has not yet much to show for its labours, it has, under the energetic though somewhat erratic leadership of Arshad al Umari, made considerable progress with the study and preparation of various schemes. It has awarded a contract for approximately 6 million dinars for earth-moving in connexion with the Wadi Tharthar scheme to the British firm of Balfour, Beatty and Company and has called for tenders for the construction of a barrage over the Euphrates at Ramadi. It has, however, been criticised for devoting too much of its attention to minor projects instead of concentrating on the broader aspects of development. It has had difficulties also in connexion with personnel. Ali Mumtaz, who was probably the ablest Iraqi member of the board, resigned in July, and the American member, General Donald Adams, returned to the United States for reasons of health within a few months of his arrival in Iraq. Up to the end of the year neither of these had been replaced, though a new American member was expected early in 1952.

28. A matter of serious concern to His Majesty's Embassy was the refusal of the Iraq Government or Development Board to extend much-needed financial help to the Iraq State Railways until the railways' claim against His Majesty's Government, for approximately 600,000 dinars, in connexion

with the transport of British forces during the war, had been settled. The Iraqis have always tended to regard the railways, with their British director-general, as a British responsibility and they were apparently ready to see the efficiency of the railways decline rather than accept any compromise on this claims issue. Towards the end of the year there were signs that they were combining their demand for a settlement of the claim with a demand for a revision of the 1936 Railway Agreement, which provides that two out of the five members on the Board of Administration shall be British, as a precondition for the provision of financial assistance. At the same time Nuri Pasha was asking for an experienced Britisher to take on the management of the railways during the period of capital development which would follow the release of revenues by the Development Board.

29. An agreement between the United Kingdom and Iraq was signed in Bagdad on 18th February whereby scarce currency was to be made available to Iraq from the sterling area pool to cover her essential imports from, and other essential payments to, scarce currency countries for the period 1st October, 1950, to 30th September, 1951. During this experimental period, Iraq was free to decide herself the nature and extent of her essential dollar expenditure, including capital items. His Majesty's Embassy has proposed to the Iraq Government that these arrangements should be extended until July 1952, when the Financial Agreement of August 1947, which regulates Iraq's sterling balances, will expire, but the matter is being held in suspense pending ratification of the Iraq Petroleum Company agreement.

30. The laws freezing the property of Iraqi Jews who had been deprived of their Iraqi nationality threw the market into confusion for some months, and many persons with little or no business experience took the place of Jews who had been established here for years. Towards the end of the year conditions were improving, but there was still a marked shortage of credit resulting from the departure of the Jewish moneylenders. Although no reliable statistics are available, it is clear that the wheat crop in 1951 was poor and the barley crop about average. Prices of both rose steeply in November and December and the Government, which had earlier authorised the export of 30,000 tons of wheat, became frightened about internal supplies. On 26th December they suddenly imposed a ban on the export of barley, in spite of

the fact that contracts had been signed for the shipment of over 100,000 tons, mostly to the United Kingdom, between December 1951 and March 1952. Encouraged by the high prices of cotton, the Department of Agriculture distributed sufficient seed to produce in 1951 six times more than in 1950. Unfortunately, as a result of the mild winter in 1950-51, the boll weevil made disastrous inroads and in many areas the 1951 crop was a total failure. During the year, Iraq signed trade agreements with India, Pakistan, Lebanon, Syria, Western Germany and Italy, chiefly with the idea of finding extra markets for her dates. There were noticeable signs of increasing Japanese

and German interest in Iraq as an export market.

31. A Civil Air Services Agreement on standard "Bermuda" lines was concluded between Iraq and Britain on 19th April, 1951. British airlines acquired the right to operate transit and terminating services between United Kingdom and Iraqi territory, with corresponding rights for an Iraqi airline. In order to meet Iraqi objections that the carriage by international airlines using four-engined pressurised aircraft of traffic between Beirut and Bagdad would provide overwhelming competition for Iraqi Airways, British airlines did not seek traffic rights on this sector.

EQ 1531/34

No. 2

RATIFICATION OF THE IRAQI PETROLEUM AGREEMENT

Proceedings in the Iraqi Parliament and Effect on the Political Situation

Sir J. Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received 29th February)

(No. 30. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
Sir, *21st February, 1952.*

As I have reported by telegram, the Agreement signed on 3rd February between the Government of Iraq and the Iraq Petroleum Company, Basra Petroleum Company and Mosul Petroleum Company, entered into force when the process of ratification was completed by the Regent's signature on 18th February. Simultaneous ratification was accorded to the Agreement of 25th December between the Iraq Government and the Rafidain and Khanaqin Oil Companies. I now have the honour to submit an account of the proceedings in the Iraqi Parliament, together with some observations on the methods used by the Government to secure ratification and their effect on the political situation here.

2. There was never any doubt that the Government's majorities were sufficient to ensure an overwhelmingly favourable vote in both the Chamber and the Senate. Nuri Pasha's attention was concentrated not on Parliament but on the street. Memories of the "Portsmouth riots" of January 1948 and of the recent riots in Cairo were in everybody's mind, and the leaders of the extremist parties had again made it clear that their tactics would be to appeal to "the people" against what they regarded as an unrepresentative Parliament. The possibility could not be excluded that, either by the deliberate

will of certain opposition leaders or as a result of some unforeseen clash between demonstrators and police, there might be bloodshed once more. And Nuri Pasha could not be sure that, if this happened, the two supports of his power—the parliamentary majority and the Palace—would remain unshaken. This was presumably the consideration uppermost in his mind when he planned the lightning campaign in which he drove the oil Bills through all their stages in ten days. At the same time he took care that the most readily available material for street demonstrations was dispersed at the critical time, by extending the secondary school holidays for one week from 16th February and postponing the beginning of term at two of the Bagdad Colleges for one week and at another two for two weeks from the same day.

3. On 9th February the President of the Chamber of Deputies announced the receipt of two draft laws ratifying the Oil Agreements and also of the law relating to the administration of Government oil refineries. The President told the House that these Bills would be referred to the Economic Committee for examination. This was the signal for the inevitable attack by the Opposition, and the Istiqlal Party were naturally the first to launch the offensive. Faiq Sammarai, deputy leader of the party, protested against the President's ruling and demanded that

the Bills should be referred to a Joint Financial and Economic Committee, in view of their financial aspect. The President replied that under the internal regulations of the Chamber all Bills dealing with minerals must be referred to the Economic Committee. He added that if Faiq Sammarai wished, he would put his proposal to the vote. This was done and the proposal was rejected by an overwhelming majority. The five Istiqlal Deputies then walked out of the Chamber and were joined by the only United Popular Front Deputy in the House and one Independent.

4. The Economic Committee of the Chamber met on the following day, 10th February. The Prime Minister was present and at the start of the meeting asked the committee to begin at once the study of the Oil Agreements. A Deputy of the Istiqlal Party immediately protested, stating that 14th February had been fixed as the date on which the committee was to study the agreements, and that in accordance with its agenda the committee should discuss the tobacco monopoly at its present meeting. He was supported by a Deputy of Saleh Jabr's Popular Socialist Party, and after the committee had voted for immediate consideration of the agreements they both walked out. On the same evening the five Istiqlal Deputies resigned from the Chamber. In a statement published on 11th February, explaining their action, they maintained that Parliament was unrepresentative of the people and not qualified to decide on such a matter as the Oil Agreements unless the latter had first been put to the electorate; they also protested against the Government's action in trying to force the agreements through Parliament to the detriment of the country.

5. On 11th February the Prime Minister held a press conference in the Chamber of Deputies in which he defended in a masterly fashion the Government's action in concluding the agreements. (A copy of the record of his statement was enclosed in Mr. Gamble's letter No. 1532/32/52 of 14th February to Eastern Department.) The Prime Minister concluded with a warning to the Government's political opponents against endangering the safety and prosperity of Iraq by exploiting the nationalist feelings of Iraqi youth.

6. On the same day the Economic Committee of the Chamber approved the Oil Agreements after the Popular Socialist Party had submitted a list of seventy-one questions to the Prime Minister to which they demanded answers. They received

what they considered unsatisfactory and inadequate replies, and at a meeting of the Central Committee of the party that evening it was decided that the party should oppose the Oil Agreements. A brief announcement to this effect, published in the press of 12th February, stated that "having studied the agreements from all angles in the light of the report submitted by the party's committee set up to examine them, it became evident to the Central Committee that the agreements mean great losses and harm to Iraq. The Central Committee has unanimously decided to reject the agreements."

7. The Lower House met again on 12th February. At the beginning of the proceedings the Prime Minister expressed his regret that the Deputies of the Istiqlal Party had submitted their resignation, which he asked them to withdraw and the House not to accept. He went on to explain why he was unable to agree with the Istiqlal Party's policy of nationalisation, repeating what he had said at his press conference the previous day, namely, that if Persia with her policy of nationalisation were to obtain more for her oil than Iraq he would be the first to ask for nationalisation of Iraq's oil should the oil companies refuse to accord Iraq an equal revenue per ton. Nuri Pasha then asked the House to give priority to debating the Oil Agreements, as the Budget and other important legislation depended to a large extent on additional funds which could only be provided if the Oil Agreements were ratified. When asked by a Deputy if he meant that the House should there and then debate the agreements, the Prime Minister replied in the negative. The House then continued with the debate on the Budget for 1952-53 which had begun on 9th February.

8. On 13th February the newspaper *Al Naba*, the unofficial organ of the Popular Socialist Party, published in twenty-three columns a statement by Saleh Jabr in which he criticised the two Oil Agreements in detail. While rejecting the case for nationalisation, he maintained that the Government had not made as good a bargain with the Iraq Petroleum Company and its associates as was possible in the circumstances. It was true that the Government had obtained 50 per cent. of the profits, though the statement criticised the method of calculating both profits and costs, but it was also necessary to remember that the company were getting 50 per cent. too. This constituted an unjustifiably large return on their capital. The statement then contended that the Government of Venezuela received

a larger sum per barrel under its various oil agreements than Iraq would now obtain, although the costs of production in Iraq were appreciably lower. It also drew attention to the possibility that the sterling accruing to Iraq under the agreement might be frozen by Her Majesty's Government, and that its convertibility into other currencies which Iraq might need for her development was not assured.

9. On the same day the United Popular Front and the National Democratic Party issued a joint communiqué in which they repeated their view that Iraq should receive 50 per cent. in kind of the total oil production. The communiqué then repeated the argument of these parties that the agreement should not be ratified by a Parliament which was so unrepresentative and not qualified to decide on so important an issue. A liberal use of such adjectives as "equivocal," "fraudulent," "arbitrary," was made in the communiqué, which concluded by stating that the country would not be bound by the agreements.

10. The final vote in the Lower House took place on 14th February. When the meeting opened the Prime Minister proposed that the Oil Agreements should be dealt with as a matter of urgency, and this proposal was put to the vote and accepted, to the indignation of Abdul Karim al Uzri, a former Minister of Finance and an intermittent supporter of Saleh Jabr, who alleged that he had been told on the previous day by officials of the Chamber that the agreements would not be discussed at this meeting. One of the Popular Socialist Deputies began to read the statement published by his party on the previous day, and was stopped by the President after fifteen minutes on the ground that the internal regulations of the Chamber did not permit the reading of a text beyond that time. After some argument it was agreed that the other Deputies of the Popular Socialist Party should continue to read the statement in relays until it was complete. The Prime Minister then spoke, and expressed his regret that, although the present leaders of the Popular Socialist Party had agreed to the bases for negotiations which had been laid down in 1950, they had not until now declared their views on the outline of the agreement published in August 1951, on the ground that they were waiting for the publication of the final text. He referred to their statement as "an encyclopædia of oil," and said the Government would be glad to study it in the future. In the course of his speech he maintained that the Government had not only secured a better revenue per

ton than any other oil-producing country, but had also opened the way for nationalisation. The meaning of this remark is not altogether clear. Perhaps the Prime Minister had in mind what he had previously stated at a press conference, namely, that nationalisation is a unilateral act and consequently that no future Government could be precluded by the present agreement from taking it if they so desired. He may also have been alluding to the provisions for the training of Iraqis, which might make nationalisation more feasible at some future time. The next speaker was Abdul Karim al Uzri who, after stating that he considered nationalisation impracticable at present and that the Government should have insisted on equal sharing of oil in kind, expressed grave anxiety over the provision for the payment of Iraq's share in sterling which, he said, was very dangerous owing to the possibility that sterling might be frozen and might not be regularly convertible into other currencies. After eight speeches in favour of the agreements and eight against, a Deputy of the Government Party moved the closure. This was carried against the protests of nineteen Popular Socialist Deputies, who withdrew from the House. The agreements were then put to the vote article by article and as a whole, and on each occasion approved by 89 votes to 7. The seven opponents were Abdul Karim al Uzri, two other Independents, the solitary representative of the United Popular Front and three members of the recently formed Nationalist bloc (see paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 17 of 29th January).

11. On the following day, 15th February, a storm of criticism and abuse broke in the press of the United Popular Front, the National Democratic Party and the Istiqlal Party. The Popular Socialists issued a further statement over Saleh Jabr's signature which was more dignified in tone and traced the "arbitrary" tactics of the Government from the committee stage to the final vote in the Lower House. The statement explained that the party had been obliged to leave the House in view of these tactics, and that it placed full responsibility for the consequences of what had been done on the Government.

12. On 16th February the agreements went to the Finance and Economic Committee of the Senate, where the Prime Minister again appeared to urge their consideration as a matter of urgency. Saleh Jabr arrived late, and on learning that the Oil Agreements were being discussed, walked out in protest. The committee approved the agreements on the same day,

and on the following day they were debated in the Senate itself. After three hours of discussion, in which Saleh Jabr made a long speech against ratification and Taufiq Suwaidi spoke in support of the Government, the agreements were adopted by 17 votes to 1, the three Popular Socialist Senators having walked out before the vote was taken.

13. The newspapers of 18th February published manifestos from the Istiqlal Party, the United Popular Front and National Democrats calling for a general strike on the morning of the following day to protest against the ratification of the Oil Agreements. Each manifesto ended with a request to the populace to remain calm and avoid disturbances of the peace. I am informed that efforts were made to obtain the collaboration of the Popular Socialists in calling this strike, but that Saleh Jabr refused to be associated with it.

14. The final stage in ratification, signature by the Regent, could not be regarded as a foregone conclusion in view of the threat contained in the manifestos of the three Opposition Parties. His signature was obtained, however, on 18th February, so that the strikers on the following morning were faced with a *fait accompli*. In the event the strike passed off peaceably and without demonstrations of any consequence.

15. The spectacle of a constructive measure being carried through in a Middle Eastern country with so much determination is in itself so rare and satisfying that I hesitate to criticise Nuri Pasha's handling of Parliament. He may have been right in supposing that a more prolonged debate, particularly if it continued after the return of the schools and colleges, might have resulted in street disturbances. But if this conclusion was wrong, and the available evidence suggests that it was, then it seems unfortunate that the Government should have provided the critics of the agreements with an additional argument for future use. It will no doubt be contended by those who wish to upset the present settlement that it was not only ratified by an unrepresentative Parliament at the end of its term, but also that even this Parliament was not given an adequate opportunity to express its views. One point which emerges clearly is that in the event of Persia or any other neighbouring country receiving a higher revenue per ton of oil than Iraq the present settlement would be undermined and would have to be renegotiated.

16. In the short run, it appears to be Saleh Jabr who has suffered the most serious

political setback. There is a certain amount of speculation as to whether he might have voted differently if his views had been treated with more respect by the Government, but I do not think this probable. His obstinate silence before the announcement of the agreement four days after its signature, despite the fact that he had been kept fully informed by the Iraq Petroleum Company throughout the negotiations and had been provided with a copy of the draft agreement, suggests that he intended throughout to take his final decision on political grounds and not on the merits of the settlement. In this Saleh Jabr has unfortunately allowed himself to be unduly influenced by the less reasonable section of his party, particularly by Saiyid Abdul Mahdi, and it is the views of this group that have generally prevailed against wiser counsels in his party. Since his criticisms of the agreements were not made until after they had been signed and were consequently not subject to amendment but only to ratification or rejection, he evidently had no intention of trying to influence their terms. His main preoccupation seems in fact to have been the avoidance of responsibility. However that may be, he seems now to be in a position of greater isolation than before. The other Opposition parties received him in the ranks of the Government's opponents on this issue without much show of gratitude, and I understand that there is a current joke in United Popular Front circles to the effect that Saleh Jabr has opposed the agreements because they were too hard on the companies. At the same time his relations with Nuri Pasha have taken a sharp turn for the worse. The mixture of irony and impatience with which he was treated by the Prime Minister must have gravely wounded his dignity, and I do not think that he will easily forget it.

17. The Government has emerged from this debate with added strength. The prestige which always attaches to success, the anti-climax of the strike on 19th February, and the immediate evidence of the results of the Government's policy in the shape of higher revenues, tax remissions and an increase in civil service wages, have all contributed to this result. It is now more or less certain that the present Parliament will be dissolved in the early spring, but the previous expectation that a "neutral" Government would be put into office in order to conduct new elections is falling into the background and the opinion is growing that after all Nuri Pasha will go to the country himself on the strength of his achievements during the present parliamentary session.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Tehran and Paris and to the Head of

the British Middle East Office (Fayid) and to the British Middle East Office (Cairo).

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

CT 10393/16

No. 3

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE REGENT OF IRAQ

State of Health of King Talal of Jordan

Mr. Eden to Sir. J. Troutbeck (Bagdad)

(No. 103. Confidential) *Foreign Office, 16th May, 1952.*

I called on the Regent of Iraq this afternoon because His Royal Highness has shown for some time past a considerable concern about the health of King Talal, his cousin, and also because we felt that Iraq was inclined to take perhaps rather too close an interest in developments which might ensue were King Talal to become really seriously ill.

2. I remarked to His Royal Highness that he would perhaps recall a message I had sent him in Bagdad. I was sorry that it had not been possible for me to say more, but I did think that in all matters concerning relations with Jordan the greatest caution was required. The Jordan of to-day was not the same as the Jordan of King Abdullah. His Royal Highness assented to this and I then asked if he had any news of King Talal's health. He said that he had heard only this morning that the King was seriously ill again. He was not altogether surprised at the news because on leaving for Madrid he had been told that the Queen had already arrived back from Switzerland. The Queen had told him when he had seen her there that she required two weeks more for her convalescence.

3. I said that the reports which we had received from you showed that the King had indeed had a relapse. I feared that he might be gravely ill. I felt that His Royal Highness ought to know this, and I expressed my concern at this news, which I knew must distress him.

4. The Regent asked me whether I knew what plans, if any, had been made in the event of King Talal being too ill to continue to govern. Was a Regency intended? He presumed that the King's brother, Prince Naif, who was in the Lebanon, would not be Regent. Maybe Prince Zaid might be.

It was possible that the Regent's advice might be asked for. If so, he would be available, and would be willing to go to Amman.

5. I said that we had as yet no notion as to what might happen if the King did not recover fairly soon. I did not know whether the matter of Regency had been considered. (I noticed, however, that the Regent assumed that King Talal's son would succeed him.) I thought it was necessary to proceed with extreme caution in all these matters, for it would be a mistake to give Jordan any impression that other nations, however friendly, were trying to suggest to her the course she should follow. If I might suggest it, I thought that the Regent should not consider going to Amman unless he received the clearest invitation to which he could afterwards refer, otherwise there was a risk that people would pretend that his journey had some ulterior motive.

6. His Royal Highness said that he quite understood this but that one of King Talal's grievances against him had been that he had not been to Amman.

7. The Regent was perfectly calm and friendly throughout the discussion. He showed no signs of resentment at the advice I gave him on this occasion or about our previous attitude. For the moment I think that it is his intention to proceed with caution and he said nothing that could even remotely be taken as a hint that he thought that Iraq and Jordan might be joined under one Crown, if King Talal were to die. On the contrary, his whole attitude was based on the assumption that Talal's sixteen-year-old son would succeed him.

8. I am sending copies of this Despatch to Her Majesty's Minister at Amman, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and to the Head of B.M.E.O.

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14. The final stage in ratification, signature by the Regent, could not be regarded as a foregone conclusion in view of the threat contained in the manifestos of the three Opposition Parties. His signature was obtained, however, on 18th February, so that the strikers on the following morning were faced with a *fait accompli*. In the event the strike passed off peaceably and without demonstrations of any consequence.

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16. In the short run, it appears to be Saleh Jabr who has suffered the most serious

political setback. There is a certain amount of speculation as to whether he might have voted differently if his views had been treated with more respect by the Government, but I do not think this probable. His obstinate silence before the announcement of the agreement four days after its signature, despite the fact that he had been kept fully informed by the Iraq Petroleum Company throughout the negotiations and had been provided with a copy of the draft agreement, suggests that he intended throughout to take his final decision on political grounds and not on the merits of the settlement. In this Saleh Jabr has unfortunately allowed himself to be unduly influenced by the less reasonable section of his party, particularly by Saiyid Abdul Mahdi, and it is the views of this group that have generally prevailed against wiser counsels in his party. Since his criticisms of the agreements were not made until after they had been signed and were consequently not subject to amendment but only to ratification or rejection, he evidently had no intention of trying to influence their terms. His main preoccupation seems in fact to have been the avoidance of responsibility. However that may be, he seems now to be in a position of greater isolation than before. The other Opposition parties received him in the ranks of the Government's opponents on this issue without much show of gratitude, and I understand that there is a current joke in United Popular Front circles to the effect that Saleh Jabr has opposed the agreements because they were too hard on the companies. At the same time his relations with Nuri Pasha have taken a sharp turn for the worse. The mixture of irony and impatience with which he was treated by the Prime Minister must have gravely wounded his dignity, and I do not think that he will easily forget it.

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ANTHONY EDEN.

SAUDI POLICY TOWARDS THE HASHEMITES

Mr. Riches to Mr. Ross, Eastern Department. (Received 30th July)

(No. 1942/5/52. Secret) *Jedda, 23rd July, 1952.*

In your letter ES 1942/4 of 14th July you asked for my views on whether the Amir Saud is likely to inherit any or all of his father's animosity against the Hashemites.

2. In paragraphs 5 and 6 of his letter 1942/2/52 of 6th April to Bowker the ambassador expressed the view that the Amir Saud was likely to be guided by the same star of self-interest that his father's policy had always followed; and that the frontier question had ceased to be a personal dispute and become a matter of national prestige. I think that Saudi policy towards the Hashemites may be described in similar terms, and I do not therefore expect the Amir Saud to introduce any personal change in that policy when he ascends the throne.

3. I think it fair to say that even Ibn Saud has never allowed his natural belligerency and personal dislike of the Hashemites and their minions such as Nuri, to lead him into an inflexible policy of antagonism towards Jordan and Iraq, when his clear self-interest in having peaceful relations with his Northern neighbours has dictated otherwise and no loss of face was involved. As you know he very quickly established a *détente* with Jordan when circumstances permitted. If circumstances arise which might enable the Saudis similarly to improve their relations with Iraq, without losing face, I should expect them to seize the opportunity whether Ibn Saud or the Amir Saud were

then on the throne—with the one reservation that, under the Amir Saud, such a move would carry less authority and be less sure-footed than if Ibn Saud were behind it. The Saudis, who have a guilty conscience over the Hejaz, are well aware of the superiority of the Iraqi armed forces over theirs, and they are equally aware that Iraqi oil production and revenues may soon become as important as those of Saudi Arabia. The resultant fears and suspicions, exacerbated by the ingrained Saudi-Hashemite distrust are, to my mind, the factors which will continue to determine Saudi policy towards Iraq, rather than any personal animosity the Amir Saud may inherit from his father. The story of Hashemite perfidy and irredentism will doubtless live on in Riyadh for many generations; but, in any case, new personalities and fading memories (and such previously important factors as the settlement of the frontier tribes) on the Saudi side, are not, of themselves, likely to produce any immediate change in Saudi-Hashemite relations. If of course when the Regent and Nuri leave the Iraqi scene, Iraqi policy were to become more flexible *vis-à-vis* the other Arab States a rapprochement between the two countries might be easier to achieve as part of a general strengthening of Arab co-operation as a whole.

I am sending copies of this letter to Rapp, Hay, and Beeley.

D. M. H. RICHES.

VISIT OF KING FEISAL AND THE REGENT OF IRAQ TO ENGLAND

Mr. Eden to Sir J. Troutbeck (Bagdad)

(No. 192. Confidential) *Foreign Office, 6th October, 1952.*

As your Excellency will have seen from my telegram No. 738 of the 1st October, King Feisal and the Regent of Iraq are not expected to leave this country for Iraq until about the 10th October. Meanwhile you may be interested to have some impressions of their official visit, which ended on the

30th September and the programme⁽¹⁾ of which is enclosed.

2. The Regent did not arrive with the King as had been originally planned. This had the advantage that the reception at Southampton was very properly devoted to the King alone. His Majesty's landing attracted less publicity than might have been expected, being overshadowed by the

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

coincidental arrival of Mr. Charles Chaplin. The luncheon party on the same day was held for the purpose of the welcome of Her Majesty's Ministers, and among the guests were included all Ministers of Cabinet rank who could attend.

3. The Minister of State acted as host at Covent Garden on the evening of the 23rd September and the Royal Party was composed only of the King, the Regent and two Aides de Camp. It was a pleasantly informal occasion: the King apparently found the ballet and décor quite to his taste and seemed very interested to meet the two principals of the ballet and to be shown round behind the scenes afterwards.

4. I am informed that the Royal visitors' stay at Balmoral was a success in spite of the bad weather and the fact that they had failed to bring with them any clothes suitable for out-door life in Scotland. They appear to have been very pleased with their short stay as guests of Her Majesty The Queen, and more particularly with the happy and informal family atmosphere. Her Majesty presented King Feisal with the insignia of a Knight Grand Cross of the Victorian Order and gave the Regent a silver-framed photograph of Herself and His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh.

5. The Royal visitors appear to have spent a large part of their time in the United States sightseeing at hydro-electric and irrigation projects and to have submitted to a number of prolonged and highly-technical lectures by their conductors. They were, therefore, perhaps understandably, more interested in the salmon ladder than in any other aspect of the Tummel-Garry Hydro-electric Scheme at Pitlochry.

6. The visit to Stirling Castle may have been in some respects the most successful item of the tour. The Royal Party were much impressed by the young officers of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders with whom they lunched, and they were given an enthusiastic welcome by the Saturday crowds of Stirling. At Edinburgh a full-scale official welcome was arranged: a

Royal Salute was fired on the Party's arrival and the castle was floodlit in honour of their visit. The dinner in the castle at which the Earl of Home, Minister of State for Scotland presided and the Lord Provost was present, was attended by the customary Highland ceremony. It is of interest that the Station Master at Waverley station laid down the green carpet and wore his top hat for what, in view of recent regulations introduced on the railways, may be the last time.

7. On Monday the 29th of September the Regent, who had caught a cold at Balmoral did not join the King in visiting the Royal Air Force station at Odiham. Although there was too much cloud for an aerobatic display, the King was shown some impressive manoeuvring by two squadrons of Meteors. The Secretary of State for Air was the host on this occasion.

8. At the dinner on the same day I delivered to the King a small gift presented by Her Majesty's Government as a token of their regard and with their good wishes on the occasion of his departure from the United Kingdom. It is a silver rose bowl of modern design as approved by the Arts Council under a scheme instituted last year. It is a worthy example of contemporary British craftsmanship and I hope that it will be to the King's taste.

9. In general, every effort was made to avoid giving the Royal visitors too full a programme as may, I understand, have been the case in the United States. It is intended that appropriate honours should be accorded to the King and Regent on their departure after the Regent's private visit to Spain. In conclusion I think it may fairly be said that everything possible has been done to ensure that King Feisal will carry with him a pleasant impression of his conclusion to the years he has spent in this country.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's representatives at Washington and Amman.

I am, &c.

A. D. M. ROSS.

ATTACKS ON GREAT BRITAIN IN THE IRAQI PRESS

Sir J. Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received 5th November)

(No. 144. Confidential) Bagdad,
Sir, 31st October, 1952.

During the past three or four weeks the attacks on Great Britain in the Iraqi press have increased in intensity. Criticisms of the Iraq Government's conduct of affairs, and allegations of corruption and nepotism in high places have also increased during this period. For the first time the Regent has been criticised in the press. I decided to express my anxiety at this state of affairs to the Iraq Government and I accordingly sought an interview with the Prime Minister. The meeting took place on 26th October. Other subjects besides the press were discussed, and the meeting lasted for 3½ hours.

2. I began by telling the Prime Minister, who during this part of the conversation had the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in attendance, that since my arrival in Iraq I had become accustomed to attacks on my country which appeared almost every day in the Iraqi press. It seemed that the situation now was worse than ever before and I thought it would be hard to believe from the press that Iraq was an ally and friend of Great Britain. I could think of no country other than Russia in which the press attacks on Great Britain were so sustained and so violent. After reading out a few choice extracts and handing him a large bundle for later perusal, I went on to say that the Iraq Government could not escape responsibility for this state of affairs, especially as I had now heard that they proposed to take action against the English-language *Iraq Times* for publishing a letter pointing out that Iraq had benefited from British imperialism. (I am reporting this incident in a separate letter, in which it appears that any action which might have been taken against the *Iraq Times* would have been based, outwardly at least, on other grounds.) I hoped his Excellency would realise that the hostile tone of the Iraqi press was bound to have its effect on the people who read it and nothing else. Also it made my task more difficult. If, for instance, I were passing on to London a request for help, the willingness of Her Majesty's Government to meet the Iraqi request could hardly fail to be conditioned by what I had reported about the attitude of the Iraqi press. I hoped that his Excel-

lency would do all he could to improve the present situation.

3. The Prime Minister showed little disposition to accept my complaint. He said that if I had been in Iraq during the past thirty years I would have found little change in the tone of the Iraqi press. It had always been hostile to Britain and the reason was solely the policy and shortcomings of successive British Governments. And so the argument continued for a good hour and a half, but at the end of it his Excellency did agree to urge those editors over whom the Government had influence to improve the tone of their papers. So I may possibly have made some impression.

4. Whatever practical effect it may produce, I think the conversation was useful in two respects. In the first place it evidently came as a surprise to the Prime Minister and the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that we take this continuous vituperation in the Iraqi press seriously. They seem to regard it much in the same way as a school-boy regards cheeking his form-master, a kind of natural occupation which it would be curmudgeonly of the master to resent. Secondly, it was instructive to me to get an insight into the depth of feeling among some at any rate of the Iraqis against Western and Christian influence. In the ordinary way the Iraqi, even when he harbours such feelings (and I do not believe that they all do, at any rate to the same degree), is too naturally polite to express them. The Prime Minister on this occasion for once opened up. Without ever being discourteous, though speaking at times with vigour, he took me back to the initial liberation from the Turks and spoke almost with nostalgia of the old days when a good Moslem ruled in Bagdad and "we were all equal." He did indeed give us some slight credit for having given the Arabs their independence, but the whole burden of his lengthy disquisition was upon our shortcomings—the promises we had made and broken, the carving up of a single Arab area into separate spheres of European influence, the misgovernment which had led to the glorious insurrection of 1920, the subsequent imposition upon Iraq of a treaty which every Iraqi nationalist had opposed from the first, and above all, our iniquitous policy in Palestine, for the results of which

we far more than the Americans were responsible.

5. I tried to persuade him that there was another side to all this, e.g., that, when all was said and done, we had delivered Iraq from Turkish rule and given her her independence, provided a long succession of honest and able administrators for the country, built the railway system and handed it over practically free of charge, and created the oil industry upon which the financing of further development depended. He accepted all this but seemed to dismiss it as unimportant in comparison with the wrongs we had done. I came away therefore impressed by the seemingly unbridgeable gulf between ourselves and our Western outlook and the bitter, suspicious resentment that this half Arab, half Kurdish Prime Minister, despite his outward friendliness, appears to harbour against our presence and our influence in a Moslem land.

6. How far he represents general opinion in Iraq it is difficult to say. My guess is that he was probably voicing not inaccurately the views of a large proportion of the educated and semi-educated in Bagdad and Mosul. Certainly that is all they ever hear from the press, and Mustafa al-Umari may himself have been unconsciously affected by it. On the other side of the picture there is the instinctive turning to us for help and advice whenever difficulties arise. There is also the universally friendly welcome that any Englishman receives when he travels about the country. Any memento of one of Her Majesty's past ambassadors is a safely guarded treasure. But the Prime Minister in his mood that day does, I believe, represent an underlying resentment, present in this as in other Moslem countries, against the white man and the Christian who has during the past century humiliated them by emphasising his superiority in every sphere. This, though often kept invisible below the surface could easily be fanned into a fanatical movement of hatred and destruction. It has happened here before and more than once. The destruction wrought in the British war cemetery in Bagdad in 1941 has not yet been fully repaired.

7. The Iraqi, it seems to me, or at any rate the townsman, will never forget a grievance. Being one of the laziest of mortals and having no family life, he will sit in his cafe for hours on end surrounded by his cronies, brooding over his grievances and talking interminable politics. By a

mixture of tact and firmness one may keep him sane and good-humoured for a time, and a joke may turn his thoughts at a difficult moment. But there is a side to his nature which is embittered, frustrated and fanatical. Seeing little but squalor and stagnation all round him, he will not admit even to himself the obvious answer, that he belongs to a peculiarly irresponsible and feckless race. On the contrary, he blames his frustration upon everyone but himself, and above all upon the British, feeling only envy or resentment for the few oases of civilisation which we have created in his midst. His worst instincts urge him to wipe out these blots on the desert landscape and to drive out those who perpetrated them. That, I believe, is half the meaning of the cry for independence. It is not for freedom to create, it is for freedom to destroy every vestige of an alien civilisation.

8. As I see it, our major task here is to prevent these evil instincts from rising to the surface and threatening our whole position. At times they have certainly done so, as we have seen in the murderous outbreaks of 1920, 1941 and 1948. If one was to be guided only by the press, one would conclude that another such wave of frenzy was about to descend upon us now. But Arabs enjoy heroics and cannot be taken entirely seriously either in what they say or in what they write. It may be therefore that the present wave of excitement will die down, as has happened before, when the elections are over and a new Government comes into power. At the moment the Bagdadi lawyers and coffee-house politicians seem to regard it as almost a matter of honour to have a *coup d'Etat*. It has happened in Egypt and Syria, and even in the despised Lebanon. The Bagdadis are hanging their heads in shame; they have not yet even murdered a Prime Minister.

9. But even though order is preserved and calamity avoided, I think we should be unwise to expect any easy time ahead. The resentment of which I have spoken is ever present and is likely to become more and more evident unless and until the Iraqi can be brought to believe that we are not, as they suspect, a power in decline.

10. If an emergency were to arise, I doubt if the Regent or the present Prime Minister would be of much help in dealing with it, even though the latter's past depredations must have left him with a good deal to lose. The strongest bulwarks are the army, the police and perhaps the local officials. It is for that reason that I

have been pleading so earnestly for support for the army. And for the same reason my staff and I do our best to cultivate army officers, police officials and the Mutassarifs and Qaimaqams in the provinces. Meanwhile we continue to keep in close touch with all sections of Bagdad society that are open to us, and there has been no sign whatever of any social boycott. Outwardly they seem as friendly as ever. But the situation is less easy than at any time since I arrived here eighteen months ago, and it is a good thing that the Regent has at last returned from his prolonged stay abroad. The next few weeks should show whether things are going to calm down or to get out of control. Personally I have considerable

confidence in Nuri Pasha, who, though increasingly unpopular, seems to be more feared and respected than ever before. The deterioration since his resignation has been most marked, despite the fact that the present Government is composed of more or less presentable people as compared with the criminal types with which Nuri surrounded himself.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Washington, and the head of the British Middle East Office at Fayid.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

EQ 1016/39

No. 7

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAQ

Sir J. Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received 5th November)

(No. 145. Confidential) *Bagdad, 31st October, 1952.*
Sir,

The political situation in Iraq has developed rapidly during the last few days.

2. On Sunday, 26th October, His Royal Highness the Regent returned to Bagdad after more than three months' absence. The same evening the Cabinet discussed the internal situation with him. On the following day a Royal Iradah was issued dissolving Parliament (see my telegram No. 673 of 29th October). Under the terms of the Constitution, the new Parliament must assemble within four months of the dissolution of the old Parliament. In this case, therefore, a new Parliament must be in being by the end of February. In fact, an effort will no doubt be made to assemble it before the end of January, since a session beginning after that date would not qualify as one of the new Parliament's four ordinary sessions. Elections may take place any time within the permitted period, but the whole electoral process, under an amendment to the Electoral Law which was passed at one of the last sessions of the late Parliament, must not take longer than sixty-eight days, (see Bagdad despatch No. 87 of 3rd July).

3. On Tuesday, 28th October, the United Popular Front and the Istiqlal and National Democratic parties, as they had frequently promised during the previous month, submitted petitions to the Regent. I enclose summaries of the three petitions. As you

will see, the United Popular Front's memorandum was in imprecise terms, and called for unspecified amendments to the Constitution and the Electoral Law. I understand that Taha al-Hashimi, the leading member of the Front, has been offered a safe seat in the next Parliament, and this may be the reason for the mild nature of the Front's memorandum. The petitions of the Istiqlal and National Democratic parties, on the other hand, were far from vague. They have many similarities; both, for instance, call for the limitation of the authority of the Head of the State and, in particular, the abolition of his power to dismiss Cabinets, the amendment of the Electoral Law to provide for direct elections, the establishment of a State Council to safeguard the rights of the people, freedom to form trade unions, the rooting out of corruption, the limitation of the size of agricultural holdings, the abolition of tribal law and the rejection of all schemes of joint defence. The parties' attitudes to the 1930 Treaty differed only in the manner in which they were expressed. While the Istiqlal Party demanded that steps be taken to abrogate the Treaty, the National Democratic Party called for the eviction of all foreign forces and freedom from the Treaty.

4. On the same day, Saleh Jabr stated in a letter to the Prime Minister that the Popular Socialist Party would boycott the elections unless they were conducted on the one stage system.

5. The Head of the Royal Diwan, on behalf of the Regent, published a reply on 29th October to the three parties which had submitted memoranda. I enclose a full translation of this document. In effect, the reply states that His Royal Highness agrees that certain reforms are necessary, but he believes that they should be effected in the proper constitutional way, and that it will, therefore, be for the new Parliament to undertake the appropriate measures. He adds that, since some of the leaders of the parties which submitted the petitions have been in power in the past, they must share responsibility for the conditions of which they complained. The Regent also points out that no community is without corrupt elements. In every State there are good people and bad people. In Iraq the administration is staffed from the former.

6. The manoeuvre of dissolving the existing Parliament before the party petitions were received by the Regent, and of replying that, while His Royal Highness had no desire to stand in the way of constitutional reform, this could be brought about only by the Parliament, has delighted all those of moderate views, and must have thrown the three parties concerned into confusion. Its neatness and strength might seem to suggest the hand of Nuri, but I am assured that its author is the present Prime Minister, Mustafa al Umari. The reaction of the National Democratic Party has been to declare rather angrily that, come what may, they will boycott the elections. The Istiqlal Party hurried to point out that since no member of the party has ever been in power except the leader, Mohammed Mahdi Kubba, who was a member of the Cabinet formed after the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty, the Regent's remarks about the apportionment of responsibility for existing conditions cannot be applied to them.

7. This firm handling of the situation by the Regent and the Government has undoubtedly eased tension in Bagdad and has removed the immediate threat of disorders. There may be further decrease in tension following the King's arrival yesterday. His progress from the airport to the Royal Bilat was the occasion for outbursts of tumultuous enthusiasm. But nothing has yet been done to solve the difficult problem of Saleh Jabr's relations with Nuri, and with the present Cabinet, which remain uneasy.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris and Ankara, and

to the Head of the British Middle East Office at Fayid.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7

Summary of the National Democratic Party's Memorandum presented to the Regent on 28th October, 1952

After describing the appalling conditions which exist in Iraq to-day, the memorandum says that the following demands must be fulfilled if the situation is to be remedied:—

1. The amendment of the Constitution in order to safeguard the sovereignty of the people, in particular the additions to the Constitution made in 1943 which gave the Head of State increased powers, such as the right to dismiss the Cabinet, should be amended. The Head of State and every other person in authority should be debarred from any financial or economic undertaking which might lead to an abuse of authority.

2. The amendment of the Electoral Law and the adoption of the principle of direct elections.

3. The conduct of the forthcoming elections on the basis of the official census. No citizen should be debarred from entering Parliament. The elections should be carried out by a Ministry which enjoys the confidence of the public.

4. To abolish reactionary laws.

5. To enact uniform laws to apply to all districts, towns and villages and the inhabitants thereof.

6. Independence of the Judicature.

7. The establishment of a State Council.

8. The freedom to form unions.

9. An amnesty for all political prisoners.

10. To cancel all laws which are inconsistent with democracy and to abolish the idea of amending the Penal Act.

11. Cleansing the administration of bribery and corruption and preventing exploitation and monopolies.

12. The abolition of feudalism.

13. Limitation of land holdings.

14. The distribution of Miri land to cultivators.

15. The increase of the peasants' share of agricultural produce.

16. A reduction in the burden of taxation imposed on those who are unable to pay it.

17. Progressive taxation of those in the high income group, whether they are agriculturalists or not.

18. A reduction of indirect taxes.

19. The elimination of foreign economic exploitation.

20. The nationalisation of public enterprises.

21. The termination of foreign monopolies.

22. Encouragement for the investment of Iraq capital in modern, industrial and economic schemes.

23. The prevention of the advancement of individual interests at the expense of the community.

24. The eviction of all foreign forces.

25. Liberation from the 1930 Treaty.

26. Rejection of all joint defence schemes.

27. Neutrality between the international blocks.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7

Summary of the Istiqlal Party's Memorandum presented to the Regent on 28th October, 1952

During the Regent's absence, which lasted four months, world events of great importance have taken place in neighbouring countries. Everyone in Iraq regrets that he was born on this soil since the Government of the country is based on exploitation which in turn springs from tyranny and feudalism. Illiteracy, poverty and disease are rife and justice has lost the value it has in civilised countries.

The purpose of this memorandum is not merely to complain of the evil conditions prevailing in Iraq, but to submit certain demands the fulfilment of which, the Party hopes, will save the country from its present serious plight.

While addressing the Regent direct, the Party is mindful of the fact that under the Constitution the Head of State is "not responsible" since all responsibility is vested in the Cabinet. The Constitution differentiates between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities. But the fact that the Constitution does not restrict the prerogatives of the King is a serious breach of the Constitution by the executive.

The Party does not wish it to be thought that it is demanding the Regent's interference in affairs of State. The Party is merely demanding that such interference may be ended to safeguard the Constitution.

The Government of the country should be a parliamentary Government subject to the wishes of the people. This should mean that "The King reigns but does not rule," that power is in the hands of the people and is exercised by its Deputies whom it elects freely and that the Government machinery is subject to control by Parliament.

The contrary has been the case in Iraq. Rule by Parliament is a fiction, Ministers have been chosen from a limited group of men known for their inclinations which are detrimental to the interests of the people. Outdated laws remain in force, parliamentary elections have been manipulated. The rights of the individual are bargained for in open court. Those who have reached ministerial rank have amassed wealth and acquired property. Bribery has become widespread.

The Party makes the following demands:—

1. Amendment of the Constitution to determine the rights of the people in such a way as to prevent the King, in his capacity as "not responsible" Head of State, interfering in State affairs and to establish the principle that "The King reigns but does not rule"; also to abolish the King's right to dismiss a Prime Minister, to abolish the appointment of Senators and to provide for free elections.

2. Amendment of the Electoral Law, the Municipal Administration Law and the Liwa Administration Law so as to provide for direct elections and to guarantee the proper execution of these laws by abolishing the immunity of the officials implementing them.

3. The cleaning-up of the administration and the enactment of the Illegal Profits Law, the effect of which should be retrospective.

4. Granting constitutional liberties including the right to form parties and unions and the establishment of a State Council to safeguard the rights of the people.

5. The limitation of the size of land holdings, the distribution of lands to cultivators and the imposition of a progressive tax on agricultural income until land distribution has been carried out.

6. The abolition of the Tribal Civil Criminal Disputes Regulation and "sheikhdoms" and the disarmament of the tribes.

7. Raising the standard of living by combating the high cost of living and enacting a social security law.

8. Review of the working of the Development Board.

9. The independence of the Judicature.

10. Strengthening and equipping the army and setting up arms factories.

11. To work to get rid of the oppressive 1930 Treaty, which has restricted the independence and sovereignty of Iraq; the evacuation of all foreign forces from Iraq; and refusal to take part in any kind of collective security.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7

Summary of the Memorandum submitted by the United Popular Front to H.R.H. the Regent on 28th October, 1952

The memorandum is not meant to be a complaint but rather a note setting out the Front's opinion about the present situation of the country and the demands for reform. Conditions are going from bad to worse in both domestic and foreign fields.

The Constitution must be amended. Its provisions are being violated without anyone being held responsible.

The Legislature has lost its power to supervise State affairs and its ability to carry out its duty by bringing those responsible to account.

The Electoral Law should be amended and it should be based on sound principles.

The relations between Iraq and its ally under the 1930 Treaty are unequal. The relations have deteriorated since 1st May, 1941.

Public liberties have been suppressed, laws have been violated, the standard of living has declined and the gap between ruler and ruled has been widened.

D. J. D. MAITLAND,
30th October, 1952.

Enclosure 4 in No. 7

Reply from the Head of the Royal Diwan

To: His Excellency Sayid Taha al Hashimia, President of the United Popular Front.

His Excellency Sayid Kamil al Chadirchi, President of the National Democratic Party.

His Excellency Sayid Muhammad Mahdi Kubba, President of the Independence Party.

I have submitted to His Royal Highness the Regent and Heir Presumptive to the Throne your memoranda dated 28th October, 1952, and His Royal

44330

Highness has commanded me to explain to you the following:—

His Royal Highness agrees with you that the condition of the country needs to be improved and appreciates the interest shown by you in this regard. He considers that the parties and every loyal Iraqi citizen should co-operate with those responsible to work for the advancement of the country and for the welfare and prosperity of the people, and that all views or advice offered by any party as regards the way in which the defects should be overcome is worthy of sympathetic consideration.

No country in the world is without corrupt elements. But there are also good, rightminded, wise and understanding elements, which resist the elements of evil and drive out corruption through their loyalty and integrity and by enforcing the laws and regulations of the country. To these elements His Royal Highness entrusts responsibility and he places in their hands the administration of the country, as provided for in the Constitution. They are responsible to Parliament, according to the democratic system prevailing in the country. In accordance with this principle, which is embodied in the Constitution of Iraq, Governments have been set up in Iraq since the establishment of national rule. All heads of parties and a large section of the prominent men of the country, who are of various creeds and opinions, have participated in the administration of the country and in its creation, and have borne the burdens of Government and have become acquainted with its secrets. They have known the various consequences of past events, some of which have been useful and some harmful to the country. Moreover, the happiness, prosperity and progress which Iraq has achieved is the fruit of the efforts exerted by them, both when in power and out of power and when in Parliament. If any error has been committed they share in it, each in proportion to his share of responsibility. If some of these gentlemen, or the Ministers whom they chose as colleagues, have shirked their responsibilities in the face of certain parties, on the plea that they were influenced by the Highest Quarter (i.e., the Regent), that Quarter does not know them nor the responsibility which they shirked. This is a matter which cannot be commented upon, and it should be left to those who possess wisdom and logic to gauge the weight of such allegations.

In your memoranda, you desire to carry out quick and beneficial reforms in the country. His Royal Highness shares your

17. Progressive taxation of those in the high income group, whether they are agriculturalists or not.

18. A reduction of indirect taxes.

19. The elimination of foreign economic exploitation.

20. The nationalisation of public enterprises.

21. The termination of foreign monopolies.

22. Encouragement for the investment of Iraq capital in modern, industrial and economic schemes.

23. The prevention of the advancement of individual interests at the expense of the community.

24. The eviction of all foreign forces.

25. Liberation from the 1930 Treaty.

26. Rejection of all joint defence schemes.

27. Neutrality between the international blocks.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7

Summary of the Istiqlal Party's Memorandum presented to the Regent on 28th October, 1952

During the Regent's absence, which lasted four months, world events of great importance have taken place in neighbouring countries. Everyone in Iraq regrets that he was born on this soil since the Government of the country is based on exploitation which in turn springs from tyranny and feudalism. Illiteracy, poverty and disease are rife and justice has lost the value it has in civilised countries.

The purpose of this memorandum is not merely to complain of the evil conditions prevailing in Iraq, but to submit certain demands the fulfilment of which, the Party hopes, will save the country from its present serious plight.

While addressing the Regent direct, the Party is mindful of the fact that under the Constitution the Head of State is "not responsible" since all responsibility is vested in the Cabinet. The Constitution differentiates between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities. But the fact that the Constitution does not restrict the prerogatives of the King is a serious breach of the Constitution by the executive.

The Party does not wish it to be thought that it is demanding the Regent's interference in affairs of State. The Party is merely demanding that such interference may be ended to safeguard the Constitution.

The Government of the country should be a parliamentary Government subject to the wishes of the people. This should mean that "The King reigns but does not rule," that power is in the hands of the people and is exercised by its Deputies whom it elects freely and that the Government machinery is subject to control by Parliament.

The contrary has been the case in Iraq. Rule by Parliament is a fiction, Ministers have been chosen from a limited group of men known for their inclinations which are detrimental to the interests of the people. Outdated laws remain in force, parliamentary elections have been manipulated. The rights of the individual are bargained for in open court. Those who have reached ministerial rank have amassed wealth and acquired property. Bribery has become widespread.

The Party makes the following demands:—

1. Amendment of the Constitution to determine the rights of the people in such a way as to prevent the King, in his capacity as "not responsible" Head of State, interfering in State affairs and to establish the principle that "The King reigns but does not rule"; also to abolish the King's right to dismiss a Prime Minister, to abolish the appointment of Senators and to provide for free elections.

2. Amendment of the Electoral Law, the Municipal Administration Law and the Liwa Administration Law so as to provide for direct elections and to guarantee the proper execution of these laws by abolishing the immunity of the officials implementing them.

3. The cleaning-up of the administration and the enactment of the Illegal Profits Law, the effect of which should be retrospective.

4. Granting constitutional liberties including the right to form parties and unions and the establishment of a State Council to safeguard the rights of the people.

5. The limitation of the size of land holdings, the distribution of lands to cultivators and the imposition of a progressive tax on agricultural income until land distribution has been carried out.

6. The abolition of the Tribal Civil Criminal Disputes Regulation and "sheikhdoms" and the disarmament of the tribes.

7. Raising the standard of living by combating the high cost of living and enacting a social security law.

8. Review of the working of the Development Board.

9. The independence of the Judicature.

10. Strengthening and equipping the army and setting up arms factories.

11. To work to get rid of the oppressive 1930 Treaty, which has restricted the independence and sovereignty of Iraq; the evacuation of all foreign forces from Iraq; and refusal to take part in any kind of collective security.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7

Summary of the Memorandum submitted by the United Popular Front to H.R.H. the Regent on 28th October, 1952

The memorandum is not meant to be a complaint but rather a note setting out the Front's opinion about the present situation of the country and the demands for reform. Conditions are going from bad to worse in both domestic and foreign fields.

The Constitution must be amended. Its provisions are being violated without anyone being held responsible.

The Legislature has lost its power to supervise State affairs and its ability to carry out its duty by bringing those responsible to account.

The Electoral Law should be amended and it should be based on sound principles.

The relations between Iraq and its ally under the 1930 Treaty are unequal. The relations have deteriorated since 1st May, 1941.

Public liberties have been suppressed, laws have been violated, the standard of living has declined and the gap between ruler and ruled has been widened.

D. J. D. MAITLAND,

30th October, 1952.

Enclosure 4 in No. 7

Reply from the Head of the Royal Diwan

To: His Excellency Sayid Taha al Hashimia, President of the United Popular Front.

His Excellency Sayid Kamil al Chadirchi, President of the National Democratic Party.

His Excellency Sayid Muhammad Mahdi Kubba, President of the Independence Party.

I have submitted to His Royal Highness the Regent and Heir Presumptive to the Throne your memoranda dated 28th October, 1952, and His Royal

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Highness has commanded me to explain to you the following:—

His Royal Highness agrees with you that the condition of the country needs to be improved and appreciates the interest shown by you in this regard. He considers that the parties and every loyal Iraqi citizen should co-operate with those responsible to work for the advancement of the country and for the welfare and prosperity of the people, and that all views or advice offered by any party as regards the way in which the defects should be overcome is worthy of sympathetic consideration.

No country in the world is without corrupt elements. But there are also good, rightminded, wise and understanding elements, which resist the elements of evil and drive out corruption through their loyalty and integrity and by enforcing the laws and regulations of the country. To these elements His Royal Highness entrusts responsibility and he places in their hands the administration of the country, as provided for in the Constitution. They are responsible to Parliament, according to the democratic system prevailing in the country. In accordance with this principle, which is embodied in the Constitution of Iraq, Governments have been set up in Iraq since the establishment of national rule. All heads of parties and a large section of the prominent men of the country, who are of various creeds and opinions, have participated in the administration of the country and in its creation, and have borne the burdens of Government and have become acquainted with its secrets. They have known the various consequences of past events, some of which have been useful and some harmful to the country. Moreover, the happiness, prosperity and progress which Iraq has achieved is the fruit of the efforts exerted by them, both when in power and out of power and when in Parliament. If any error has been committed they share in it, each in proportion to his share of responsibility. If some of these gentlemen, or the Ministers whom they chose as colleagues, have shirked their responsibilities in the face of certain parties, on the plea that they were influenced by the Highest Quarter (i.e., the Regent), that Quarter does not know them nor the responsibility which they shirked. This is a matter which cannot be commented upon, and it should be left to those who possess wisdom and logic to gauge the weight of such allegations.

In your memoranda, you desire to carry out quick and beneficial reforms in the country. His Royal Highness shares your

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views and believes that every individual in Iraq desires reform, advancement, progress and prosperity for the country. His Royal Highness shares the joys and sorrows of the people. You have asked for the amendment of the Constitution, the Electoral Law and other laws, and for the promulgation of legislation of use to the country. His Highness declares that it is his keen desire to have free elections carried out in the country without any elector being subjected to pressure. He wishes the Chamber of Deputies to be composed of true representatives of the people. He wishes a Government responsible to the Chamber to be formed, which would be in a position to submit to the Chamber, by constitutional methods, useful legislation according to the needs of the country, whether it be the same as that mentioned in your memoranda or not. His Royal Highness declares that wise and experienced statesmen of the country have participated in the enactment and amendment of the Constitution which is now in force. The Constitution has been approved by the legislative assemblies, and if it is in the interests of the country that more amendments be made to the Constitution, the Highest Quarter will not stand in the way, since such action is within the competence of the Government and the representatives of the people, according to the provisions of the Constitution itself, which everyone respects. Similarly, the question of amending the Electoral Law,

whether on the basis of direct or indirect elections, is not within the competence of the Highest Quarter, since it is up to Parliament to consider such matters and to choose the best electoral procedure for the country.

This is a summary of the observations of His Royal Highness on the contents of your memoranda. I wish to remind you that His Royal Highness consulted the heads of the political parties about the kind of Cabinet which should be formed to conduct the elections, whether it be a non-party cabinet or a coalition. His Royal Highness understood from the majority of them that they favoured the formation of a neutral cabinet. When asked about the neutral person or persons who should form the cabinet, they left it to His Royal Highness to decide, as he had more knowledge than they had. This is a proof that His Royal Highness had not hesitated to consult the heads of political parties or other statesmen on important matters, although such matters were within his constitutional competence. In line with the policy which His Royal Highness has pursued of consulting heads of political parties and other leading statesmen of the country, His Royal Highness will consult them in connexion with the important questions dealt with in these memoranda.

Please accept my profound respects.

AHMAD MUKHTAR BABAN.

Rais of the Royal Diwan.

EQ 1016/78

No. 8

DISTURBANCES IN BAGDAD

Events of 22nd-24th November, 1952

Sir J. Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received 3rd December)

(No. 156. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
Sir, *28th November, 1952.*

In my recent despatches I have described the political events in Iraq since the Regent returned from abroad on 26th October. These events culminated in serious disturbances in Bagdad last week-end. I have reported major developments by telegram and I now have the honour to submit a more detailed account of them.

2. It was clear by the middle of last week that the fate of Mustafa al-Umari's Government was in the balance. They had gone some way towards meeting the demand of the four Opposition parties for direct elections by announcing that they

had decided to set up a committee to draft an amendment to the electoral law which would enshrine this principle and which would be laid before the next Parliament. But the four Opposition parties had reaffirmed their determination to boycott the elections and had all called on their followers to prevent them from being held. It was feared that as soon as the Government announced the date on which the elections were to begin, the Opposition might try to bring them down by an appeal to the street. The Government's position had been undermined by the fact, which was public knowledge, that the Regent, who for at least two weeks had doubted

Mustafa al-Umari's steadfastness, had invited Hikmet Sulaiman behind the Prime Minister's back to form a Government. Hikmet declined, but the damage to the Government's morale was serious.

3. On the morning of Saturday, 22nd November, the Cabinet met to decide when to announce the date on which the electoral campaign would be launched. At about the same time the demonstrations began. Some weeks previously the students of the College of Pharmacy and Chemistry had struck in protest against certain provisions of the college regulations. The regulations were amended and students returned to the college. On 18th November a fight occurred amongst the students instigated, it was believed, by relations of the dean. The students struck again on 19th November, and on the 22nd, when the Cabinet was meeting, the students of all the colleges came out on strike in sympathy. Whether or not the strike itself was inspired by the Partisans of Peace and other extreme Left-wing groups, it was certainly these elements and the Communists who took control of the students once they were on the streets. Soon they were shouting the familiar peace slogans, and also calling for the resignation of the Government and for direct elections. The demonstrators, many of whom were boys in their teens, were armed for the most part with staves and brick-bats, although some carried daggers and revolvers. The police were unarmed, and remained so throughout the disturbances on the orders of the Government. Clashes occurred in various parts of the city, in some of which demonstrators fired on the police. The police used tear gas. At least one demonstrator was killed and thirty police were injured, some gravely.

4. At about 3 p.m. on Saturday, Mustafa al-Umari submitted his Cabinet's resignation to the Regent. This was announced on Bagdad radio at 6 p.m. Minor demonstrations continued throughout the afternoon, but by nightfall Bagdad was quiet. In the rising tension of the previous weeks four of the Sunni ex-Premiers—Jamil Madfai, Ali Jaudat, Tawfiq Suwaidi and Nuri Pasha—had closed their ranks in support of Mustafa al-Umari; and it was one of these, Jamil Madfai, to whom the Regent now turned. At the end of the day it seemed likely that he would succeed in forming a Government.

5. On the morning of Sunday the 23rd there were further demonstrations; this

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time members of the four Opposition parties took part. It is not yet known whether these individuals turned out on the instructions of their party leaders, but I think this likely in the case of the Istiqlal and the National Democratic Parties at least. The demonstrations were thus on a larger scale than on the previous day and it was soon evident that they seriously threatened the safety of the capital. By noon the offices of the United States Information Service in the main street of the city had been broken open and the contents were being burnt on the street outside. At 1 p.m. the mob were in control of all of Rashid Street from North Gate to King Feisal Square and of the approaches to the two main bridges across the Tigris. At this time I sent an oral message to Mustafa al-Umari, who was still at the Prime Minister's office, to the effect that I was disturbed by the situation and trusted that the Iraqi authorities would take all necessary measures to protect foreign lives and property. This message reached him within ten minutes and he replied that he would take all possible steps. At about this time the Mutasarrif of Bagdad in accordance with his legal powers and presumably after consultation with the Government, appealed to the army for assistance. Troops began to enter the city from the north during the afternoon, and gradually pushed their way through to the South Gate.

6. Disturbances continued throughout the afternoon in the course of which demonstrators were joined by workers from the factories at Khadhimain who happened to have a half-holiday. Groups of demonstrators marched through Rashid Street setting fire to the offices of the *Iraq Times* and damaging furniture and equipment in the offices of the B.O.A.C. which are situated nearby. Then, having reached South Gate, they turned into Ghazi Street and assaulted the police station at Bab al-Sheikh. This they managed to set on fire and at least four of the policemen inside were killed. The mob seized two of the bodies and, after mutilating them, dragged them back through the streets to South Gate where they burned them. Late in the afternoon I sent a further message to the Prime Minister in which I expressed my concern that, despite my first message, damage had been done to British property. I added that I must hold the Iraq Government responsible for this. Mustafa al-Umari replied that he had done all he could and could not be held responsible for such

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damage as had occurred. In any case he had resigned and was going home.

7. Meanwhile Jamil Madfai's attempt to form a Government had failed. Nuri offered to try his hand, but the Regent now decided to appoint a soldier to restore order. At 6 p.m. the Chief of the General Staff, General Nuruddin Mahmud, announced on Bagdad radio that the Regent had charged him with the formation of a Government and that he had assumed responsibility for law and order. Large bodies of demonstrators continued to roam the streets. One of them 600 strong passed by the gates of this embassy and subsequently broke a few of the display cases in the front of the Information Department offices. A detachment of the Royal bodyguard arrived soon afterwards to reinforce the police guard at the embassy. At 10 p.m. martial law was proclaimed in Bagdad liwa. The Director of Military Operations, Brigadier Abdul Muttalib Amin (who was until recently the Iraqi Military Attaché in Damascus) was appointed Military Governor of Bagdad.

8. General Nuruddin quickly formed a Government including two of Mustafa al-Umari's Ministers, and their first Cabinet meeting was held at the Palace that night. Nuri Pasha was also present in the later stages of this meeting. Immediate measures to restore order were discussed and guidance was given to the police as to the persons to be arrested. The first arrests were made in the small hours of Monday morning, 24th November. Later the Military Governor dissolved all five political parties throughout the country and closed down seventeen Bagdad newspapers including all the party organs.

9. During Monday forenoon "funeral" processions (in fact only one demonstrator had been killed) paraded through the streets accompanied by cries of "Down with Nuruddin Mahmud" and "We want a popular Government under Kamil Chaderchi," who is the leader of the National Democratic Party. On at least two occasions the army had to fire over the heads of these crowds. Arrests continued throughout the day. Among those detained (nearly 300 so far) are Faiq Samarrai and two other leading members of the Istiqlal Party, Kamil Chaderchi and two other leaders of the National Democratic Party, four members of the United Popular Front, Abdul Wahab Mahmud, the president of the Lawyers' Association and Mohammed Mahdi al Jawahiri, both of whom are

leaders of the Peace Partisans. Three members of the Central Committee of Saleh Jabr's party are also detained. Sporadic firing continued until 6.30 p.m. on Monday, but since then Bagdad has been quiet, though armoured cars are still stationed at key points and sections of infantry patrol the streets. A night curfew has been in force since 24th November and all schools and colleges in the capital have been closed till further notice.

10. During the three days' disturbances five policemen were killed and more than 300 admitted to hospital. Casualties among the demonstrators were probably not large, and only one is known to have been killed. Damage to property was in the circumstances surprisingly slight.

11. On 24th November the police had to disperse a crowd which tried to attack the British Institute at Basra. Disturbances were also reported from Kut, Amara Hillah, Kerbela and Nejef on 25th November. In all these places order was easily restored, but there was loss of life at Nejef. No incidents have been reported from the northern provinces. It is possible that there would have been more serious trouble in the provinces if this embassy had not learned, on the morning of the 25th, that Saleh Jabr was instructing his followers to organise peaceful demonstrations in every liwa. This information was at once conveyed to the Prime Minister who sent for Saleh Jabr that afternoon and persuaded him to rescind his instructions.

12. Late on the night of 24th November, General Nuruddin Mahmud's Government issued a communiqué setting out their programme. In this document (a translation of which I enclose) the Government, while offering some concessions to popular demands, stress their determination to maintain law and order and to bring those responsible for the riots to justice. The most important of the eight points which the Government made, are first, their decision to set up a committee to amend the electoral law on the basis of the principle of direct elections, so that the forthcoming elections (which they will conduct) can be held in accordance with that principle; secondly their promise to take steps to ease the burden of taxation and, finally, their undertaking to root out corrupt elements.

13. In the past few days decrees have been issued implementing many of the Government's promises. I will report more fully on these measures in a later despatch;

they provide, among other things, for the abolition of the *istihlak* and land taxes on fruit and vegetables, the reduction of customs duty on a wide range of essential commodities, the setting up of a military court, the investigation of the cases of those persons who have been detained and a review of the staff of the Ministry of Finance (notoriously the most corrupt of the Government departments) with a view to retiring old, inefficient or redundant officials. Further decrees are still being broadcast.

14. Although the character of these disturbances was in some respects unforeseen, the possibility of mob violence in Bagdad had been apprehended for some time. Discontent, never far below the surface had undoubtedly been gathering over recent months. Ambitious politicians felt increasingly that Nuri Pasha and his associates had had all too long a period in power, and that he had stacked the cards all too skilfully for the coming elections. The influence of the throne was weakened by the Regent's prolonged absence abroad. And the recent changes of régime in Egypt and Lebanon undoubtedly encouraged the Opposition parties to contemplate unconstitutional action.

15. There are many who say to-day that the trouble might have been avoided if Mustafa al-Umari had carried out the elections as soon as he came into office in July. Instead, he decided to await the cooler weather and the Regent's return. Unfortunately, the Regent at that point showed a strange lack of awareness and prolonged his absence from the country until the end of October. By the time he got back, the tension was already high. All four Opposition parties were clamouring for a change in the electoral system, arguing, not entirely without justification, that the caretaker Government was nothing less than a tool of Nuri Pasha and that the existing electoral system, amended as it had been by Nuri a few months before was a perfect instrument for Government manipulation. They therefore threatened not merely to boycott the elections, but also to use all possible means to prevent their taking place.

16. An ugly situation was thus threatened, and it cannot be said that any of those in a position of responsibility played an impressive part. The Regent himself, who might have averted the whole trouble if he had returned earlier, did not see that

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his acceptance of the Prime Minister's policy of refusing concessions involved as a logical consequence that he should make it clear that the Government had his whole-hearted support. His approaches to Hikmet Suleiman, who was known to be in favour of conceding direct elections immediately, weakened both the Government's prestige and its internal cohesion. Mustafa al-Umari's position was further undermined by the timorous character of some of his colleagues, and most notably of the Minister of Justice and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jamel Baban. In judging the Prime Minister's reaction to the crisis it must therefore be admitted that he was heavily handicapped from the start. Nevertheless, it must be said that he should have been sufficiently aware of the precariousness of his position to resign before the trouble started; and further that, having failed to resign at the right time he should not have resigned at the worst possible moment. As I have reported above, the demonstrations on Saturday were not the anticipated effort of the political parties to prevent the holding of elections, but a surprise move by the Communists, who were given an opportunity of exploiting the situation by the strike of college students. Mustafa al-Umari's ignominious abdication in the face of Saturday's demonstration thus gave the impression that the Communists and fellow-travellers were strong enough to overturn Governments.

17. One of the great disappointments was the part played by Saleh Jabr, both in the period leading up to the crisis and during it. Previously he had always been an upholder of law and order, and it was reasonable to hope that he would maintain a sense of responsibility. But he allowed himself to become more and more the tool of his most irresponsible supporters who succeeded in making him at once the figurehead of a fanatical Shia movement and the channel through which the unrest in Bagdad might have spread to all parts of Iraq.

18. Needless to say, this was not lost on Nuri Pasha who, being determined so far as one can see to destroy Saleh Jabr's position for largely personal reasons, took advantage of the occasion to rally round himself the old Sunni political leaders. Neither Nuri nor Saleh seemed to have any conception of the harm they were doing to the country by pursuing their vendetta.

19. The events of 22nd-24th November have illustrated the ease with which less

than 1 per cent. of the population of Bagdad can create an acute crisis of government in Iraq. Estimates of the number of demonstrators on the streets at its maximum are of course varying, but it seems certain that the total did not exceed 5,000 and it may have been as little as 2000. The absence of looting or so far as could be seen, of spontaneous anti-foreign feeling, suggests that the crowds were fairly well controlled by their political leaders throughout. What was unexpected was that on the first day these leaders were exclusively Communists and fellow-travellers, who were thus shown to have more initiative and power of organisation than had been generally supposed. But the small number of demonstrators who came out into the streets even at the height of the crisis suggests also that Nuri Pasha had not been far away in his belief that the whole agitation that led up to these events was a monstrous bluff which could easily have been called by a determined Government. It is noteworthy that none of the factory workers came out on strike at any time during the demonstrations.

20. As a result of these events, Iraq is governed to-day by a soldier with no political experience and, perhaps luckily, with no political ambition, whose colleagues are for the most part untried men. Nevertheless, their first actions suggest a wise and well-balanced approach to their problems. They appear to have decided to deal in the most conciliatory way possible with the rank and file of the Opposition and to concede a number of popular demands, while at the same time, striking firmly both at the leaders of the extremist political parties and at the Communist and fellow-travelling organisers of the demonstrations. Hence on the one hand the large number of arrests, extending even into the leadership of Saleh Jabr's party, and on the other hand the orders not to fire on the crowds, the concession (at least in principle) of direct elections, the measures to reduce the cost of living and (no doubt in an attempt to satisfy the students who began the trouble) the abolition of fees for higher education.

21. The staff of the United States Embassy shows some sign of being more than usually affected by recent happenings, and particularly by the destruction of its Information Office. I am a little afraid lest its reports may lead the United States Government to write off Iraq as a possible factor in Middle Eastern defence and

stability. I see myself no reason for so gloomy a conclusion. We have known for years the difficulty of getting sense out of any Arab country. We have seen political crises in Iraq many times before. She will of course never be a very reliable factor but, when the elections have been held and a more permanent Government comes into power, we may hope that she will be able to settle down again and at any rate remain something of a bastion against the inroads of communism. Indeed, this latest crisis may even prove a blessing in disguise in that it has brought into the open the opponents of stability and shown what feckless irresponsibility can lead to. The Regent himself has seemed calm and determined on the two occasions on which I have seen him since his return, and he and the King showed some courage in driving through the main street of Bagdad on the morning of 25th November, when it was still not clear whether the situation had been brought entirely under control.

22. It must however be added that the more fundamental problems facing the country still remain to be solved. Among these are the questions of tax reform, the useful employment of the young effendis, the low standard of efficiency and honesty in the administration and the moulding of the different races and religious sects into a united whole. The present Government, which is presumably only a temporary one, cannot be expected to tackle such problems seriously, and one must hope that it will refrain from any quick and ill-considered measures which would make their solution even more difficult for the Government which will succeed it after the elections. What that Government will consist of it is too early to predict, but the likelihood is that we shall see the return of the old familiar faces. No Atatürk has yet emerged in Iraq. Nuri Pasha, on the other hand, still has plenty of kick in him.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

Enclosure in No. 8

Communiqué issued by the Prime Minister on 24th November, 1952

The Government assumed responsibility in these critical times after tragic incidents had occurred. Its primary object is to restore order and to protect the lives of the people and their property and to restore confidence to the people.

The Government is determined to suppress evil elements and to prevent interference with the laws of the country and with the entity of the State. Peace is the first condition for any kind of progress, reform or profitable work in any community. The Government is, therefore, determined to achieve this object, and it hopes for success through the help of God and through the wisdom of the people. The Government is absolutely determined to achieve its first object. It is likewise resolved to carry out useful reforms and to provide food, clothing and shelter for the poor people and to give a breathing space to the Iraqi taxpayer in every possible way. The competent authorities have already undertaken the preparation of the legislation necessary to do this. Before long the people will be aware of the extent of the Government's concern to bring them prosperity and happiness.

The Government do not wish to withhold facts from the people, nor do they wish to make extravagant promises. The measures which the Government are determined to undertake in the interests of the people will become apparent in the near future. The Government is resolved to:—

- (1) prepare the necessary legislation to lighten the burden of taxation;
- (2) make higher education free as is the case in secondary and primary education;

- (3) conduct an economic policy calculated to protect the national wealth;
- (4) strengthen the army and to provide it with military weapons and improve its organisation and training;
- (5) set up quickly a committee composed of authorities in law and administration to prepare a draft electoral law on the basis of the principle of direct elections, so that the elections which this Government will carry out will be in accordance with it. Whereas martial law was proclaimed in order to restore normal conditions the Government will hasten to annul it as soon as that object has been achieved and will then conduct the elections in an atmosphere of freedom;
- (6) set up a committee of legal personalities to investigate the tragic events which have happened during the past few days, find out the persons really responsible, and establish the extent of their responsibility so that they will receive the punishment which the law provides;
- (7) cleanse the State of corrupt elements and to replace them by competent elements;
- (8) expedite the enactment of the legislation necessary for social security.

NURUDDIN MAHMUD.
Prime Minister.

EQ 1016/83

No. 9

ACTIVITIES OF THE IRAQI CABINET SINCE THE DISTURBANCES IN BAGDAD OF 22nd-24th NOVEMBER, 1952

Sir J. Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received 10th December)

(No. 160. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
Sir, *6th December, 1952.*

The Iraqi Cabinet have been busy since the disturbances which brought them to power almost two weeks ago. They have much to show for their activity since they set about implementing their programme, modest though it may be, with an enthusiasm hitherto unknown in Iraqi politics.

2. I reported in my despatch No. 156 of 28th November that General Nuruiddin Mahmud had two main purposes: first to deal firmly with those responsible, directly or indirectly, for the disturbances; and secondly to make concessions to reasonable popular demands. In pursuit of the first object a Royal Iradah was issued on 26th

November setting up a Military Tribunal. On the same day a committee was formed to investigate the cases of those under detention with a view to releasing those against whom there was no evidence of responsibility for the disturbances and bringing the rest before the Military Tribunal as soon as possible. A few days later it was announced that this committee was charged also with enquiring into the causes of the disturbances. At the same time forty-one of the detainees were released. I understand that the first cases may be tried next week.

3. In pursuit of the second object many ordinances, regulations and ministerial instructions have been issued. These

measures may be divided into those designed to help schoolboys and college students, those designed to purge the administration of corrupt or otherwise undesirable officials and those designed to reduce the cost of living of the poorer classes. Two regulations abolishing fees in the Law College and the College of Commerce and Economics are examples of the first type. The setting up of committees to weed out undesirable elements amongst the staffs of the colleges and secondary schools in Bagdad and of all schools in the provinces, and the appointment of another committee to dismiss corrupt, redundant or inefficient officials in the Ministry of Finance, are examples of the second. (This latter committee has begun its work by dismissing the six remaining Jews in the Ministry.)

4. The most important of the economic measures are two ordinances issued on 25th November providing for a reduction in the customs duty on tea, sugar and textiles and the abolition of the land tax and *istihlak* (consumption) tax on fruit and vegetables. Further measures include the reduction of the rates of hire of agricultural machinery and the raising of the exemption limit for property tax in towns and in the country from ID. 20 and ID. 10 to ID. 150 and ID. 75 respectively. Two further committees have been set up, one to report on the State domains fit for pump irrigation at Government expense and the other to examine the wage rates of workers in the railways and the port. It is too early yet to estimate the effect of these measures on the cost of living of the poor and middle classes since, although the wholesale prices of tea and sugar have already fallen, it is not clear how the Government will ensure that the benefits of their measures are passed on to the consumer.

5. The most important act of the new Cabinet so far is of course the appointment on 26th November of a committee to amend the Electoral Law "on the basis of the principle of direct elections." This committee met for the first time on 27th November and is expected to finish its work on 10th December. It may not be until a week later that the ordinance enshrining the amendment will be ready to be issued.

6. The Government's diligence in putting its programme into effect has increased confidence throughout the country and the Prophet's Birthday was celebrated on 29th November without incident. The news that Kashani had organised a half-day strike in Tehran on that day in sympathy with the

Iraqi people's struggle against the Anglo-American imperialists and the statement (which seems to be without foundation) made by Najib al-Rawi, the Iraqi Ambassador in Egypt, that some eighty members of the Tudeh Party had crossed into Iraq a few days before the disturbances and had played a major part in organising them caused a flutter in the holy cities of the Shiah. As though in reply, Sheikh Muhammad Hussain Kashif al Ghita, one of the leading mujtahids of Najaf, issued an appeal to the Iraqi people to keep the peace, and Sheikh Muhammad al Khalisi delivered a lecture at Kadhmain on the incompatibilities of Islam and communism.

7. Tension in Bagdad and throughout the country has eased and the risk of further disturbances in the immediate future has decreased. But everyone is waiting to see just how far the Electoral Law is to be amended and whether General Nuruddin Mahmud proposes to allow the political parties to re-form. One immediate improvement is in the press. The editors of those newspapers which survived the Military Governor's suppression order are commenting on the affairs of the country with more common sense and responsibility than one would have imagined they possessed, to judge by the abuse and distortions in which almost the entire Iraqi press has indulged in recent years.

8. A full discussion of the causes and handling of the recent disturbances will probably not take place until the ringleaders come before the Military Tribunal, but Iraqi opinion seems to be agreed already on certain points. First, Mustafa al Umari is condemned on all sides for his failure either to compromise with the Opposition parties or to stand firm, and his resignation at the worst possible moment is regarded as almost criminal irresponsibility. Secondly, several Bagdad newspapers have reflected a widespread feeling in calling on college students to devote more of their attention to their studies and to leave politics to those better able to understand them. Thirdly, the prestige of the Regent has increased. He remained calm during the crisis, and is considered to have played his part with more dignity and patriotism than the politicians. His reputation has been further enhanced by a statement which the Minister of Finance has made to the press, to the effect that the Regent personally initiated much of the new Government's programme. Finally, most Iraqis are surprised at the strength and

degree of organisation of the Communist instigators of the disturbances.

9. There is a body of opinion which considers that the disturbances were an expression of popular dissatisfaction with the lack of progress Iraq has made in twenty years of national Government. This view was put to a member of my staff by a group of members of the "Arab Revival Club," an association of young educated Iraqis in business or in Government service. These men are appalled at the conditions under which the majority of their fellow-countrymen live. These conditions they attribute principally to the antiquated systems of land tenure which obtain in most provinces. They maintain that land reform, which they consider to be the key to social reform and economic progress, cannot come about, however much legislation may be passed, so long as Parliament is packed by the ruling class with a *bloc* of illiterate Sheikhs who have every reason to preserve the existing

system. Nuri Pasha and his followers, in the eyes of these young men, are thus largely to blame for the dreadful social conditions in the country. I suspect, myself, that this view over-simplifies the issue and that to raise local standards more is needed than to get rid of Nuri and the Sheikhs. I doubt too, very much, even if they succeeded in gaining control of affairs, the effendi class would have it in them to effect much improvement. Nevertheless, it is certain that there is a wide gulf of sentiment between the middle-class effendi, who feels acutely his position of a have-not, and the Pashas and Sheikhs, who have so overwhelming a share of wealth and power in the country.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Jedda, B.M.E.O. (Fayid), Washington, Paris and Ankara.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

EQ 1012/1

No. 10

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN IRAQ

Mr. Beeley to Mr. Eden. (Received 16th July)

(No. unnumbered. Confidential)

Bagdad,

7th July, 1952.

Sir,

With reference to Sir John Troutbeck's despatch No. 125 of 18th July, 1951, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on leading personalities of Iraq as at 1st July, 1952.

I have, &c.

H. BEELEY.

Enclosure

Leading Personalities in Iraq

Royal Family

1. King Faisal II.
2. Abdul Ilah, His Royal Highness the Amir.
3. Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir.
4. Hussein Nasir.

Other Personalities

1. Abbas Mahdi.
2. Abdul Amir al Uzri.
3. Abdul Fettah Ibrahim.
4. Abdul Ghani al Dalli.
5. Abdul Hadi Chelabi.
6. Abdul Hadi Dhahir.
7. Abdul Hadi Pachachi.
8. Abdul Ilah Hafidh.
9. Abdul Jabbar Chelabi.
10. Abdul Karim al Uzri.
11. Abdul Mahdi (Saiyid).
12. Abdul Majid Mahmud.
13. Abdul Qadir Gailani.
14. Abdul Rahman Jaudat.
15. Abdul Razzaq al Dhahir.
16. Abdul Wahhab Mahmud.
17. Abdul Wahhab Murjan.
18. Abdul Wahid al Haj Sikkar (Sheikh).
19. Abdullah Damluji.
20. Abdullah Qassab.
21. Ahmad al Ajil.
22. Ahmad, Sheikh of Barzan.
23. Ahmad Mukhtar Baban.
24. Ahmad al Rawi.
25. Akram Mushtaq.
26. Ali Haidar Sulaiman.
27. Ali Jawdat al'Ayyubi.
28. Ali Khalid al Hejazi, C.B.E.
29. Ali Mahmud Sheikh Ali.
30. Ali Mumtaz al Daftari.
31. Ali al Sharqi.
32. Alwan Hussein, C.B.E.
33. Arshad al Umari, K.B.E.
34. Asim al Naqib, Saiyid.
35. Ata Amin.
36. Baba Ali Sheikh Mahmud.
37. Babekr Agha I Selim.
38. Baha Ud Din Nuri.
39. Darwish al Haidari.
40. Daud al Haidari.
41. Dhia Ja'far.
42. Fadhil Jamali.
43. Faiq Samarrai.

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44. Ghazi Daghestani.
45. Hamid al Naqib.
46. Hashim Jawad.
47. Hassan Sami Tatar.
48. Hassan al Talabani.
49. Hazim Shemdin Agha.
50. Hikmat Sulaiman.
51. Hussain Fauzi.
52. Hussain Jamil.
53. Ibrahim Akif al Alusi.
54. Ibrahim Saleh al Kabir.
55. Ismail Namiq, K.B.E.
56. Ismail Safwat.
57. Jalal Baban.
58. Jamal Baban.
59. Jamal Umar Nadhmi.
60. Jamil Abdul Wahhab.
61. Jamil Madfai.
62. Jamil al Urfali.
63. Kamil Chaderchi.
64. Khalil Ismail.
65. Khalil Kanna.
66. Mahmud Agha Hajji Rasul.
67. Mahmud Agha Zibari.
68. Mahmud I Sheikh Said: Sheikh.
69. Mahmud Subhi Daftari.
70. Mahrut al Hadhdhal, Sheikh.
71. Majid Mustafa.
72. Mar Shimun.
73. Muaffaq al Alusi.
74. Mudhaffar Ahmad.
75. Muhammad Ali Chelabi.
76. Muhammad Ali Mahmud.
77. Muhammad Hassan Kubba.
78. Muhammad Hussain Hadid.
79. Muhammad Hussain al Kashif al Ghita.
80. Muhammad Mahdi Jawahiri.
81. Muhammad Mahdi Kubba.
82. Muhammad Ridha Shabibi.
83. Muhammad Said Qazzaz.
84. Muhammad al Sadr (Saiyid).
85. Muhammad Sadiq Shenshal.
86. Muhammad Salim al Radhi.
87. Mulla Mustafa.
88. Musa Shabandar.
89. Mustafa al Umari.
90. Muzahim Amin al Pachachi.
91. Nadhif Shawi.
92. Nadim Shakir al Pachachi.
93. Naji al Asil.
94. Naji Shaukat.
95. Najib al Rawi.
96. Nasrat al Farisi.
97. Nuri al Qadhi.
98. Nuri Sa'id.
99. Nuruddin Mahmud.
100. Rafail Petros Butti.
101. Rashid Ali al Gailani.
102. Rauf al Bahrani.
103. Rauf al Chadirchi.
104. Sa'ad Umar.
105. Sadiq al Bassam.
106. Said Haqqi.
107. Saleh Haidar.
108. Saleh Jabr, K.B.E.
109. Salih Saib al Jubburi.
110. Salman Sheikh Daud.
111. Sami Fattah.
112. Sami Shawkat.

113. Shakir al Wadi, M.V.O.
114. Dr. Shawkat al Zahawi.
115. Taha al Hashemi.
116. Tahsin Qudri, K.C.V.O.
117. Tariq al Askari.
118. Tawfiq al Naib.
119. Taufiq Suweidi.
120. Tawfiq Wahbi Ma'ruf, C.B.E.
121. Umar Nadhmi.
122. Yahya Qassim.
123. Yusuf Abdullah al Gailani (Saiyid).

Leading Personalities in Iraq

The Royal Family

1. King Faisal II

Born in Bagdad on 2nd May, 1935, the son of King Ghazi and a sister of the Amir Abdul Ilah. He succeeded to the throne on the death of his father on 3rd April, 1939.

During the Rashid Ali rebellion in May 1941 he and his mother were at first confined at Qasr Zuhur on the outskirts of Bagdad but were removed to the summer palace at Pir Mum just before the collapse and flight of the rebel Government.

The King spent his summer holidays in Egypt in 1943 and 1944 and in England in 1946, where he attended the Victory Celebrations and was the guest of the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace.

His early education was directed by an English governess who was succeeded by an English tutor in 1946. In 1947 he went to Sandroyd Preparatory School and entered Harrow, his father's old school, in May 1949. He spent the summer holidays of 1948 and the Easter holidays of 1950 in Iraq. In 1950 he was given a notably warm welcome by the people and the opportunity was taken for him to visit a number of important provincial centres. He came to Iraq in the autumn of 1950 with his mother and returned to Harrow seven weeks after her death in December 1950.

The King did not return to Iraq again until December 1951, when he spent the winter holidays in Bagdad. He suffered most of the time from asthma, to which he has a tendency, and was unable to take part in public life. Returned to Harrow for the Easter term 1952.

He is intelligent and well-mannered and is said to be doing well at Harrow. He is very popular in Iraq.

2. Abdul Ilah, His Royal Highness the Amir

Born in the Hejaz in 1912, the only son of the late King Ali, ex-King of the Hejaz. He came to Bagdad with his father in 1926 after Ibn Saud had expelled the latter from the Hejaz. He was educated privately and at Victoria College, Alexandria. He became Regent on the death of his cousin King Ghazi in April 1939.

During the Cabinet crisis of January 1941 which led to the fall of Rashid Ali's Cabinet, he endeavoured to resist the Prime Minister's demands for the appointment of new Ministers, but fled to Diwaniyah to escape the threats to his life made by four army officers Salah-ud-din Sabbagh, Kamil Shabib, Fahmi Said and Mahmud Salman. Rashid Ali thereupon resigned and Taha al Hashimi succeeded him. The Regent then returned to the capital.

During the night of 1st April the four army officers already mentioned occupied Bagdad with their troops and went to the Palace to demand the resignation of Taha al Hashimi and the appointment of Rashid Ali as Prime Minister. The Regent was, however, warned in time, eluded them and took refuge in the American Legation. Thence he was smuggled to Habbaniya on 2nd April and flown to Basra. On instructions from Bagdad, the Officer Commanding, Iraq Army,

at Basra attempted to arrest the Regent, who took refuge on board of one of His Majesty's ships. By now any hope of rallying support for his cause in the south had been lost. On 16th April he was flown to Jerusalem, together with Ali Jaudat and Jamil Madfai, who had meanwhile joined him at Basra. During the hostilities in May, the Regent remained in Palestine. He returned to Bagdad on 1st June, after the collapse of Rashid Ali's régime and was welcomed by a large gathering of officials, notables and well-wishers.

In November 1943 he was declared Heir to the Throne under the provisions of an amendment to the Organic Law passed in October.

In December 1943 the Regent paid an extensive visit to the United Kingdom at the invitation of His Majesty's Government. For three days he was a guest of Their Majesties the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace. During 1944 the Regent toured extensively within the country and paid particular attention to the army manoeuvres which he constantly attended. In June he visited Alexandria, returning early in July, and in September he again visited Transjordan and Egypt. He paid a second brief visit to Transjordan in February 1945.

In May 1945 he left on an official visit to the United States, returning via Canada and Great Britain. In London he was twice received by the King, met the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet and attended the Victory Thanksgiving Service. He also visited the occupied area of Germany. He returned via France and Italy, whence he proceeded on an official visit to the President of the Turkish Republic before returning to Iraq in September.

The Regent visited London in the summer of both 1946 and 1947. In 1946 he attended the Victory Celebrations on 8th June, and in 1947 he paid official visits to France and Belgium as well as to London. He and Nuri Pasha held informal discussions with the Foreign Office in September 1947 about the Iraq Government's desire to replace the 1930 Treaty. He was therefore to some extent committed personally to the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty and was placed in a difficult position by the demonstrations against it in Bagdad in January 1948. He did not extricate himself from this position with undiminished credit.

In 1948 he took a personal part in the unsuccessful attempts to unify the war effort of the Arab States against Israel and paid a number of visits to the Iraq Army in Palestine. He paid a State Visit to the Shah of Persia in June 1949 and visited England later in the summer.

He again visited England in the summer of 1950 when his sister became seriously ill and had to enter hospital. He returned to England in the autumn to arrange for the Queen Mother's journey to Iraq. In the last few months of the year he was pre-occupied with his sister's declining health. Shortly before her death he flew with his mother and sisters to the Hejaz where they visited Mecca. He returned to Iraq the same day. He accompanied the King to England in February 1951 and returned after six weeks. He again left the country at the end of May for a short visit to Amman. Left for London in July 1951 and returned to Iraq in September. While in London he had been examined for suspected appendicitis, and a successful operation was performed in London in November 1951, the Regent returning to Bagdad in December. He paid an official visit to Kuwait in March 1952, and an unofficial one to Bahrain in April. In May he paid an official visit to Spain and returned to Iraq towards the end of the month. He visited Amman for a few days in June in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Jordan Government to accept a Hashimite as member of the Jordan Council of State. He returned to Bagdad angry and disillusioned.

The Regent is an intelligent man with an excellent memory. He has a shy charm of manner and his natural judgment is good. But his will is abnormally weak and he can seldom withstand either his own passions or the pressure of others. He tries to take his duties seriously and he is genuinely anxious to hand over the monarchy unimpaired in strength and reputation to his nephew the King, but he is easily discouraged or intimidated. He is much influenced by his mother. His intense pride in the Hashimite Royal House and his concern to maintain its unity and prestige explain his deep anxiety over events in Jordan since the death of King Abdullah and provide the motive for his well-intentioned but generally ill-timed interventions in Amman since King Talal's illness precipitated the crisis in Jordan.

He is basically uninterested in affairs of State and does not identify himself with the progress and aspirations of his people, whose interests he seems to regard as distinct from those of the Royal Family. He feels more at home with Englishmen than with Iraqis and his recreations are those of the English. He maintains a large racing stable, supports a pack of hounds and breeds pheasants and spaniels. He is irresponsibly extravagant, and in 1945 spent over \$200,000 in the United States on jewellery. He is also believed to have invested heavily, at the cost of grave indebtedness, in speculative industrial enterprises in Bagdad.

His Regency has been a troubled one and he has twice been forced to flee from Bagdad. These experiences have impelled him to make a real effort to obtain the personal loyalty of the Army, in which he has had some limited success. But these experiences have also implanted in him a deep distrust of his people and a determination to keep in his own hands as much power and patronage as possible. His fears cause him to interfere in details of Government policy and administration, particularly in the appointments of officials and the choice of Government candidates for Parliament. He will never allow a Prime Minister a completely free hand in the selection of his Ministers. At the same time his indolence makes him neglect the higher direction of policy. He seldom reads State papers unless they have direct connexion with the position of the Hashimite House.

He has twice been married. First in 1936 to the daughter of Salah-al-Din Fauzi Beg of Cairo, whom he divorced in 1940, and secondly to another Egyptian lady Mlle. Faiza Tarabulsi in November 1948, whom he divorced in 1950. Stories about his dissipation circulate. He speaks very good English.

He was made an Honorary Air Commodore in the Royal Air Force in September 1943, was appointed Honorary G.C.M.G. in 1942 and Honorary G.C.V.O., with the award of the Royal Victorian Collar in 1943.

3. Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir

Born at Istanbul 1900, he is the youngest son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz and a half brother to the late Kings Ali of Hejaz and Faisal I of Iraq, and to King Abdullah of Jordan. His mother was a Turk.

He was educated at Istanbul. He served with the Sharifian forces during the first world war and won the good opinion of British officers. He was appointed an Honorary G.B.E. for his services.

He came to Iraq in 1922 and was commissioned in the Iraqi cavalry. He acted as Regent for a short time during King Faisal's absence in 1924. From 1925 to 1928 he studied agriculture at Oxford and from 1928 to 1931 he lived in Cyprus where his father had retired after being driven from the Hejaz by Ibn Saud.

After the death of King Hussein in 1931 the Amir Zaid was appointed Iraqi Minister at Ankara in January 1932. He was transferred to Cairo in 1934, owing to the scandal caused by the marriage of his sister to Atta Amin (q.v.), but he refused to accept this appointment. At the end of 1934 he was engaged in litigation in Athens about properties which he

claimed to have inherited in Greece. He was appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. In 1937 he was recalled for enquiries into allegations that he had used his position to give false certificates for arms destined for Spain. He survived the enquiry and returned to Berlin. He was withdrawn from Berlin in the spring of 1938 and remained in Iraq until the summer of 1939 when he went to live at Istanbul.

In 1933 he had married a Turkish lady who had been divorced by her previous husband. This *mesalliance* was the main reason for his not being made Regent on the death of King Ghazi in 1939.

He came to Bagdad in October 1941 to meet the Amir Abdullah who paid a state visit to Iraq in that year. In June 1942 he returned to Turkey, which remained his home until he was appointed the first Iraqi Ambassador in London in 1946.

In 1943, 1945, 1946, 1949, 1950 and 1951 he came to Iraq to act as Regent during the absences of the Amir Abdul Ilah.

The Amir Zaid is a friendly and well-mannered man. He is a shrewd observer who takes a detached and cynical view of Iraqi and Arab politics. Although he is lazy, dislikes responsibility, and is a heavy drinker, he would probably have made a more successful Regent than his cousin Abdul Ilah. He speaks English and Turkish in addition to Arabic. His wife has had some success as an artist, having held exhibitions of her paintings in London and in Paris, but she is seldom seen in Iraq.

4. Hussein Nasir

A cousin of the King and of the Regent, with the style of "Highness."

He was educated in Istanbul during the 1914-18 war. From 1935 to 1938 he was attached to the Iraqi Legation at Ankara and later held an appointment in the Royal Palace at Bagdad. Iraqi Consul in Jerusalem from 1946 to 1948.

He is married to a daughter of King Abdullah of Jordan, whose service he entered in 1948. He was appointed Jordan Minister at Ankara in December 1948.

A good humoured, genial and friendly man without much ability or personality.

Other Personalities

1. Abbas Mahdi

Shia. Born 1898. Served in the Head Post Office, the Iraqi Legation at Tehran and the Ministry of Education. Minister of Education 1932-33. Minister of Economics and Communications in Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in 1934. Director-General of Tapu 1934. Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1937. Minister of Economics and Communications 1937-38, in the Cabinets of Hikmat Sulaiman and Jamil Madfai. Appointed Principal Private Secretary at the Royal Palace in July 1941.

Minister at Tehran 1943-45. Appointed first Iraqi Minister in Moscow in 1945. Was made senator in 1949, after his final return from Moscow. He played a prominent part in opposing the policy of Nuri Said's Government in the Senate in 1951 and again in 1952.

2. Abdul Amir al Uzri

Born 1899 at Kadhmain of the well-known Shia landowning family. Brother of Abdul Karim al Uzri (q.v.). Educated Bagdad and United States. D.Sc. Michigan University. Appointed engineer in Directorate-General of Irrigation 1929 and rose to Assistant Director-General in 1941.

Minister of Communications and Works in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet of 1944. Minister of Supply for a month in August 1944 and then returned to Communications and Works. Appointed Director-General of Irrigation 1946. He resigned this post in November 1950 on being appointed a member of the Development Board.

A rather weak personality, incompetent and unreliable.

3. Abdul Fattah Ibrahim

Sunni, born Bagdad 1906. Educated in Bagdad and at the American University of Beirut, where he was infected by communism. A teacher from 1934 onwards, he was appointed inspector in the Ministry of Education in 1943 but resigned in 1945 when he was transferred to Basra as Director of Education. Since then he has been director of the Rabita Press, which publishes Leftist literature, and is now losing money.

Founder of the National Unity Party (Hizb al Ittihad al Watani), he has always been sympathetic to communism, and when he was a teacher he was often reported as spreading communism among students. His name has not, however, been connected with those tried since 1947 for underground Communist activity.

Has been prominent with Muhammad Mahdi Jawahiri (q.v.) in the "Peace Movement" in Iraq since 1950.

4. Abdul Ghani al Dalli

Shia of Suq al Shuyukh. Born about 1920. Educated at Naseriyah, Bagdad Law College and the London School of Economics (1945). Became a teacher at the Bagdad Law College in 1946 and in the same year was appointed by Saleh Jabr Assistant Master of Royal Ceremonies in the Palace. Became director-general of the Industrial Bank in September 1947, in which post he has shown himself to be a competent official.

A founder member of the Ba'ath Club in 1949. He speaks excellent English and his wife, whom he married in 1950, also speaks a little.

5. Abdul Hadi Chalabi

Shia of Kadhimain. Born Bagdad 1895, the son of a wealthy landowner.

Deputy for Bagdad 1934 and again in 1935. Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet of Arshad al Umari 1946. Appointed Senator in June 1947 and elected First Vice-President of the Senate in February 1950.

In politics he supports Saleh Jabr and Nuri Said, but he is more interested in business. He is probably the largest corn broker in the country and many agriculturalists are heavily indebted to him. He made big profits from the export of barley at the inflated prices ruling in Greece and Italy in 1947, and was attacked in the press for obtaining more than his share of export licences through Saleh Jabr who was then Prime Minister. His business record shows that he is fairly unscrupulous and will not hesitate to evade his obligations if it suits him.

Stout and unattractive in appearance, he is good company but speaks Arabic and Persian only. He is a philanthropist. His wife appears in public.

6. Abdul Hadi Dhahir

Bagdad Shia, born about 1900, whose wealth derives mainly from property in the city of Bagdad. Interested in politics, but too rich to need to work, he twice entered Government service and twice resigned after two or three years. He has often been a Deputy and has intermittently practised as a lawyer. As Mutasarrif of Hilla from 1943 to 1944 he showed himself an experienced and honest but lazy administrator.

He has a clear mind, but though by nature affable and moderate, he has in recent years been under the influence of his more energetic and fanatic younger brother Abdul Razzaq (q.v.).

He was Minister of Economics in Tawfiq Suwaidi's Cabinet in 1946 and is a bitter opponent of Nuri Said and Saleh Jabr. He is a founder member of the United Popular Front and was elected to the Front's Political Committee in June 1951.

7. Dr. Abdul Hadi Pachachi

Sunni. Born in 1894. Son of a former Rais Belidiya of Bagdad and cousin of Muzahim al Pachachi (q.v.). Educated in Bagdad and Istanbul, he qualified as a doctor in France and entered Government service in 1933 as director of the Isolation Hospital.

He was Minister of Social Affairs in Arshad al Umari's Cabinet from June to November 1946, was appointed Mayor of Bagdad in 1948, and Director-General in the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1949. He represented Iraq at the International Labour Organisation Conference at Geneva in June 1951.

Fat, genial and lazy, he does not play a prominent part in politics. He is married to a White Russian wife and speaks fluent French and some English.

8. Abdul Ilah Hafidh

Born about 1897 in Mosul. Son of Mohammed Ali Fadhil who was for some time a Senator. Educated in Paris where he qualified as a dentist but also took a degree in political science.

Deputy for Mosul in 1926 and again in 1935. In 1935 and again from 1938 to 1940 he held foreign service appointments at Paris, Beirut and Bombay. In 1936 he was Director-General of Commerce and in 1941 Director-General of Revenue.

Held a number of ministerial appointments from 1942 onwards under Nuri Said, Arshad al Umari and Saleh Jabr. Appointed first Governor of the National Bank in 1949 and reappointed for a further term of three years in 1952.

Fair and fat with a passion for growing roses, he is friendly and co-operative, but not energetic. Has little knowledge of banking and is inclined to play for safety. He speaks French and English.

9. Abdul Jabbar

Bagdad Shia, born about 1906. Graduated in agriculture at the University of California and in education at Columbia Teachers' College. He served first in the Ministry of Education, in which he became Director of Primary Education (and Acting Director-General) in 1943 and Chief Inspector in 1946. He left Education in 1946 to become Minister of Supply in Tawfiq Suwaidi's Cabinet. When this Cabinet resigned he was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Communications and Works. He has also been a member of Iraqi delegations to the San Francisco and other conferences.

He is a sincere nationalist but broad-minded and reasonable with a keen sense of humour. He is convinced of the need of Western assistance for Iraq, and is highly respected by his many British friends, who can always rely on his co-operation. One of Iraq's few honest and competent officials, he has no illusions about his countrymen and is subject to fits of depression. He drinks heavily. He speaks English very well. His wife, who speaks some English, appears in public.

10. Abdul Karim al Uzri

Kadhimain Shia, born in 1908; brother of Abdul Amir al Uzri (q.v.). Educated in Bagdad and at the London School of Economics, he has held a number of Government appointments. Secretary to the Ministry of Education, 1932. Assistant Secretary at the Royal Palace, 1934. Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, 1936. Acting Director-General of Revenues, 1937. Director of Commerce, 1938. Resigned 1938. Director-General of Economics from 1939 until he resigned again in 1942 after being involved in a financial scandal.

Elected Deputy in 1943, and again in 1950, he is a member of the Bagdad Chamber of Commerce and of the Board of the National Bank. He joined the National Democratic Party on its foundation in 1946 but resigned about a year later. He has a profitable estate near Kadhimain and interests in a cement

factory. He married into the large Rifa'i family of Najaf.

Minister of Finance under Tawfiq al Suwaidi, February 1950.

As a nationalist, he is highly critical of many aspects of British policy in Iraq; but he is western in outlook, realises the value for Iraq of the British connexion, and is friendly and co-operative. He was an able Minister of Finance and was chiefly responsible for the passage through Parliament of the law establishing the Development Board. He supports Saleh Jabr. He speaks English well.

11. Abdul Mahdi (Saiyid)

Shia from the lower Gharraf (Muntafik). Born about 1894 of an influential family and owns a large estate.

Deputy in the Turkish Parliament and in most Iraqi Parliaments from 1927 onwards. He was a supporter of the late Yasin Pasha al Hashemi.

Minister of Education under Rashid Ali in 1933. Minister of Economics in the Governments of Taha al Hashimi and Nuri Said in 1941 and of Communications and Works under Nuri in 1942. Senator from 1941. Again Minister of Communications and Works under Tawfiq al Suwaidi in 1950. He now strongly supports Saleh Jabr and is the main instrument of the latter's influence in the Muntafik. He is a founder member of Saleh Jabr's Popular Socialist Party. An implacable opponent of Nuri Said. His influence over Saleh Jabr is considerable and is resented and feared by a large number of Saleh Jabr's followers.

In November 1950 he was accused of the attempted murder of Senator Khayyun al Ubaid but was released on bail after a week in prison. Although the case against him was subsequently stopped, he bitterly resented what he considered to be a deliberate act of hostility on Nuri's part.

A strong nationalist and fervent Shia, he is uneducated and xenophobic. He speaks no European language.

12. Abdul Majid Mahmud

Shia. Born about 1909. Educated in the United States where he obtained a degree in Agriculture. Director of Education in the Muntafik in the early 1930's. Superintendent (Personnel) of Public Revenues. Inspector in the Income Tax Department in 1941. Held an appointment in the Ministry of Economics in 1942. Appointed Assistant Accountant-General in 1944. A member of the Iraqi delegation to the Bretton Woods Conference in 1945. Has until recently been Director-General of the Agricultural Bank to which post he was appointed by Saleh Jabr. Visited England in 1950 in connexion with the purchase of a trawler for fishing in the Persian Gulf. Appointed Minister of Economics under Nuri Said in December 1950 and Acting Minister of Agriculture in April 1952.

Abdul Majid Mahmud was Secretary of the Muthanna Club, most of the members of which were Western educated nationalists with leanings towards national socialism, and is a founder member of the Ba'ath Club, which contains many of the same individuals whose ideals are now those of democratic socialists. He played an active part in the Rashid Ali movement. He is much under the influence of Fadhil al Jamali.

To meet, he is a mild and friendly little man. He was a member of the Committee appointed in 1951 to negotiate with the Iraq Petroleum Company and, in his capacity as Minister of Economics, signed the oil agreements in February 1952. It is doubtful whether he fully understood the complicated issues under discussion and was content to take his orders from Nuri Said. His wife speaks some English.

13. Abdul Qadir Gailani

Born in Bagdad in 1904 of the family of the Naqibs of Bagdad. Elder brother of Yusuf Gailani (q.v.). Educated at Bagdad and studied at the London School of Economics. Entered the Foreign Service 1926, and served in London and Cairo, where he was in charge of the Legation several times between 1934 and 1940. Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, 1940. He was closely associated with the rebel Government of Rashid Ali and after its collapse was interned in Rhodesia and later in Iraq. Released 1944. Reappointed to Foreign Service and sent as Chargé d'Affaires to Karachi, 1948. Transferred to Cairo, 1949, but was not appointed Minister because the Regent distrusts him for the part he played in 1941. In June 1951 he was appointed Counsellor in the Iraqi Foreign Service on special duty with the Arab League.

He tries hard to be pleasant and has done his best to live down the past. Both he and his Egyptian wife speak good English.

14. Abdul Rahman Jaudat

Born about 1910. His father was Sunni and his mother Shia; he himself is considered a Shia. Educated Bagdad Law College.

Served as Qaimmaqam in Najaf Suq al Shuyukh and Diwaniya. Appointed Mutasarrif in the Muntafik in 1946 and in Diwaniya in 1947. Mutasarrif of Bagdad December 1949 and appointed Director-General of the Interior in June 1951.

A competent official and co-operative in his dealings with the British. He is a protégé of Saleh Jabr.

15. Abdul Razzaq al Dhahir

Shia of Bagdad. Born about 1903. Younger brother of Abdul Hadi Dhahir (q.v.). He has travelled in Europe and speaks English fairly well. In 1942 he was attacked by a nervous disease which affected his brain, and he spent some time in a mental home in Beirut. Joined the Istiqlal Party when it was founded in 1946, but soon left it to join the late Sa'ad Saleh's Liberal Party, of which he continued to be a member until Sa'ad's death early in 1949. Deputy for Bagdad since 1948 and has been on Iraqi delegations to several inter-Parliamentary conferences. Minister of Economics in Ali Jaudat's Government of December 1949. He resigned with the opposition deputies in March 1950 and is a founder member of the United Popular Front. In June 1951 he was elected to the Front's Permanent Bureau.

Abdul Razzaq and his brother are well off, having property in Bagdad and lands in Abu Ghuraib. He is a self-opinionated man with a wide range of superficial knowledge. A political opponent of Nuri Pasha. He has published a book damning tribal feudalism in Iraq and three volumes of essays inveighing against British imperialism.

16. Abdul Wahhab Mahmud

Sunni of Basra. Born in 1909. Educated Basra and Bagdad, where he graduated in law in 1932. As a young man he held advanced Leftist opinions. Arrested by Jamil Madfai's Government in 1938 for attempting to raise the Diwaniya tribes against them. Released by Nuri Pasha after the military demonstration which removed the Madfai Government. Deputy 1939 to 1947. Minister of Finance in Suwaidi Cabinet of 1946. Member of the Liberal Party from 1946 to 1948, when the party suspended activity. Elected President of the Bar Association in August 1950. He is one of the leading Iraqi fellow-travellers.

17. Abdul Wahhab Murjan

Born about 1910 of a rich Shia landowning family of Hilla. Educated at the Bagdad Law College, he

was appointed a judge about 1935 but soon resigned to practise as a lawyer.

In 1946 and 1947 he was leader in Hilla of Kamil Chaderchi's National Democratic Party but resigned in 1947 owing to his exclusion from the party's Higher Committee and to his being taken up by Saleh Jabr, who secured his election to the Chamber of Deputies in March 1947.

He was again elected Deputy for Hilla in the 1948 elections and was appointed Minister of Economics in June 1948 in Muzahim Pachachi's Government. Resigned on his election as President of the Chamber of Deputies in autumn 1948. Elected vice-President of Nuri Sa'id's Constitutional Union Party in December 1949. Became Minister of Communications and Works under Nuri Said in September 1950 and was transferred to Finance in December 1950. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1951.

He is not very intelligent, and owes most of his influence originally to Saleh Jabr's and recently to Nuri Sa'id's support. He has fallen foul of Saleh Jabr on two personal issues. He knows a little English.

18. Abdul Wahid al Haj Sikkar, Sheikh

Born about 1890. Chief of the Fetlah tribe of the Mishkhab in Diwaniyah liwa. Worked with Rashid Ali to overthrow Ali Jawdat's Government, 1935. Deputy, 1937. Imprisoned by Hikmet Sulaiman's Government for fomenting tribal disturbance, 1937. Deputy, 1939. Supported Rashid Ali's rebel Government, 1941. Interned 1941 to 1944 and in residence force until 1945.

Abdul Wahid's interest in politics sprang from his desire to increase his local wealth and importance through political influence in Bagdad. The compulsory economy of his exile left him the richest tribal leader in the Middle Euphrates and his influence is still greater than that of any other Chief of the Fetlah. Since his internment he has not taken any part in Bagdad politics, but in the autumn of 1951 he joined Nuri Said's Constitutional Union Party.

19. Abdullah Damluji

Sunni, born in Mosul in 1895, and formerly called Abdullah Said Effendi. Studied medicine in Constantinople and served in the Turkish army, but transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud when the latter occupied Hasa in 1913.

As Ibn Saud's Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1922 he signed the Uqair Protocol, and in 1926 took part in the negotiations in London which led to the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927. His influence with Ibn Saud afterwards waned and in 1928, after the failure of the Medina Railway Conference at Haifa, at which he was Ibn Saud's representative, he posted his resignation to Ibn Saud and came to Bagdad instead of returning to the Hejaz.

In Iraq he has been thrice Minister for Foreign Affairs (in 1930-31, 1934 and 1942), thrice Director-General of Health (1932-33, 1934-35 and 1941-42), and Master of Ceremonies at the Palace in 1937-38.

From 1942 onwards, he devoted himself mainly to business. He was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations in 1947 and was elected Deputy for Mosul in the 1948 elections.

He was appointed Iraqi Ambassador in Tehran in February 1950. He spent most of his time in Bagdad however and eventually resigned from this post in May 1951.

He speaks English well.

20. Abdullah Qassab

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1900, the son of an 'Alim, Abbas Amin al Fetwa. Educated Bagdad, graduated from the Law College, 1928, and entered Government Service. Qaimaqam Samarra 1936, Director of Tribal Affairs, Ministry of Interior, 1938, Mutasarrif of

Diwaniya, 1941, Mosul, 1944, Director-General of the Date Monopoly, 1947. Appointed Mayor of Bagdad, 1951.

Minister of Interior under Nuri Pasha, 1943 and again under Arshad al Umari in 1946.

A fairly capable administrator without marked political leanings.

21. Ahmad al Ajil

Sunni Sheikh of the Shammar Jarba tribe. Younger brother of Sfuq al Ajil (q.v.), he was born about 1923 and educated at Victoria College, Alexandria and in Mosul and Bagdad.

He went to London with his father Ajil in 1937 to attend the coronation of His Majesty King George VI. After Ajil's death in 1940 Ahmad set about undermining Sfuq's position in the tribe, disputed the inheritance with him, and in 1944 was suspected of being involved in an attempt to poison him with locust bait.

He became Deputy for Mosul in 1948 and in October of that year he was recognised by the Government as paramount Sheikh of the Shammar in Iraq instead of Mish'an al Faisal who had replaced Sfuq the previous June. He is now more popular than his rivals with the tribe, but constant intrigue amongst themselves has reduced the influence of all Shammar Sheikhs.

Flashy, engaging and plausible, Ahmad is one of the very few English-speaking tribesmen.

22. Ahmad, Sheikh of Barzan

Kurdish chieftain of Barzan, at the foot of the Chia-i-Shirin. Elder brother of Mulla Mustafa (q.v.).

The Military Government established friendly relations with him in 1919 but did not exercise administrative control in his area. In 1920 he was implicated in the murder of two British officials, and in 1922 he harboured Turkish agents and unsuccessfully attacked Amadia. On both occasions troops destroyed his Barzan headquarters. He made peace with the authorities in 1923 and was permitted to remain in Barzan.

After a successful private war against a neighbouring Baradost chieftain in 1931, he was defeated by Iraqi Government troops, assisted by the Royal Air Force, and driven across the Turkish frontier in 1932. The Turks first interned him and his brothers but surrendered him to the Iraqi Government in 1933 on condition that his life be spared. He lived in forced residence in Mosul, Hilla and Bagdad until 1935, when he was permitted to move to Sulaimaniya.

When his brother Mulla Mustafa escaped from Sulaimaniya in 1943, Sheikh Ahmad was again removed to Hilla, but was allowed to return to Barzan when a settlement was made with Mulla Mustafa in 1944. Although at this time he was overshadowed politically by Mulla Mustafa, his religious influence was so strong that Mulla Mustafa dared not oppose him openly. He became unbalanced, liquidated a number of Mullahs in the name of his own home-made religion, and finally ordered his men to attack the local Government headquarters in July 1945.

After full-scale operations, which were aided by lavish bribery, Iraqi forces defeated the Barzanis, and Sheikh Ahmad and Mulla Mustafa fled to Persia, where they were well received by the Russian authorities.

Sheikh Ahmad returned to Iraq in the spring of 1947 and surrendered with a number of his followers. He was sentenced to death, but in December 1949 the sentence was commuted to one of life imprisonment. He is in Basra gaol.

23. Ahmad Mukhtar Baban

Born about 1895. Sunni from near Khaniqin. He is not a true Baban but takes the name from a marriage connexion with the late Jamil Bey Baban of Kifri. Educated Bagdad Law School and served as

a judge for many years. Director-General of Supplies, 1942. Successively Minister of Social Affairs, Communications and Works and Justice under Nuri Sa'id, 1942-44. Minister of Justice under Hamdi Pachachi 1944. Minister of Social Affairs, 1946. Head of the Royal Diwan, 1946. He visited Europe in the summer of 1951.

He has considerable influence over the Regent and his advice is not always good. His personal morals are questionable. He speaks no English.

24. Ahmad al Rawi, K.B.E.

Born about 1896, the son of a Bagdad Sunni Alim. Brother of Najib al Rawi (q.v.). Became a police officer soon after the formation of the Iraqi Government and after reaching the rank of Commandant, served in several liwas as a mutasarrif. In 1939 he was made an administrative inspector and soon afterwards was placed on pension.

After the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebel Government in 1941 he was recalled by Jamil Madfai and made Director-General of Police. He held this position successfully for four years of war and co-operated wholeheartedly with the British Forces. He was appointed Honorary K.B.E. for his war services in 1946.

Created Pasha by Amir Abdullah of Transjordan in 1943, he was appointed Iraqi Minister to Syria and the Lebanon in 1945 and to the King of Transjordan in 1946. He returned to Iraq the same year to take up the post, first of Director-General, and later (1949) of Under-Secretary, in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In this capacity he represented Iraq at several meetings of the Arab League Political Committee in 1948 and was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations in the latter half of 1949. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Amman in January 1951. In May 1952 he was appointed Iraqi Minister at Karachi.

A supporter of Iraq's British connexion, Ahmad Pasha is an intelligent and pleasant man. More politician than administrator, he is generally well-informed but does not carry the weight that his position and connexion would lead one to expect. He used to aspire to cabinet rank, but now seems satisfied with his present career, in which he can indulge his liking for travel and talk. He speaks English well.

25. Akram Mushtaq

Sunni, born Bagdad 1903. Gazetted officer in the Iraqi army, 1927. Passed Cranwell and appointed to the Royal Iraqi Air Force, 1930. Captain, 1932; Major, 1937; Lieutenant-Colonel, 1938; Commander of the Royal Iraqi Air Force 1937 to 1939. Relieved of his command and commission and appointed Director-General of Civil Aviation in 1939. He still holds this post. Member of the Iraqi delegation to the International Civil Aviation Conference at Chicago in 1944.

He is an intelligent and likeable man and speaks English well, but he is an indifferent administrator and has little influence. He took an active part in Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'état* of 1936 and some people still hold this against him. A drug-taker, he tried to commit suicide in 1949, and was afterwards sent to Europe to be cured.

26. Ali Haidar Sulaiman

Born at Rowanduz 1905 of a well-known Kurdish family. Educated at Mosul and the American University, Beirut. He represented his university at the 1929 meeting of the International Students Union at Geneva.

Lecturer in Modern History at the Higher Teachers' Training College, 1930. Transferred to Ministry of Interior, 1933. Transferred to the Iraqi Foreign Service and served at Rome and Cairo between 1937 and 1939. He was interned after 1941 as a sympathiser with Rashid Ali (he is a brother-in-law of

Yunis Sab'awi who was hanged for his part in the rebellion). Released in 1944 he became a partner of Ali Kemal in the New Bagdad scheme. In 1949 he was associated in business with Abdul Hadi Chelabi and is now director of the firm, Iraq Engineering Works.

Deputy for Rowanduz 1948. Resigned 1950. Minister of Social Affairs under Muzahim Pachachi, 1948. Minister of Communications and Works under Ali Jawdat, 1949-50. Appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Iraqi Foreign Service in May 1951.

He supports Muzahim Pachachi and is opposed to Nuri Pasha. A sincere and intelligent nationalist with moderate reformist views. Speaks good English. His wife appears in public, but does not know English.

27. Ali Jawdat al'Ayyubi

Sunni of humble Mosul origin, born 1886. Educated at Istanbul and commissioned in the Turkish army. In Turkish times he was a member of the Arab Nationalist society Al Ahd al Iraqi. He fought against the British at Shuaibah but surrendered soon afterwards and was employed in 1915 to encourage Arab officer prisoners to join the Arab Revolt. Later he joined Faisal, and in 1920 was Faisal's Military Governor at Aleppo.

He returned to Iraq with King Faisal in 1921 and from then until 1923 he held various posts in the provincial administration. In 1922 he took an active part in agitation against the Mandate.

As Minister for Interior under Ja'far al Askari (1923-24) he voted for the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922. He was again a provincial Governor and later worked in the Ministry of Interior between 1924 and 1930, when he became Minister of Interior under Nuri Sa'id. He resigned from the Cabinet in September 1930 and also (in company with Yasin al Hashimi and Rashid Ali) from the Chamber of Deputies in protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930.

Private Secretary to the King 1933; Prime Minister 1934, he was forced to resign by an agitation against him throughout the country organised by Yasin al Hashimi and Rashid Ali.

President of the Chamber of Deputies, 1935. Iraqi Minister in London, August 1935; Paris, December 1936-October 1937. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Nuri Sa'id 1939.

After the Rashid Ali *coup d'état* in April 1941 he joined the Regent at Basra and accompanied him to Jerusalem. After the collapse of the rebellion he returned to Bagdad and became Minister for Foreign Affairs under Jamil Madfai in June 1941.

Iraqi Minister at Washington 1942-48. He joined Muzahim Pachachi's Government in the reshuffle of September 1948 as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and in December 1949 he succeeded, after two failures, in forming a Cabinet which resigned in February 1950.

He has always been a weak and vacillating character of small intelligence and he is now a semi-invalid. He is, however, well meaning and friendly, and he is respected for his Nationalist past. He is in close touch with the United States Embassy. He has become rich through acquiring Government land. His wife is a Syrian who speaks good English, his elder son is married to an American and his daughter is married to the son of Muzahim al Pachachi (q.v.). He himself speaks some English.

28. Ali Khalid al Hejazi, C.B.E.

Sunni, born about 1893 in Damascus. After serving in the Ottoman army he became an officer in the Kurdish gendarmerie at the end of the first world war and was awarded the B.E.M. and the M.C. for gallantry during campaigns in Kurdistan.

Appointed Inspector of Police, 1921; Assistant Commandant of Police, 1923; Commandant of Police in the Mobile Force, 1935; Commandant of Police Sulaimaniya, 1937. He was Commandant of Police

Bagdad from after the Rashid Ali rebellion in 1941 until 1946 and did good work to stop looting after May 1941.

In 1946 he was appointed Honorary C.B.E. for war services.

Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya 1947-48, he was one of the very few Arab officials to speak fluent Kurdish. Appointed Director-General of Police in May 1948, he did much to restore the police morale which had been shaken as a result of the disturbances of January 1948. A heavy drinker and a poor administrator, but tough and strict in discipline, he set about re-equipping the police, especially the mobile forces. He was loyal to the Regent and the British connexion.

In February 1950 in a fit of drunken resentment he made an abortive attempt to use his mobile forces against the Government. He was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment. The sentence was later reduced to three and a half years, and he was released in November 1950 by Nuri Said.

A courageous but stupid man who was more than normally corrupted by power, his thoughts may have been turned to the use of force by the example of the three successful Syrian *coups d'état* of 1949.

29. Ali Mahmud Sheikh Ali

Sunni, connected with the Ubaid tribe. Born Bagdad, 1902. Educated at the Bagdad Law College, he practised as a lawyer from 1923 to 1936. An extreme Nationalist, he was arrested both in 1924 and 1930 for violent agitation against Anglo-Iraqi treaties. He was twice elected Deputy.

Appointed judge in the Court of Appeal in 1936 and Minister of Justice under Hikmat Sulaiman in 1937. Mutasarrif of Basra, 1939; Director-General of Customs, 1940. Again Minister of Justice in Rashid Ali's rebel Cabinet, he fled to Persia after Rashid Ali's collapse but was later surrendered to the British military authorities and interned in Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq, tried and sentenced to seven years imprisonment in 1942.

Released in 1949, he now practises as a lawyer again. It was proposed by Tawfik Suweidi to appoint him to the Court of Cassation in 1950, and his influence appears to be reviving. He frequently writes viciously anti-British articles for the Iraqi press.

30. Ali Mumtaz al Daftari

Born 1901. Sunni of the Daftari family of Bagdad. Educated at Bagdad Law College and entered Government service in 1920. Rose to be Director-General of Revenues by 1935, but had to leave Iraq after Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'état* which overthrew the Government of Yasin al Hashemi in 1936. Re-appointed Director-General of Revenues by Nuri Sa'id in 1939.

Minister of Finance under Taha al Hashemi, 1941. Director of Rafidain Bank 1941. Again Minister of Finance under Nuri Sa'id in 1941 and 1943. Minister of Communications and Works under Tawfik Suweidi in 1946. Minister of Finance under Muzahim Pachachi in 1948 and under Ali Jawdat, December 1949 to February 1950. Resigned from the Chamber of Deputies in 1950.

Appointed a Member of the Development Board in November 1950 and tendered his resignation from the Board in June 1951.

He was a member of the Liberal Party formed in 1946, but resigned in 1948. He is opposed to Saleh Jabr and generally to Nuri Pasha. His name has frequently been mentioned as a possible neutral Prime Minister. He gives an impression of sincerity and ability, but when in power finds difficulty in co-operating with his Cabinet colleagues. He has been involved in at least one financial scandal. He and his wife, who is the daughter of the late Yasin al Hashimi, speak very good English.

31. Ali al Sharqi

Shia from Najaf. Born about 1890. Originally a Mulla in Najaf and later Qadhi in Basra and elsewhere, he finally became Head of the Supreme Ja'fari Court. He was made a Senator in 1947 during Saleh Jabr's term of office. Minister without Portfolio in Ali Jawdat's Government of December 1949.

He is of no political importance.

32. Alwan Hussein, C.B.E.

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1899. Educated at the English Protestant School, Bagdad.

He joined the Civil Police in 1917 and did good work during the rebellion in 1920. Assistant Commissioner of Police, Mosul, in 1920. Commissioner of Police Central Criminal Investigation Department, 1924. He went to England in 1930 and attended a Senior Officers' Course at Scotland Yard. He then gradually took over the C.I.D. from the British D.I.G. Removed by Yasin al Hashemi, he returned to the C.I.D. in 1939 when Nuri Sa'id became Prime Minister. Transferred to the provinces by Rashid Ali, he again returned to the C.I.D. after the collapse of Rashid Ali's Government in 1941. Director-General of Police, 1946. He was attacked by the Opposition for the alleged undue severity of police action against the demonstrators during the riots against the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948. He lost his nerve under these attacks and suffered a minor nervous breakdown. Appointed Commandant of the Police Training School, May 1948, and transferred to be Director-General of Prisons in December 1948. Re-appointed Director-General of Police in September 1950.

A pleasant, friendly and competent official without much personality. He speaks good English. He was appointed Honorary C.B.E. for war services in 1946.

33. Arshad al Umari, K.B.E.

Sunni, born in 1888 of the well-known Umari family of Mosul. Educated in Turkey and employed as Municipal Engineer in Istanbul. He served on the Turkish staff in 1914-18 war.

A member of the first Iraqi Parliament, he later held several official appointments. Mayor of Bagdad from 1931 to 1933, and again from 1936 to 1944, with a short interruption in 1941 when he formed a Committee of Internal Security to conclude an armistice with the British forces after Rashid Ali's flight. He was a successful Mayor and can claim credit for much of such modernisation as Bagdad has achieved.

He represented Iraq at the Arab Unity Congress in Cairo in 1944 which resulted in the formation of the Arab League and in 1945 he led the Iraqi delegation to San Francisco. Minister of Economics and Communications under Ali Jawdat in 1934. Minister of Supply under Hamdi Pachachi in 1944. Appointed a Senator in June 1944. He was Prime Minister from June to November 1946, and aroused great opposition by his dictatorial methods. He played some part in the political intrigues which resulted in the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty and was Minister of Defence in the Government of Mohammed al Sadr which took over after the Portsmouth riots. Resigned his seat in the Senate in November 1950 on his appointment as Vice-Chairman of the Development Board. In this capacity his erratic nature and his tendency to concentrate all work in his own hands have earned him much criticism, which his outspoken retaliation does nothing to assuage. On the other hand, there is probably no other Iraqi who would apply so much energy to the work of the Board.

He is president of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society and has done a good deal to improve their finances. His daughter, Mme. Mumtaz al Umari, is a leading figure in the Ladies' Committee of this society.

He has an attractive personality and a capacity for hard work which is rare in an Iraqi, but his rapid changes of opinion, his obstinacy and impatience of criticism make him unfit for politics. He speaks Turkish and some very bad French. He was appointed Honorary K.B.E. for war services in 1946.

34. Asim al Naqib, Saiyid

Born Bagdad 1879; the fourth son of Sayid Abdul Rahman and younger brother of Sayid Mahmud. Appointed Naqib on the latter's death in 1936. A conventional Sunni Alim, he takes no part in politics but appears as a figurehead on important Islamic occasions. He attended the Memorial Service for King George VI at St. George's Church, Bagdad.

35. Ata Amin

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1898. Educated at the Bagdad Law School.

Assistant Private Secretary to King Faisal, 1921. Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service in 1925 and was appointed to the Iraqi Legation in London. Legal draftsman in the Ministry of Justice, 1927. Returned to the Foreign Service in 1928 and held appointments at Ankara, London, Rome, Paris and Berlin between 1932 and 1943. From 1940 to 1943 he was in charge of the Iraqi Legation in London. Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1943; Minister at Ankara, 1944; transferred to Paris, 1949.

He is married to a sister of the Amir Zaid. He speaks good English.

36. Baba Ali Sheikh Mahmud

Kurd. Born about 1912, second son of the well-known Sheikh Mahmud (q.v.). He spent much of his childhood in Persia, when his father was engaged in various rebellions. Between 1928 and 1932 he was educated at the expense of the Iraq Government at Victoria College, Alexandria, where he was a classmate of the Regent. Later he went to Columbia University.

He was appointed to a minor post in the railways in 1938, but soon resigned. His outspoken criticism of Iraqi administration in Kurdish areas led to his arrest and exile for a few months in 1943. A repetition of the offence in 1945 narrowly missed having the same result. He is still a strong critic of the Iraq Government's handling of Kurdish problems.

Minister of Economics under Arshad al Umari in 1946 and in the succeeding Government of Nuri Pasha. Deputy for Sulaimaniya, 1947; lost his seat in 1948.

Baba Ali speaks excellent English and possesses an attractive, though not very forceful, personality. He is interested in the improvement of agriculture in Kurdistan and particularly in the growing and marketing of tobacco. Since 1948 he has spent most of his time in Sulaimaniya and although not a member of his party, is Saleh Jabr's most influential supporter in Sulaimania. He visited America in 1950 and since then has been in close contact with the United States Embassy.

37. Babekr Agha I Selim

A powerful Kurdish chief (recognised by the Iraqi Government as paramount) of the Pizhder tribe of Qal'a Diza on the Lesser Zab north of Sulaimaniya. Now an old man, he has always been friendly in his dealings with the Government, whether British or Iraqi, and he behaved well when Government administration was established in the Pizhder area in 1938.

In 1941 he was preparing to revolt against Rashid Ali's régime, and he has since often affirmed his loyalty to the British connexion. In 1947 he was operated on in the Iraq Petroleum Company hospital at Kirkuk and has since led a quiet life.

His rival for influence in the Pizhder is Mahmud Agha Hajji Rasul (q.v.).

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38. Baha ud Din Nuri

Kurd, born in Bagdad about 1897 of an Erbil family. His father was a well-known Alim. Educated in Bagdad, he joined the Turkish army in 1917 and the Iraqi army in 1921.

In 1924 he was First-Lieutenant Small Arms Instructor and in 1927 he was promoted Captain. Passed Iraqi Staff College, 1930; attended Staff College Camberley, 1935-36. On his return to Iraq he was deeply involved in Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'état* and was thereafter appointed to Operations Branch. Dismissed from the army by Taha al Hashimi in 1938, he became Assistant Traffic Director on the Iraqi State Railways.

In autumn 1941 he rejoined the army as Major-General and was appointed Assistant C.G.S., but was retired again in 1944. He was Acting Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya in 1944 and was elected Deputy for Sulaimaniya in 1947 and 1948. Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri Said during 1949. Appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Iraqi Foreign Service in May 1951, and chargé d'affaires at Tehran.

One of the most capable Staff Officers in the Iraqi army, he suffered twice for his connexion with Bekr Sidqi. He is an intelligent man and a fairly good administrator; but in spite of a frank and engaging demeanour he is not entirely honest or reliable. He is a Freemason and a connoisseur of mystic poetry, but he is also self-seeking. As Minister he was co-operative with the British, but he was widely censured for his continued connexions with a Lebanese firm supplying the Government. He speaks Arabic, Kurdish, Persian, Turkish and English well.

39. Darwish al Haidari

Born in Bagdad in 1907 of the Haidari family which originated from Erbil. Educated at the American University, Beirut, and at Texas University where he studied agriculture.

Entered Government service, 1930. Director of Rustamiya Experimental Farm, 1933 and of Abu Ghuraib Experimental Farm, 1940. Director of Grain in the Local Products Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, 1942. Transferred back to the Department of Agriculture after he had been accused of the illegal disposal of a quantity of grain.

He was on the Iraqi delegation to the Hot Springs Food Conference in 1943 and since becoming Director-General of Agriculture in 1946 he has represented Iraq at several international conferences of Food and Agricultural Organisation.

Fat and jovial in appearance, he has a strong personality and much energy, initiative and determination, mainly directed towards furthering his own interests. He is a devout Moslem and a Xenophobe. He is a dictator in his department and his jealousy of any interference has made it difficult for British experts to co-operate with him. On account of his American training he is generally believed to be biased in favour of American machinery and ideas. A window dresser, and regarded by many as a barrier to progress.

He and his wife, who is a sister of Yusuf and Abdul Qadir Gailani (q.v.) speak good English and French.

40. Daud al Haidari

Bagdad Sunni, born about 1885. Son of a one-time Sheikh al Islam, his family is of Kurdish origin from Erbil. Once an A.D.C. to Sultan Abdul Hamid, he spent the 1914-18 war in Constantinople and came to Bagdad in 1921.

Member for Erbil in the Constituent Assembly in 1924. Minister of Justice under Tawfik Suweidi, 1929. Deputy for Erbil, 1930-34.

Iraqi Minister in Tehran, 1941-42. Minister of Justice under Nuri Said, 1942-43. Minister in London, 1943-45. Appointed Senator in 1945. Minister of Social Affairs in Mohammed al Sadr's Cabinet, January-June 1948.

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A courageous but stupid man who was more than normally corrupted by power, his thoughts may have been turned to the use of force by the example of the three successful Syrian *coups d'état* of 1949.

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He is of no political importance.

32. Alwan Hussein, C.B.E.

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1899. Educated at the English Protestant School, Bagdad.

He joined the Civil Police in 1917 and did good work during the rebellion in 1920. Assistant Commissioner of Police, Mosul, in 1920. Commissioner of Police Central Criminal Investigation Department, 1924. He went to England in 1930 and attended a Senior Officers' Course at Scotland Yard. He then gradually took over the C.I.D. from the British D.I.G. Removed by Yasin al Hashemi, he returned to the C.I.D. in 1939 when Nuri Sa'id became Prime Minister. Transferred to the provinces by Rashid Ali, he again returned to the C.I.D. after the collapse of Rashid Ali's Government in 1941. Director-General of Police, 1946. He was attacked by the Opposition for the alleged undue severity of police action against the demonstrators during the riots against the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948. He lost his nerve under these attacks and suffered a minor nervous breakdown. Appointed Commandant of the Police Training School, May 1948, and transferred to be Director-General of Prisons in December 1948. Re-appointed Director-General of Police in September 1950.

A pleasant, friendly and competent official without much personality. He speaks good English. He was appointed Honorary C.B.E. for war services in 1946.

33. Arshad al Umari, K.B.E.

Sunni, born in 1888 of the well-known Umari family of Mosul. Educated in Turkey and employed as Municipal Engineer in Istanbul. He served on the Turkish staff in 1914-18 war.

A member of the first Iraqi Parliament, he later held several official appointments. Mayor of Bagdad from 1931 to 1933, and again from 1936 to 1944, with a short interruption in 1941 when he formed a Committee of Internal Security to conclude an armistice with the British forces after Rashid Ali's flight. He was a successful Mayor and can claim credit for much of such modernisation as Bagdad has achieved.

He represented Iraq at the Arab Unity Congress in Cairo in 1944 which resulted in the formation of the Arab League and in 1945 he led the Iraqi delegation to San Francisco. Minister of Economics and Communications under Ali Jawdat in 1934. Minister of Supply under Hamdi Pachachi in 1944. Appointed a Senator in June 1944. He was Prime Minister from June to November 1946, and aroused great opposition by his dictatorial methods. He played some part in the political intrigues which resulted in the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty and was Minister of Defence in the Government of Mohammed al Sadr which took over after the Portsmouth riots. Resigned his seat in the Senate in November 1950 on his appointment as Vice-Chairman of the Development Board. In this capacity his erratic nature and his tendency to concentrate all work in his own hands have earned him much criticism, which his outspoken retaliation does nothing to assuage. On the other hand, there is probably no other Iraqi who would apply so much energy to the work of the Board.

He is president of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society and has done a good deal to improve their finances. His daughter, Mme. Mumtaz al Umari, is a leading figure in the Ladies' Committee of this society.

He has an attractive personality and a capacity for hard work which is rare in an Iraqi, but his rapid changes of opinion, his obstinacy and impatience of criticism make him unfit for politics. He speaks Turkish and some very bad French. He was appointed Honorary K.B.E. for war services in 1946.

34. Asim al Naqib, Saiyid

Born Bagdad 1879; the fourth son of Sayid Abdul Rahman and younger brother of Sayid Mahmud. Appointed Naqib on the latter's death in 1936. A conventional Sunni Alim, he takes no part in politics but appears as a figurehead on important Islamic occasions. He attended the Memorial Service for King George VI at St. George's Church, Bagdad.

35. Ata Amin

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1898. Educated at the Bagdad Law School.

Assistant Private Secretary to King Faisal, 1921. Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service in 1925 and was appointed to the Iraqi Legation in London. Legal draftsman in the Ministry of Justice, 1927. Returned to the Foreign Service in 1928 and held appointments at Ankara, London, Rome, Paris and Berlin between 1932 and 1943. From 1940 to 1943 he was in charge of the Iraqi Legation in London. Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1943; Minister at Ankara, 1944; transferred to Paris, 1949.

He is married to a sister of the Amir Zaid. He speaks good English.

36. Baba Ali Sheikh Mahmud

Kurd. Born about 1912, second son of the well-known Sheikh Mahmud (q.v.). He spent much of his childhood in Persia, when his father was engaged in various rebellions. Between 1928 and 1932 he was educated at the expense of the Iraq Government at Victoria College, Alexandria, where he was a classmate of the Regent. Later he went to Columbia University.

He was appointed to a minor post in the railways in 1938, but soon resigned. His outspoken criticism of Iraqi administration in Kurdish areas led to his arrest and exile for a few months in 1943. A repetition of the offence in 1945 narrowly missed having the same result. He is still a strong critic of the Iraq Government's handling of Kurdish problems.

Minister of Economics under Arshad al Umari in 1946 and in the succeeding Government of Nuri Pasha. Deputy for Sulaimaniya, 1947; lost his seat in 1948.

Baba Ali speaks excellent English and possesses an attractive, though not very forceful, personality. He is interested in the improvement of agriculture in Kurdistan and particularly in the growing and marketing of tobacco. Since 1948 he has spent most of his time in Sulaimaniya and although not a member of his party, is Saleh Jabr's most influential supporter in Sulaimaniya. He visited America in 1950 and since then has been in close contact with the United States Embassy.

37. Babekr Agha I Selim

A powerful Kurdish chief (recognised by the Iraqi Government as paramount) of the Pizhder tribe of Qal'a Diza on the Lesser Zab north of Sulaimaniya. Now an old man, he has always been friendly in his dealings with the Government, whether British or Iraqi, and he behaved well when Government administration was established in the Pizhder area in 1938.

In 1941 he was preparing to revolt against Rashid Ali's régime, and he has since often affirmed his loyalty to the British connexion. In 1947 he was operated on in the Iraq Petroleum Company hospital at Kirkuk and has since led a quiet life.

His rival for influence in the Pizhder is Mahmud Agha Hajji Rasul (q.v.).

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38. Baha ud Din Nuri

Kurd, born in Bagdad about 1897 of an Erbil family. His father was a well-known Alim. Educated in Bagdad, he joined the Turkish army in 1917 and the Iraqi army in 1921.

In 1924 he was First-Lieutenant Small Arms Instructor and in 1927 he was promoted Captain. Passed Iraqi Staff College, 1930; attended Staff College Camberley, 1935-36. On his return to Iraq he was deeply involved in Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'état* and was thereafter appointed to Operations Branch. Dismissed from the army by Taha al Hashimi in 1938, he became Assistant Traffic Director on the Iraqi State Railways.

In autumn 1941 he rejoined the army as Major-General and was appointed Assistant C.G.S., but was retired again in 1944. He was Acting Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya in 1944 and was elected Deputy for Sulaimaniya in 1947 and 1948. Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri Said during 1949. Appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Iraqi Foreign Service in May 1951, and chargé d'affaires at Tehran.

One of the most capable Staff Officers in the Iraqi army, he suffered twice for his connexion with Bekr Sidqi. He is an intelligent man and a fairly good administrator; but in spite of a frank and engaging demeanour he is not entirely honest or reliable. He is a Freemason and a connoisseur of mystic poetry, but he is also self-seeking. As Minister he was co-operative with the British, but he was widely censured for his continued connexions with a Lebanese firm supplying the Government. He speaks Arabic, Kurdish, Persian, Turkish and English well.

39. Darwish al Haidari

Born in Bagdad in 1907 of the Haidari family which originated from Erbil. Educated at the American University, Beirut, and at Texas University where he studied agriculture.

Entered Government service, 1930. Director of Rustamiya Experimental Farm, 1933 and of Abu Ghuraib Experimental Farm, 1940. Director of Grain in the Local Products Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, 1942. Transferred back to the Department of Agriculture after he had been accused of the illegal disposal of a quantity of grain.

He was on the Iraqi delegation to the Hot Springs Food Conference in 1943 and since becoming Director-General of Agriculture in 1946 he has represented Iraq at several international conferences of Food and Agricultural Organisation.

Fat and jovial in appearance, he has a strong personality and much energy, initiative and determination, mainly directed towards furthering his own interests. He is a devout Moslem and a Xenophobe. He is a dictator in his department and his jealousy of any interference has made it difficult for British experts to co-operate with him. On account of his American training he is generally believed to be biased in favour of American machinery and ideas. A window dresser, and regarded by many as a barrier to progress.

He and his wife, who is a sister of Yusuf and Abdul Qadir Gailani (q.v.) speak good English and French.

40. Daud al Haidari

Bagdad Sunni, born about 1885. Son of a one-time Sheikh al Islam, his family is of Kurdish origin from Erbil. Once an A.D.C. to Sultan Abdul Hamid, he spent the 1914-18 war in Constantinople and came to Bagdad in 1921.

Member for Erbil in the Constituent Assembly in 1924. Minister of Justice under Tawfiq Suweidi, 1929. Deputy for Erbil, 1930-34.

Iraqi Minister in Tehran, 1941-42. Minister of Justice under Nuri Said, 1942-43. Minister in London, 1943-45. Appointed Senator in 1945. Minister of Social Affairs in Mohammed al Sadr's Cabinet, January-June 1948.

He was an intermediary when the British Oil Development Company's concession was negotiated and has since been paid a retaining fee by the Basra and Mosul Petroleum Companies, who describe him as their legal adviser, but do not in fact consult him. He resigned from the Senate under a new interpretation of the Constitution in March 1949 rather than give up this fee.

Daud Pasha is a friend of the Regent but is widely distrusted both politically and financially. He was involved in the agitation against the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948.

His two step-daughters are well known in Bagdad society. He speaks English fairly well and is well disposed towards the British, but his actions tend to be dictated by his financial embarrassments. A nice old man.

41. Dhia Ja'far

Bagdad Shia, born in 1911. He studied mechanical engineering at Birmingham University, where he obtained a B.Sc. in 1934 and a Ph.D. in 1936, and then had twenty months' training with the Great Western Railway.

Appointed Assistant Mechanical Engineer in the Iraqi State Railways in 1937, he was subsequently promoted to be Mechanical Engineer. During the war he was Director-General of Engineering Supplies.

Deputy for Bagdad in 1947. He failed in the 1948 elections, but was later returned for Kerbala in a by-election.

Minister of Communications and Works under Saleh Jabr in 1947 and of Economics under Nuri Said in 1949 and under Tawfiq Suweidi in 1950. A founder-member and member of the Central Committee of Nuri Said's Constitutional Union Party, December 1949. Minister of Economics under Nuri Said in September 1950. Transferred to Communications and Works in December 1950. He played a prominent part in the negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1950 and 1951. Appointed Acting Minister of Finance in December 1951. Headed the Iraqi delegation which proceeded to London in June 1952 for discussions on Iraq's sterling balances and other financial matters.

He is well educated and speaks excellent English. He was a successful Minister of Economics, and is a strong supporter of Nuri Said, having close connexions also with Saleh Jabr. He helped to save British property in 1941. The financial reputation of his family is doubtful.

He enjoys British company, but is exceptionally resentful against what he considers the unequal relationship between Britain and Iraq, and is consequently difficult to deal with officially. The I.P.C. regarded him as the main obstacle to an agreement on oil problems. He is extremely ambitious and has energy and ability, and must be reckoned with as a potential Prime Minister.

His wife, who is related to the Agha Khan, looks as though she would be more at home in Beirut than in Bagdad. She speaks some English.

42. Fadhi Jamali

Shia of Kadhmain, born 1902. Educated American University, Beirut, 1921-27, and Columbia University 1927-29. Joined the Ministry of Education, 1929. Director-General of Instruction, 1933; Inspector-General of the Ministry, 1937. He visited Germany in 1937 and made arrangements for an Iraqi party to attend the Nuremberg Rally of 1938. Visited England in 1938 at the invitation of the British Council.

He was a founder member of the Muthanna Club, whose members were mostly Western educated nationalists, and whose political thinking was much influenced by national socialism. He strongly resisted British influence in the Ministry of Education and it was British influence which caused his transfer from

that Ministry to a position in the Iraqi Embassy in Washington in January 1943. He did not take up this appointment, but became Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1944. He was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945.

Foreign Minister from June 1946 to January 1948 in the successive Cabinets of Arshad al Umari, Nuri Said and Saleh Jabr. During this time he attended the Palestine Conference in London in 1946 and the United Nations General Assembly in 1947. He was out of politics for a time after the failure of the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948, but was given a sinecure in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs later in the same year and was appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo in February 1949. He was recalled almost immediately to become Minister for Foreign Affairs under Nuri Pasha in March 1949. He resigned after six months under a constitutional rule, since he had no seat in Parliament, and was appointed Permanent Iraqi delegate to the United Nations Organisation. He was elected Deputy for Diwaniya in the by-elections of June 1950 and became President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1950.

Jamali is a self-made man, and is one of the first of the type to reach a prominent position. Although he is ambitious, he is unlikely to become a powerful influence in the country, having little political support in his own right.

Jamali is intelligent, energetic and honest, but he is also vain, at times unreliable and emotionally unstable. The Xenophobic nationalism of his younger days has been greatly modified by his extensive contacts with the West and by a genuine conviction of the necessity for Iraq of co-operation with the West. But he will never forgive the British policy in Palestine and the Shia fanatic is not far below the surface. He is interested in Western literature and likes Western music.

He is married to a Canadian and has a large circle of British and American friends.

43. Faiq Samarrai

Sunni, born at Basra about 1904. Educated Bagdad Law College, 1928-32. Appointed a secretary in the Ministry of Justice, 1933; transferred to Tapu Department 1934; Superintendent of Labour, Ministry of Interior, 1935, and attended a Labour Conference at Geneva in 1936. After a further period in the Ministry of Justice, he became Director-General of Press and Propaganda in 1939. After a short period of service in the police and at the Ministry of Social Affairs, he became Director-General of Municipalities in 1940.

An extreme anti-foreign nationalist since his student days, he served a short sentence in 1930 for his part in the demonstrations against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. He was an active supporter of Rashid Ali and was interned from 1941 to 1945 at Fao, where he caused much trouble to the authorities. He was a founder member of the Istiqlal Party in 1946, Secretary-General in 1947 and vice-president 1948-1949 and 1950. Deputy for Samarra 1948, he resigned with the opposition Deputies in March 1950, but was again elected in the by-elections of June 1950. In 1949 and early 1950 he travelled in Syria and Lebanon for his party to make propaganda for Iraqi-Syrian union. Resigned with the other Istiqlal Deputies from the Chamber of Deputies in February 1952 in protest against the manner in which they alleged Nuri Said was attempting to railroad the Oil Agreements through Parliament.

A grossly fat and unhealthy looking individual with a bad moral reputation, he is nevertheless intelligent, and a persuasive talker. His nationalist views are sincerely held, but are probably subject to modification if it suited his personal ambition. His attitude to Great Britain became slightly less hostile during 1949, possibly owing to the influence of Nuri Pasha

who was in that year attempting to split the Istiqlal Party. He is not altogether trusted by his party colleagues. He speaks English.

44. Ghazi Daghestani

Sunni, born in Bagdad in 1910. Son of Muhammad Pasha Daghestani and brother of the wives of Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.) and Najib al Rawi (q.v.).

Attended the Royal Military College, Woolwich, and the Staff Colleges at Quetta and Bagdad. He is at present Director of Military Works. He quarrelled violently with the Regent over the despatch of Iraqi troops to Palestine in 1948, but his family influence and his strength of character have enabled him to retain his position in the Army and in society. Appointed Military Attaché in London in April 1952.

An intelligent, high-principled aristocrat and an able officer, he might well take a prominent part in politics in the future.

He and his attractive wife speak excellent English and French, in addition to Turkish and Arabic.

45. Hamid al Naqib

Sunni of Basra, born about 1890. His brother, the late Sayid Talib Pasha, was strong enough to defy the Turks in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, and was arrested and exiled in 1920 owing to his opposition to King Faisal's coming to Iraq.

Since Sayid Talib's death Sayid Hamid has been the head of the most influential Basra family. He was Deputy from 1930 to 1947, when he was made a Senator.

He is travelled and pleasant, but ponderous. He supports Nuri Said and complains that the Government neglect Basra interests. He speaks some English.

46. Hashim Jawad

Sunni, born Bagdad 1911, the son of a small official. He was educated at the American University, Beirut, and at London University, from which he graduated in Economics in 1936.

He was appointed Assistant Secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1936, joined the Iraqi foreign service in 1938 and was sent as Iraqi representative to the International Labour Organisation at Geneva. He returned to Iraq in 1941 and in 1942 became the first Acting Director-General of Labour in the Ministry of Social Affairs. He also acted as Secretary to a committee for the organisation of post-war affairs in Iraq. In his capacity of Director-General of Labour, he took part in the settlement of the Iraq Petroleum Company strike at Kirkuk in 1946. Later in the same year he was removed from his post by Arshad al Umari who regarded him as a fellow-traveller. In 1947 he was appointed to a position in the I.L.O. and has only paid short visits to Iraq since then.

A quiet and studious man with a clear head and a genuine interest in labour questions, he found the conditions in the Ministry of Social Affairs extremely frustrating and is therefore unlikely to return permanently to Iraq. He is married to a Swiss and speaks excellent English.

47. Hassan Sami Tatar

Turcoman of Kirkuk, born about 1899. His education at the Constantinople Law School was interrupted by the first world war, in which he was taken prisoner by the British forces in Mesopotamia and spent two years in a prisoner-of-war camp in India.

Returning to Iraq after the armistice, he entered the newly founded Bagdad Law College and passed out at the head of the first batch of graduates. He was immediately appointed a judge in Bagdad and thereafter served in the Ministry of Justice and on the Court of Cassation until in February 1950 he became Minister of Justice under Tawfiq al Suweidi.

Minister of Justice again under Nuri Said in September 1950. Elected Deputy for Khanaqin in February 1951.

He is a quiet man with no particular political affiliations. He speaks Arabic and Turkish.

48. Hassan al Talabani

Kurd, born about 1911 of a well-known family of Kirkuk. His ancestors were heads of a Sufi brotherhood. He graduated from the Bagdad Law College in 1934 and joined the Ministry of Interior in 1935. He served as Qaimmaqam in various Kurdish districts and at Mandali. Appointed Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya early in 1947, transferred to Erbil later in the year, to Hilla in 1948, to Baquba early in 1950 and Dulaim in October 1950. A.H.Q., R.A.F., Habbaniya, have found him very helpful, and relations with him are excellent.

He visited Europe and England in the summer of 1949.

He is intelligent, honest and capable. He is not a strong character, but as an administrator he makes up in some measure for his lack of strength by persistence and a good sense of diplomacy. He has not yet entered politics but will probably do so eventually. He is well liked by Saleh Jabr and Arshad al Umari. Personally he is good company. He speaks Kurdish and Arabic, some Turkish and some English.

49. Hazim Shemdin Agha

Kurdish chief of the Sharifan tribe of Zakho and son of Yusuf Pasha. Born about 1895. One of the largest landowners of the Zakho district, he is a progressive farmer.

A Deputy from 1925 to 1929 and again from 1938 to 1947, when he was appointed a Senator, he became Minister without Portfolio under Tawfiq Suweidi in February 1950.

Popular and influential in Zakho and well respected throughout Iraq, he is a rich man who has never taken an active part in politics. He was appointed Minister only to fill up the number of Kurds in the Cabinet. He speaks Arabic and Turkish and some English.

50. Hikmat Sulaiman

Sunni, born 1886. A member of the Committee of Union and Progress, he was Director of Education and Assistant Governor of Bagdad under the Turks, and was in Constantinople when the British forces occupied Bagdad in 1917.

Returning to Iraq in 1921 he became Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in 1923 and was Minister of Interior under Abdul Muhsin Sa'dun (1925-26) and again under Rashid Ali Gailani in 1933. He visited Turkey in 1935 and was much impressed with modern Turkish methods.

In 1936 he joined Bekr Sidqi in the *coup d'état* which over-threw Yasin al Hashimi's Government, and became Prime Minister. He resigned in 1937 after the murder of Bekr Sidqi. As Prime Minister he disappointed expectations.

Although apparently reconciled with Nuri Said in 1938, he was arrested and tried by court martial for treason under the latter's premiership in 1939. The death sentence passed on him was commuted to five years' imprisonment, and he was interned in Sulaimaniya. Released by Rashid Ali in April 1941, he was in Persia during Rashid Ali's rebellion.

When he returned to Iraq he devoted himself to farming and prospered. Unpopular with the Regent and Nuri Said, he took little part in politics until 1947, when he was involved in the intrigues which culminated in the fall of Saleh Jabr and the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948. Since then he has often been reported to be making contact with discontented army officers and people of the Left, and is generally regarded as the "dark horse" of Iraqi politics; but this impression is probably coloured by

his history and is an exaggeration of his present influence. He had a heart attack in 1949 and is unlikely to play any great political part again though he frequently gives advice to Nuri Said. He was appointed a member of the Regency Council in April 1952. He shows considerable friendship to Her Majesty's Embassy despite his inability to converse in any language but Turkish and Arabic.

His wife, a Daghestani, is a sister of the wife of Najib al Rawi (q.v.). She also is friendly but speaks Turkish only.

51. Hussain Fauzi

Sunni of Kurdish origin, born in Bagdad 1889. Educated Military Academy, Istanbul, and commissioned in the Turkish army in 1909.

He joined the Iraqi army in May 1922. He has passed the Senior Officers' Course at Belgaum, India, and has twice been attached to units in England for training. Promoted Lieutenant-Colonel in 1929 and Colonel in 1933. Commandant of the Staff College, Bagdad, 1934. In 1935 he was given the command of the Northern District. Promoted Brigadier 1935 and G.O.C. 1st Infantry Division 1936. He was appointed Chief of the General Staff in August 1937 after the murder of Bekr Sidqi. He took no part in the Bekr Sidqi coup of October 1936, but he assisted Taha al Hashimi to organise the military demonstration in favour of Nuri Said in December 1938. Placed on pension in February 1940 for interference in politics.

Although he has been a member of the Central Committee of the National Democratic Party since its inauguration in 1946 he is not prominent in political or social life. He speaks good English.

52. Hussain Jamil

Sunni of Bagdad, born about 1906. A member of the Jamil family which has marriage connexions with the Suweidis. His father was a judge. Educated at Bagdad and graduated from the Law College in 1930.

From 1933 to 1946 he served as a judge in a number of provinces including Diyala, Diwaniya, Hilla and Bagdad.

He resigned from the Public Service in 1946 in order to become a founder member of the National Democratic Party; he went into private practice as a lawyer and acted as defence counsel in a number of cases concerned with political offences.

Deputy for Bagdad, 1948. He resigned with the opposition Deputies in March 1950. Minister of Justice in Ali Jawdat's Cabinet of December 1949 to February 1950.

Hussain is a convinced Democrat and a sincere reformer who is generally respected. He is a poor man and free from suspicion of corruption. He is less intransigent than most of the opposition leaders and is not always in agreement with the leader of his party. He dislikes Americans. He speaks some English and his wife, who appears in mixed society, is fairly fluent.

53. Ibrahim Akif al Alusi

Sunni, born Bagdad, 1894. Graduated from Istanbul Medical College in 1916 and served in Iraq under the Turks.

He later joined the Iraqi Health Service and rose to be Director-General of Public Health in 1939. He was also Secretary-General of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society for some time.

Minister of Education under Hamdi Pachachi, 1944-45. Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs in 1946; Minister in Damascus, December 1948; Minister in Ankara, February 1950.

As Minister of Education he was incompetent and prejudiced, and it is generally considered that he was not a success in Damascus. Superficially friendly, he is a born intriguer.

54. Ibrahim Saleh al Kabir

Bagdad Jew, born 1885. Educated at the Alliance School in Bagdad, he entered business in the office of a Jewish merchant who later made him his partner.

Appointed to the Accounts Department of the Ministry of Finance in the early days of the Mandatory Government, he rose by gradual promotion to be Accountant-General, and finally in 1946, Director-General of the Ministry.

In 1946 he gave evidence before the Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry on Palestine. In 1947 he was chief Iraqi negotiator in the sterling balance talks and earned the respect of the British delegation, and in 1948 he took part in the discussions for the taking over of the Iraq Currency Board. He retired in autumn 1948 and has since lived quietly in Bagdad. He was appointed Honorary O.B.E. in 1946 for war services.

He was a sound civil servant, cautious and trustworthy, highly respected but never very popular. His brothers, Selman and Yusuf, are prominent Bagdad lawyers. Ibrahim has become the unofficial head of the greatly reduced Jewish Community in Iraq. So far neither he nor his brothers have shown any signs of leaving the country.

55. Ismail Namiq, K.B.E.

Sunni, born 1892, the son of an army officer of Mosul origin. Educated at the Turkish Military College, he joined the Amir Faisal in 1917.

Gazetted an officer in the Iraqi army in 1921, he attended a course in England about 1926. Commandant of Iraqi Staff College, 1931; Officer Commanding Iraqi Air Force, 1933; Cavalry Brigade, 1936; Third Division, 1937; Director-General of Administration in the Ministry of Defence 1941. Acting C.G.S. November, 1941. He accompanied the Regent to England, 1943.

Minister of Defence in the successive Cabinets of Hamdi Pachachi, Taufiq Suweidi and Arshad al Umari, 1944 to 1946. Appointed Senator, 1945.

His venality has been the subject of comment, but he is a quiet sensible man with no marked political tendencies. The Regent likes and trusts him. He speaks fair English and is a supporter of the activities of the British Council in Bagdad. Appointed Honorary K.B.E. for war services 1946.

56. Ismail Safwat

Sunni of Mosul, born 1894. In Turkish times he graduated from the Teachers' Training School, and was a teacher in 1914. He was conscripted and served as a warrant officer in Eastern Anatolia during the first world war. In 1919 he joined the Arab army at Deir el Zor and took part in Jamil Madfai's advance on Tel 'Afar in 1920. After the collapse of Faisal's régime in Syria he went to Turkey.

He came to Iraq in 1922 and joined the Iraqi army. He was on Bekr Sidqi's staff at the time of the latter's *coup d'état* in 1936. From 1940 to 1943 he headed the Iraqi Military Mission to the Yemen. After his return to Iraq he held several brigade commands. Director of Military Operations, Ministry of Defence, 1944. Promoted Major-General, 1946.

In October 1947 he presided over the Arab League Military Committee which sat at Aley Lebanon. Appointed Deputy C.G.S. early in 1948, he was made Commander of the Irregular Arab Army of liberation on the outbreak of hostilities in Palestine in May 1948. He returned to Iraq and was appointed G.O.C., Second Division, Kirkuk, in 1949. In the autumn of 1950 he became Deputy Chief of the General Staff on the revival of that appointment. In June 1952 was appointed director-general of the Iraq State Railways.

He is a taciturn man with no sense of humour, but he has a reputation for efficiency and for being a good disciplinarian. He has been reported as interested in politics, and he is a close friend and supporter

of Jamil Madfai and Ali Jawdat who are also both from Mosul.

57. Jalal Baban

Kurd of the Baban family, born 1892. At first an extreme nationalist, he was deported in 1920 but released in 1921. Appointed Qaimmaqam in 1923 and later promoted to be Mutasarrif, he served in the administration until 1932.

Minister of Economics and Communications under Naji Shaukat in 1932, of Defence under Rashid Ali in 1933, and of Education under Jamil Madfai in 1934. Director-General of Finance 1934-35 and 1936-37.

Minister of Communications and Works under Nuri Said 1939-40 and under Jamil Madfai in 1941. Minister of Finance under Nuri Said in 1943. Senator 1937-43.

Again appointed Minister of Communications and Works under Mohammed al Sadr in January 1948, he managed to retain his portfolio in the succeeding Governments of Muzahim al Pachachi and Nuri Said until November 1949. Deputy for Diyala in the 1948 elections. Resigned his seat on his appointment as a Member of the Development Board.

No man is better versed than Jalal in the art of government as practised in Iraq. Like his distant cousin Jamal Baban (q.v.), he has been the Kurd in many Governments, though neither he nor Jamal can speak Kurdish nor have any special interest in Kurdistan. An unusually competent but elusive Minister, he is undoubtedly corrupt, but except in 1938 has managed to avoid open scandal.

58. Jamal Baban

A Kurdish lawyer of the Baban family, born 1890. After serving for some time as a judge in Northern Iraq he became Deputy for Erbil in 1928.

Minister of Justice under Nuri Said 1930-32, under Jamil Madfai 1933-34, and under Ali Jawdat 1934-35. In 1935 he joined the party organised by Jamil Madfai to oppose Yasin al Hashimi.

Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri Said 1941-42 and of Justice under Saleh Jabr in 1947. Between his ministerial appointments he practised as a lawyer, and was often Deputy. Appointed Senator in July 1947.

Like his relative Jalal Baban (q.v.), he has been almost a professional Kurdish Minister. As Minister under Saleh Jabr he was criticised for venality and for influencing judges. He was Acting Prime Minister during Saleh Jabr's absence in London for the signature of the Portsmouth Treaty, and his handling of the situation caused by the demonstration was inept; but in his defence it must be said that Saleh Jabr had kept him in the dark over the course of the negotiations. He resigned with two other Ministers before Saleh Jabr himself gave up hope, and has not been very active since. He is critical of the measures taken against Iraqi Jews in 1950 and 1951. He is a champion of the cause of the emancipation of women. An attractive but weak man.

59. Jamal Umar Nadhmi

Kurd, born in 1912. Son of Umar Nadhmi (q.v.). Studied at the American University of Beirut.

After serving in the Northern liwas and in Diyala he was appointed Mutasarrif of Basra in July 1949.

Energetic and respected by the local officials and fond of social life. He has a good name for honesty. Intelligent but easily excited and violently anti-Jewish. He has no particular political affiliations but he is thought to have prospects as an Iraqi diplomatic representative abroad.

60. Jamil Abdul Wahhab

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1910 of a middle-class family. Educated at Bagdad Law College and practised for a short time.

Joined Iraqi Government service in 1933, and was appointed Assistant Magistrate, Bagdad. He was later transferred to Baquba.

Deputy for Diyala in 1939 and Bagdad in 1943 and 1947. He lost his seat in 1948, but became Deputy for Mahmudiyah in 1950. A member of the Central Committee of Nuri Said's Constitutional Union Party from its foundation in 1949.

Minister for Social Affairs under Nuri Said 1946, and under Saleh Jabr 1947. Appointed Minister of Justice in Nuri's Cabinet in July 1951.

His marriage in 1933 to a niece of Nuri Said is the main reason for his political advancement. In spite of this connexion, his attitude during the Rashid Ali rebellion was ambiguous. He is a personal friend of the Regent and Shakir al Wadi, and in April 1949 was selected as Iraqi Minister at Cairo. The Egyptian Government, however, refused the *agrement*. He is reported to have engaged in doubtful land transactions in Hilla liwa and he is said to be dissolute, ambitious and untrustworthy. He speaks a little English.

61. Jamil Madfai

Sunni of Mosul, born about 1886. Educated Istanbul and gazetted an officer in the Turkish Army. He joined the Arab revolt and in 1920 was commanding the Sharifian forces at Deir el Zor. In that year he instigated the murder of the British Political Officer and entered Tel Afar, calling upon the tribes to rise against the British in the name of the Sharif. He retired to Syria when British troops approached from Mosul.

Returned to Iraq in 1923 and served as Mutasarrif in several liwas.

Deputy from 1929 and President of the Chamber from 1932 to 1933; Senator from 1935 to 1945 and again from 1948 onwards. President of the Senate 1943, 1949, 1950 and 1951.

Minister of Interior under Nuri Pasha 1930; Prime Minister 1933 and again in 1934 with a different Cabinet. Minister of Defence under Ali Jaudat, August 1934; Prime Minister again for twelve days in March 1935, after which he was forced to resign by an agitation in the Middle Euphrates organised by Yasin Pasha al Hashimi. He refused an invitation to join the Government formed by Hikmat Sulaiman after the Bekr Sidqi *coup d'état* in 1936. He visited the Yemen in the winter of 1936-37 to obtain the Imam's adherence to the Iraqi-Saudi pact of Arab Brotherhood. Became Prime Minister again in August 1937 after the murder of Bekr Sidqi and Hikmat Sulaiman's resignation. He was forced to resign in December 1938 by a military demonstration organised in favour of Nuri Said. He accompanied the Regent on his flight to Palestine during the Rashid Ali rebellion in 1941 and after its collapse became Prime Minister for a short time. In 1943 at the suggestion of Nuri Pasha, he toured the Arab countries to canvass support for Arab unity. In 1948 after the riots against the Portsmouth Treaty he took the portfolio of Interior under Muhammad as Sadr for a few months. In 1949 he was sent by Nuri Said to various Arab capitals in an attempt to unify Arab policy towards Palestine. Accompanied the Regent on the latter's official visit to Spain in May 1952.

Jamil Madfai is said to have been energetic and resolute in his earlier years. He is popular in most political circles and his influence, which is generally used on the side of moderation, is still considerable, but he is an ageing man, susceptible to the intervention of others and afraid of making enemies. He is unlikely to take any further political part except as a figurehead, but he is said to have influenced Nuri Said against Saleh Jabr. His acquisitions of land and commercial interests have made him a rich man. He speaks no English.

62. Jamil al Urfali

Born about 1907, of a long-established Bagdad family. Sunni. Educated at Bagdad Law College, whence he graduated in 1930, and studied for a short time at the London School of Economics. On his return he edited a weekly legal journal. He joined the Iraqi Judicial Service 1933 and served as a Judge in Hilla, Diwaniya, Nasiriya and later as Chief Magistrate and President of the Execution Department, Bagdad.

Deputy for Diyala 1947. Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies 1949. Founder-member and member of the Central Committee of Nuri Said's Constitutional Unity Party, December 1949. Minister without Portfolio in charge of Auqaf Affairs under Tawfiq Suweidi, 1950.

He is a protégé of Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, without much personal influence.

63. Kamil Chaderchi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1901. Half-brother of Raouf Chaderchi (q.v.). His father was exiled in 1920 and he accompanied him to Istanbul where he studied medicine for a year.

On returning to Iraq he studied law and graduated from the Bagdad Law College in about 1925, when he was appointed to a minor position in the Ministry of Finance. Became Private Secretary to Yasin al Hashimi in 1929, and left official employment soon after to edit *Al Ikha al Watani*, the organ of Yasin Pasha's party of that name. In the early 30's he was associated with the Ahali group with Mohammed Hadid, Abdul Fettah Ibrahim and Abdul Qadir Ismail and started the newspaper *Saut al Ahali*, which has continued with some interruption and changes of name ever since. He was convicted under the Press Law in 1934 and arrested in the same year for publishing pamphlets against King Ghazi but released for lack of evidence.

The Ahali group was privy to the Bekr Sidqi coup d'Etat against Yasin al Hashimi in 1936 and Kamil became Minister of Economics and Commerce in the Cabinet formed by Hikmet Sulaiman. He resigned in June 1937 because of the increasing influence of the Army. He later formed the Democratic Party with Mohammed Hadid, Majid Mustafa and Hikmet Sulaiman which had little success. He refused to enter Nuri Said's Cabinet in 1943. In 1946 he formed the National Democratic Party, which voluntarily suspended activity in 1948, but resumed in 1950. Both in 1946 and 1947 he was prosecuted on Press Law charges.

Kamil is a muddle-headed idealist who holds progressive social democratic views with complete sincerity, but he is incapable of translating these views into a consistent policy suitable to Iraqi conditions. The poor success of the National Democratic Party is largely due to his lack of leadership and organising ability. He is an unrelenting opponent of Nuri Said. He is known to have been in contact with the Soviet Legation in 1951 and 1952.

Formerly a rich landlord, he has now sold much of his land and is no longer wealthy. He speaks very little English.

64. Khalil Ismail

Bagdad Sunni, of an obscure family of Indian origin. Born 1903. Educated at the Bagdad Law College, he held various positions in the Ministry of Interior from 1925 to 1932.

Secretary of the Cabinet 1932-35. Appointed Director-General of Interior 1935; of Education 1936; for Foreign Affairs 1937. Mutasarrif of Amara 1937-38.

Appointed Director-General of Interior 1938; of Auqaf 1940; of Census 1941; of Revenues 1942; of Finance 1943; and of Customs and Excise 1945.

In November 1948 he was made Under-Secretary in charge of the Ministry of Finance during Muzahim

al Pachachi's Government. In January 1949 he became Minister of Finance under Nuri Said and held this post until the whole Cabinet resigned in autumn 1949. He became Deputy for Amara in a by-election in March 1949.

A competent though ponderous official of the old school. While Minister of Finance he gave the appearance of being friendly and co-operative, but his habit of distorting facts was apt to lead to difficulties. Both during and after his period of office he was widely accused of corruption on a large scale. Speaks excellent English and prides himself on his legal knowledge. His daughter appears modestly in mixed society.

65. Khalil Kanna

Sunni, born in Felluja about 1905. His family is of Turkoman origin. Educated at the American University of Beirut, and the Bagdad Law College, he entered Government service in 1933 and worked mainly in the Ministry of Communications and Works until 1941, when he supported Rashid Ali Gailani's coup d'Etat and was consequently interned.

In 1946 he was a founder-member of the Istiqlal Party, but he resigned from the Party with a flourish in 1947 and married a daughter of Ali Ridha al Askeri, thus becoming a relative of Nuri Said. Elected Deputy for the Dulaim in 1947, he was not returned in the 1948 elections. Deputy for Dulaim in by-elections of June 1950.

In January 1949 he started the newspaper *Al Ahd*, which was Nuri Said's mouthpiece. In December 1949 he became a founder-member of Nuri's Constitutional Union Party and was elected to its Central Committee.

Appointed Minister without Portfolio in Tawfiq Suweidi's Government in February 1950 to supervise press and propaganda affairs.

Appointed Minister of Education under Nuri Said in September 1950. His success in this post has largely re-established his political reputation. He represented Iraq at the U.N.E.S.C.O. Conference in Geneva in June 1951.

A fervent Sunni and deeply distrusted by the Shias. A bitter opponent of Saleh Jabr and his party. He speaks good English.

His young wife speaks no English.

66. Mahmud Agha Hajji Rasul

A Kurdish chief of the Pizhder tribe of Qal'a Diza, born about 1900. He is leader of that faction of the Pizhder which in strength and local influence among the Pizhder and neighbouring tribes rivals the faction led by Babekr Agha (q.v.). The Iraqi Government have not recognised his claim to paramount leadership of the Pizhder.

An active and intelligent man, he has been accused by Babekr Agha of having contact with Communists in Azerbaijan, but there is no proof of this. He professes loyalty to the British connexion.

67. Mahmud Agha Zibari

Kurdish chieftain of the Zibari tribe east of Amadia, born about 1895. At first a supporter of Mulla Mustafa (q.v.), who married his daughter, he was bribed with money and rifles by Mustafa al Umari (q.v.), then Minister of Interior, and took the Government side against Mulla Mustafa in 1945.

Since then the Central Government have appeased him. He was elected Deputy in 1947 and 1948 and was awarded the Order of the Rafidain Class IV. Nevertheless he has continued to be a thorn in the flesh of the administrative authorities, and his neighbours fear and hate him for his rapine. He is a ruffian and brigand, but he has influence in tribal circles and cannot be ignored.

68. Mahmud I Sheikh Said: Sheikh

Kurd of the family of Barzinja Sayyids. Born 1884. He inherited from his father considerable religious and tribal influence and a tradition of opposition to central authority. In Ottoman times he was notorious for his oppression and rapacity.

He was appointed Hukumdar of Sulaimaniya and given British advisers in December 1918. In June 1919 he attempted to throw off British control but was defeated, wounded and condemned to death. The sentence was commuted and he was imprisoned in India. He was again appointed Hukumdar in August 1922 but soon began to try to extend his personal power. He was summoned to Bagdad in February 1923 but took to the mountains with his personal following and remained an embarrassment to the authorities until his surrender in 1930. From 1931 to 1941 he was in forced residence at Nasiriya, Ramadi and Bagdad.

In 1941 he escaped to Kurdistan and prepared to oppose Rashid Ali's unconstitutional Government by force. Since the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion he has lived in semi-retirement at Dari Kella in Barsian near Sulaimaniya.

He is still very influential in Sulaimaniya and causes the local authorities some trouble. He hates all Arabs and holds the Bagdad Government in contempt. He has three sons, Raouf, Baba Ali (q.v.) and Latif. He speaks Turkish and Arabic in addition to Kurdish.

69. Mahmud Subhi Daftari

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1890 at Kerbala, where his father was Public Prosecutor. He received his primary education in Bagdad and was a school teacher for a short time. He entered Bagdad Law School, 1909 and completed his studies in Istanbul where his father was transferred about 1910. He remained in Istanbul until 1921 and acquired some small reputation as a writer in literary periodicals.

Legal adviser to the Bagdad Municipality 1921-22; Deputy 1925; Amin al Asima 1930 and again in 1933. Principal of the Law School 1931; Director-General of Tapu 1932; Senator 1937 to 1944.

Minister of Justice under Nuri Said December 1938 to February 1940; Minister for Foreign Affairs also under Nuri 1943.

Mahmud Subhi is well-off, owning land on the Tigris in Azizieh Nahiya as well as house property in Bagdad. The nationalism of his youth has worn off and he is now out of politics and friends with everyone. He much enjoys social life and the sound of his own voice. He speaks Turkish and some French.

70. Mahrut al Hadhdhal, Sheikh

Sunni Arab, born about 1896. In 1927 he succeeded his famous father, Fahad Beg, as chief of the Amarat (Anaiza) tribe, beduin of the south-western desert of Iraq.

His father was uncompromisingly pro-British, but Mahrut has tried to maintain good relations with the Iraqi Government also. He is not highly respected in Bagdad, however.

In 1940 he contracted for the supply of labour on the Haifa-Bagdad road, but during Rashid Ali's rebellion in 1941 some of his tribesmen got out of control and looted the road camps. During the war he engaged in profitable smuggling, particularly of arms, from Palestine.

His Razaza estate, west of Kerbala, was expropriated for the Abu Dibis reservoir in 1944-45, and out of the high compensation he received Mahrut has since bought other estates near Kerbala.

Justly proud of his pedigree, Mahrut has more of the avarice than of the generosity characteristic of the

beduin. Intensely hated in Shi'ite Kerbala, he is often held up by Iraqis as an example of the poor son of a fine father. He respects the British.

71. Majid Mustafa

Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born about 1895. An officer in the Turkish Army during the First World War, he remained pro-Turkish for some time and later became an active supporter of Sheikh Mahmud (q.v.).

Appointed Mudir Nahiya 1927; Qaimmaqam 1928-35; Mutasarrif 1935-41; he was an able administrator.

His attitude during Rashid Ali's rebellion in 1941 was equivocal, and he forfeited the trust of both sides. On the Regent's return to Bagdad he was suspended for four years for having complied with Rashid Ali's orders.

Nevertheless in December 1943 the Regent reluctantly agreed to his appointment as Minister without Portfolio to advise on Kurdish affairs in Nuri Said's Government. He achieved a peaceful settlement with Mulla Mustafa of Barzan in January 1944, but resigned with the whole Cabinet in June 1944.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri Said in September 1950 and elected Deputy for Erbil in November 1950.

Although he is a Kurd first and an Iraqi afterwards, Majid has proved an able Minister. He has sought the assistance of this embassy on numerous occasions in connexion with the reorganisation of his Ministry. In the summer of 1951 he was given a tour of social services in the United Kingdom by the British Council and returned an enthusiastic admirer of Britain and with a much improved knowledge of English. Subsequently, however, the apathy of other members of the Cabinet to his ideas of social reform have discouraged him, and he has expressed a desire to return to his large and successful business interests which include a marble quarry in Rowanduz.

72. Mar Shimun

Eshai Mar Shimun XXIIIrd, Patriarch of the Assyrians. Born about 1909, he succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury.

After his return to Iraq he inspired the mutiny of the Assyrian Levies in 1932 and the exodus of the Assyrians to Syria in 1933 which precipitated the massacres in Mosul liwa of that year. He was deported in 1933 and given asylum in Cyprus. He spent the next seven years in Europe, mostly in England and Geneva, trying to obtain assistance for his people. Granted British naturalisation in 1939 and went to Cyprus, but in 1940 he went to America and has since been living in Chicago, taking a full part in intrigues which split the Assyrians both inside and outside Iraq.

Mar Shimun's aim was to establish the whole Assyrian community in a compact enclave under his own spiritual and temporal authority. His political inexperience and overweening ambitions caused his people much needless suffering.

73. Muaffaq al Alusi

Sunni of Bagdad, born about 1894. Educated in France, he returned to Bagdad in 1926.

Professor at the Law School 1926. Director-General Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1928. He withdrew to Beirut after a quarrel with the Minister Abdullah Damluji (q.v.) in 1930. He accompanied Nuri Said to Mecca to negotiate the Iraqi-Nejd Bon Voisinage agreement in 1931. Became Judicial Adviser to Ibn Saud 1932. Returned to Bagdad 1933 and held positions in the Iraqi Foreign Service at Tehran, Beirut and Bombay. He was dismissed from the Foreign Service in 1937, reinstated in 1939 and served at Paris, Damascus and Istanbul. He was

recalled in November 1941 and again dismissed in 1943. Since then Ibn Saud has befriended him and used him on occasion. In 1949 he sent him to Syria to intrigue against Iraqi-Syrian union.

Muaffaq is an unprincipled adventurer. He drinks heavily and his habits are unsavoury.

74. Mudhaffar Ahmad

Sunni, born in Hilla in 1899. Educated in Baghdad, he was an officer in the Turkish army.

Gazetted Assistant Commandant of Police in 1921, he was promoted Commandant in 1932. After a course at the Birmingham City Police School he was appointed principal of the Inspectors' Training School and thereafter held several appointments on the headquarters staff of the police. As Director of the C.I.D. after Rashid Ali's rebellion he enforced energetic anti-Nazi measures. His reputation in the police was high.

Director-General of Civil Defence 1941-43; Mutasarrif of Ramadi 1943; Basra 1944-45; Mosul 1946; Baghdad 1946-48. He was allotted some of the blame for police action against the January 1948 demonstrations and was removed to the Administrative Inspectorate in March 1948. He was appointed Mayor of Baghdad in 1949, and in 1950 refused the Directorate-General of Police in succession to Ali Hejazi (q.v.). Director-General of the Date Monopoly, 1951.

Appointed Honorary O.B.E. for war services 1946.

He is a polished and popular man and a keen sportsman, but there were reports of corruption when he was Mayor of Baghdad. He is related through his mother to Nuri Said and to the Askari family, and his wife, who appears in public, is a Partow. He and his wife speak good English and Turkish and some French.

75. Muhammad Ali Chelabi

Shia of Kadhmain, born about 1910. Brother of Abdul Hadi Chelabi (q.v.). In 1933, after studying at the American University of Beirut, he went to London to study economics. In 1938, was given a post in the Agricultural and Industrial Bank. In 1941 he was transferred to the newly-opened Rafidain Bank in Baghdad, of which he was appointed director in 1945.

He speaks good English and is married to a Syrian.

76. Muhammad Ali Mahmud

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1895. Educated Baghdad Law School and employed in the Ministry of Justice, in which he rose to become Director-General. He also held post of Director-General Tapu and in 1935 was a member of the Court of Cassation.

Deputy for Diyala in the Parliament of 1935 and for Erbil in those of 1936 and 1937. Minister of Finance in Hikmat Sulaiman's re-formed Cabinet of 1937.

He was Minister of Communications and Works in Rashid Ali's unconstitutional Cabinet of April 1941. On its collapse he fled to Persia but was handed over to the British in September 1941. He was interned in Rhodesia and sent back to Iraq in 1944, where he was tried and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, but released in 1947. He was elected Deputy for Kor Sanjaq in November 1950.

His daughter is married to a son of Ja'far al Askari and probably because of this connexion he joined Nuri Pasha's constitutional party in 1949. Elected to the Central Committee of the Party in November 1950.

He has only just emerged into social life. He appears to be an intelligent and reasonable man and to be feeling his way carefully back into politics. He speaks no English.

77. Muhammad Hassan Kubba

Shia of Baghdad, born 1891 and educated locally. In 1913 he became a teacher of Arabic at the German School in Baghdad. After the occupation he set up in commerce in a small way. He entered the Law School in 1920 and as a student was associated with the nationalist activities of Jafar Abu Timman. He graduated in 1923 and joined Government service. Judge at Suwaira 1927, at Kadhmain 1931; legal draftsman in the Ministry of Justice 1938.

Deputy 1944 and President of the Chamber 1947. Senator from July 1947 and Vice-President of the Senate December 1947. Minister for Social Affairs under Nuri Said 1943, he retained this portfolio in the succeeding Government of Hamdi Pachachi, but resigned to become President of the Chamber. Minister of Justice under Arshad al Umari 1946 and again in 1948 under Muzahim al Pachachi. Minister of Justice under Nuri Said January 1949. Minister without Portfolio in Nuri Said's cabinet in December 1950. Appointed Acting Minister of Health in April 1952.

A weak individual who would never have become a Minister had he been born a Sunni. He wished to resign from Arshad's Cabinet in 1946 owing to the Prime Minister's interference with the courts, but a word from the Regent restrained him. He is pleasant and friendly and proud of his erudition in Shariya law. He speaks no English.

78. Muhammad Hussain Hadid

Sunni, born 1906 of a merchant family of Mosul. Educated at American University, Beirut, 1924 to 1928, and London School of Economics 1928 to 1931.

Employed in the Ministry of Finance 1931 to 1937; Deputy for Mosul 1937; Minister of Supply under Nuri Pasha in 1946, he resigned from this Government in protest against Government interference in the elections.

He was a prominent member of the so-called Ahali Group in the first half of the 1930's. This group advocated a mild form of socialism. Some of its members later became communists. In the later '30s he was associated with Kamil Chaderchi's Democratic Party and was one of the founder members of the National Democratic Party in 1946. He is Vice-President of this party which suspended activity in 1948 but resumed in 1950. He resigned his seat in the Chamber in 1950 with the rest of the opposition deputies in protest against the intolerance of the Government and of Nuri Said's majority party.

Apart from his political activities, he has large business interests and is a partner with Kamil Khedairi in a flourishing soap business which exports to India and Egypt.

Mohammed Hadid is an intelligent and sincere democrat, an effective speaker and a persuasive writer, but he has not made the intellectual effort required to transform the ideas he learned at the London School of Economics into a suitable policy for Iraq. Until this is done he and his kind are likely to remain in sterile opposition. Although a nationalist and a critic of British influence in Iraq, he is friendly to us and has a number of British friends. He dislikes Americans. He speaks excellent English.

79. Muhammad Hussain al Kashif al Ghita

The most important Arab Shia mujtahid of Najaf. Born between 1880 and 1890 of a large family of Najaf, he was educated in the religious schools of Najaf, and is said to be very learned in Shi'ite law and theology. He has published a popular book on the origins and doctrine of the Shia.

He was Iraqi delegate to the Moslem Conference at Jerusalem in 1931, and has since visited Persia. In 1935 he played a prominent part in the Euphrates tribal insurrections against Yasin al Hashimi's Government, hoping thereby to secure for the Shia a

greater share in the Government of Iraq. After the defeat of the tribes he withdrew to the silence of Najaf.

Suspected in 1939 of accepting money from the German Legation to foster anti-British feeling, he issued a fatwa against the British during Rashid Ali's rebellion in 1941, but recanted after Rashid Ali's defeat and managed to rehabilitate himself very quickly. His nephew Ahmad was, however, interned from 1941 to 1944.

Honoured by all Iraqi Shias, Sheikh Muhammed Hussain still has some influence with the tribes of Southern Iraq. A foxy, inscrutable man and a born intriguer, he maintains relations with several Shi'ite politicians. He hates Communist Russia, but will never forgive the British for their policy in Palestine.

80. Mohammed Mahdi al Jawahiri

A Shia born at Nejaf in 1901. At one time he was employed by the Ministry of Education, but was removed from service prior to Bakr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat* in 1936. He has long been associated with various Left-wing newspapers, but is best known as a poet for which he has a considerable reputation throughout the Arab-speaking world. He has published two volumes of his works, and is at present working on the publication of a further two volumes, for which he received a grant from the Ministry of Education of £300 early in 1952.

He is a man of pronounced Left-wing views, but although he is ideologically a Marxist he is not an activist.

He has been prominently connected with the "Peace" movement in Iraq, and in November 1950 was elected as a member of the World Peace Council at the Second World Peace Congress, held in Warsaw in November 1950. In May 1951 he left Iraq for Egypt and is known to have attended a meeting of the Peace Council at Vienna before returning to Iraq in November 1951.

Since his return he has expressed dissatisfaction with the various "Peace" activities in Iraq and has kept aloof from the leading supporters of the movement. For this reason he has been severely criticised by leading Left-wing persons, and it has been alleged that the grant he received from the Ministry of Education for publishing his poetical works was the price of his silence.

In January 1951 he became chief editor of a new Left-wing newspaper, *Al Thabat*, until its suppression by the Government in April 1952. He then became owner and editor of another new Left-wing daily newspaper, *Al Jihad*.

81. Muhammad Mahdi Kubba

Born about 1900 of the well-known Baghdad Shia family of Kubba, he was educated in the religious seminary at Najaf in Grammar, Persian and theology.

After the First World War he engaged in quite a humble way in the textile trade in common with other members of his family. He never held Government office of any kind until 1948, although he was once a Deputy for Baghdad in 1937.

He was a member of the Nationalist Muthanna Club from its foundation and was helped into politics by a fellow member Dr. Jamali (q.v.). He developed pro-Axis sympathies during a visit to Germany in the late 30's but took no active part in the Rashid Ali movement.

He was made president of the Istiqlal Party on its formation in 1946, probably owing to his Shia origin, well-known name, and clean record. His voice in its councils is less effective than those of Faiq Samarra'i and Siddiq Shenshal. Re-elected president of the Istiqlal Party in November 1950, he strongly supported the Persian Government in their efforts to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951.

Minister of Supply in the Sadr Cabinet of January 1948, he resigned in June over the conduct of the elections. However, he became Deputy for Baghdad in these elections, but resigned his seat in protest, in common with the rest of the opposition, in March 1950. He was re-elected in the by-elections in June. Resigned with the other Istiqlal Deputies from the Chamber of Deputies in February 1952.

An untidy looking man, he has a reputation for sobriety and honesty. His enemies accuse him of folly rather than knavery. Intelligent, but not politically astute, he only speaks Arabic and Persian. He is a strong opponent of British "imperialism."

82. Muhammad Ridha Shabibi

Shia of Nejaf, born 1889. Educated in the religious schools of Nejaf. In 1908 he began to publish poetry in the Egyptian periodical press and acquired a reputation as a literary man. He played some part in the nationalist disturbances in Nejaf during the occupation. In 1919 he was sent to the Hejaz by some Iraqi nationalists to offer the Iraqi throne to the Amir Abdullah; thence he went to Syria and did not return to Baghdad until 1921.

He was a member of the Constituent Assembly and was Deputy for Baghdad in most Iraqi Parliaments until 1935. Senator from 1935 to 1943 and President of the Senate for a few months in 1937. He returned to the Lower House in 1943 and was its President in 1943-44. He resigned from Parliament with the Opposition deputies in March 1950.

Minister for Education under Yasin al Hashimi in 1924, he resigned from this Government with Rashid Ali Gailani over the Turkish Petroleum Company concession. Again Minister for Education in 1935 under Yasin al Hashimi, under Jamil Madfai in 1937 and 1941, and under Mohammed al Sadr in 1948.

In 1951 he played a prominent part in the formation of the United Popular Front and was elected Chairman of the Front's Political Committee.

A genial old bigot whose views on education are strongly reactionary. He is a strong critic of British influence in Iraq, but he is personally friendly to Englishmen. He speaks no English.

83. Muhammad Said Qazzaz

Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born about 1903. Largely self educated. He began his career as a clerk in the Mutasarrifiya in Sulaimaniya in 1924. Appointed Qaimmaqam of Halebja in 1934. Transferred in 1939 to Zakho and in 1941 to Kifri. From 1941 to 1944 he served in the Ministry of the Interior. In 1944 he was appointed Mutasarrif at Kut. Transferred to Erbil in 1945 and to Kirkuk in 1947, after a short spell as an Administrative Inspector. Appointed Mutassarif of Mosul in 1949. Was offered an appointment with the Basra Petroleum Company in the spring of 1952, but at Nuri Said's request has agreed to remain at Mosul until the general elections have taken place in the autumn.

He has visited England and in the summer of 1950 he toured America as a guest of the United States Government.

Hard working, honest and fearless, Said Qazzaz is generally regarded as one of the best administrators in the country. He is a close friend of Mustafa al Umari and Majid Mustafa. He speaks good English.

84. Muhammad al Sadr (Sayid)

Shia of Kadhmain, born about 1885. Educated in religious circles at Kadhmain.

He was a strong nationalist in the early days of the British occupation and took an active part in the insurrection of 1920. He fled to Syria after its suppression and returned with King Faisal in June 1921.

Appointed Senator in 1925. He was president of the Senate from 1929 to 1937 and again after a short interval from 1937 to 1943. He has several times been a member of the Regency Council during the Regent's

absences from Iraq. Prime Minister January to June 1948.

Muhammad al Sadr's political importance is due to his religious prestige and his nationalist past. For these reasons he is always consulted at moments of crisis but his weakness, ignorance and incapacity were amply proved by his total failure as Prime Minister to restore normal conditions after the disturbances in Bagdad which removed Saleh Jabr and secured the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948. He speaks no English.

85. Muhammad Sadiq Shenshal

Sunni, born in Mosul about 1908. Studied law at Bagdad and Damascus. He subsequently studied at the Sorbonne, returning to Iraq in 1939.

After serving as a Legal Adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs he became Director of Propaganda under Rashid Ali in 1941. Although acquitted of the charges brought against him he was interned. In 1946 he took a leading part in the formation of the Istiqlal Party. Resigned with the other Istiqlal Deputies from the Chamber of Deputies in February 1952.

Sadiq Shenshal is violently anti-British and he keeps up a flow of invective against the British connexion in Parliament and in the press. He is married to a sister of Yunis Sab'awi who was executed for the part he played in the Rashid Ali revolt.

86. Muhammad Salim al Radhi

Sunni, born Bagdad 1899. He was educated in Bagdad, the American University of Beirut and the Universities of California and Texas, from which he obtained doctorates in Agriculture and Science. Returning to Iraq in 1926 he joined the Department of Agriculture, in which he eventually became, and remained for several years, Director-General.

Director-General of Labour in the Ministry of Social Affairs, 1946. Iraqi Minister in Tehran, 1947-49. Appointed first Iraqi Minister to India, July 1949.

He is a landowner and is connected with the wealthy Shabandar family. His reputation in the Department of Agriculture was good, but as Minister in Tehran he was not popular with the Persians. Iraqi Shias accuse him of being a fanatical Sunni. He and his attractive wife both speak English well.

87. Mulla Mustafa

Kurdish chieftain of Barzan, born about 1898. Younger brother of Ahmad of Barzan (q.v.).

He was the fighting leader of the Barzanis in the troubles of 1931-32, surrendered with Sheikh Ahmad in 1933, and was banished to Sulaimaniya, where he lived for ten years in poverty on a small allowance from the Government.

In 1943 he escaped to Barzan, where he soon became involved in skirmishes with the Iraqi police. At first concerned only with his own position, he later began to pose as a champion of Kurdish nationalism and won much Kurdish sympathy and support. He resisted successfully the forces of police and troops sent against him. In January 1944, a settlement was arranged, and he visited Bagdad to make submission to the Regent. Returning to Barzan, he remained restless, but was formally pardoned in April 1945, when the Iraqi Government announced a programme for improving security and developing agriculture in the Barzan area.

Becoming impatient, he again took up arms against the Government in August 1945. Large Iraqi forces and clever bribery administered by Mustafa al Umari (q.v.) eventually defeated the Barzanis, and he and his brother Ahmed fled to Persia, where they were well received by the Russian authorities.

After the collapse of the Persian Kurdish independence movement led by Qazi Muhammed, Mulla Mustafa and his brother retired before the Persian forces and entered Iraq in May 1947. Sheikh Ahmad surrendered to the Iraqi Government but Mulla Mustafa refused unconditional surrender and managed to escape with a few hundred men through Turkey and Azerbaijan into the Soviet Union.

At first welcomed by the Russian authorities, but now, it is said, despised, the Mulla remains in the U.S.S.R. Popular fear of his eventual return keeps his name alive in Iraq.

88. Musa Shabandar

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1899, the son of a wealthy landowner. His brother Ibrahim is a prominent Bagdad merchant. Educated in Bagdad and in Switzerland, he was in Europe from 1918 to 1932, mostly in Switzerland and Germany.

Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service, 1932; Secretary of Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations, 1933; First Secretary, Berlin, 1935. In 1937 he was accused of giving certificates of export to Iraq for munitions destined for Spain. He was recalled and arrested, but proceedings against him were dropped.

Deputy for Amara 1937 to 1939.

Re-appointed to the Foreign Service 1939 and sent to Berlin as chargé d'affaires. Assistant Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, October 1939. Minister for Foreign Affairs in the unconstitutional Government of Rashid Ali in April 1941. He fled to Persia after Rashid Ali's collapse, but was caught and interned in Rhodesia and later sent back to Iraq for trial. He was sentenced in 1944 to five years' imprisonment and sequestration of property. Owing to ill-health he did not serve all his sentence.

He has been free since 1947 and in 1949 he joined Nuri Said's Constitutional Union Party and was appointed Minister at Damascus.

Musa Shabandar is not a strong personality. He is intelligent and accommodating, an official rather than a politician. He is married to a Lebanese and speaks English, French and German.

89. Mustafa al Umari

Sunni of the Umari family of Mosul. Born in 1893 and educated at the Bagdad Law School, he served as an officer in the Turkish forces in Mesopotamia in the first world war and was taken prisoner.

He entered Government service at the end of the war, served as Qaimmaqam and Mutasarrif in several districts and also held the posts of Accountant-General and Director-General of Interior.

He was Minister of Interior under Hikmat Sulaiman in 1937; under Jamil Madfai, 1937-38 and in 1941; under Hamdi Pachachi, 1944-46 and under Muzahim Pachachi in 1948. He has also been Minister of Justice under Madfai in late 1938, of Economics under Muhammed al Sadr, January-June 1948 (Acting Interior from March 1948 onwards), and without Portfolio under Muzahim at the end of 1948 and under Nuri Said from December 1950. He has been a Senator since 1937. Acting Prime Minister during Nuri Said's absences from Iraq in the first half of 1952. Accompanied the Regent to Amman in June 1952.

Of all Iraqi politicians and officials Mustafa is probably the most notorious for corruption. He is also one of the most capable administrators and most astute politicians in the country. He may be said to exhibit the best and the worst features of the Ottoman idea of Government. His administration during 1945 and his conduct of the 1948 elections aroused severe criticism, but he served his country well during the Barzani troubles of 1945, when his well-directed bribery was of great assistance to the Iraqi forces operating against Mulla Mustafa. He speaks only a little English.

90. Muzahim Amin al Pachachi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888. Educated at the Law School in Bagdad and graduated in 1912. Before the 1914 war he was a strong Arab nationalist. He wrote for Arab nationalist papers and had to flee to Basra in 1913 to escape arrest. After the war he was employed as a magistrate by the occupation authorities in Basra and returned to Bagdad in 1922.

He joined Government service in March 1923 and became Minister of Communications and Works under Yasin al Hashimi in 1924. In 1927 he was sent to London as Iraqi Diplomatic Agent, returning in 1928. Minister of Economics and Communications under Nuri Pasha, January 1931, and almost immediately after Minister of Interior in the same Government. He resigned in October 1931 because of differences with his colleagues over his dismissal of the Amin al Asima, Mahmud Subhi Daftari. In May 1932 he was charged with complicity in the circulation of scurrilous letters about the King. He was tried and acquitted in October 1932.

Iraqi Minister at Rome and Permanent Iraqi delegate at Geneva, 1934; Minister at Paris, 1939; he remained there as Minister to the Vichy Government and did not return when Iraq broke off relations in November 1941 but went instead to Rome. In 1944 he went to Geneva and sought facilities to return to Iraq, which were refused. He eventually returned in November 1945.

Prime Minister, June 1948 to January 1949; deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs under Ali Jawdat, December 1949 to February 1950. He was appointed Senator in 1948 but the appointment was held to be constitutionally invalid by a High Court in 1950. He left Iraq for Egypt and Saudi Arabia just before the issue of this decision. He returned to Iraq in November 1950 and took a leading part in the formation of the United Popular Front in May 1951. Resigned from the Front in May 1952. The Regent is unlikely to agree to his early return to office.

Muzahim's character presents some contradiction. He is a strong nationalist and resents "imperialism" deeply, but he has been much influenced by the Social Democratic ideas which he has encountered during his prolonged residence in Western Europe. He is often reasonable, but can be stupidly obstinate. Politically courageous at times, at others he gives up without a struggle. His ideas on general policy are sensible, but as a political tactician he is inept. He hates Nuri Pasha and strongly resents his influence with the Regent. This has led him to criticise the latter indiscreetly on occasion. He is very deaf. He speaks English.

91. Nadhif Shawi

Sunni, originally of the Ubaid tribe. Born Bagdad 1887. Educated at the Military College, Istanbul, and gazetted an officer in the Turkish army in 1909. He served in Syria in the Turkish Coastal Defence forces throughout the first world war. Afterwards he joined King Faisal's army in Syria and fought against the French at Maisaloun in 1920.

After the expulsion of Faisal from Syria he returned to Bagdad and for some years was a secondary school teacher. During this period he graduated from the Bagdad Law School.

He joined the Iraqi army in 1927. In 1935 he attended army manoeuvres in England, and on his return was given command of the Iraqi Staff College. Brigadier and Assistant C.G.S., 1937; retired, 1939.

Minister of Defence under Jamil Madfai, June to October 1941. Deputy for Dulaim, 1943 to 1947. Founder member of Saleh Jabr's Popular Socialist Party, June 1951. He was described as a pleasant but colourless Minister.

92. Nadim Shakir al Pachachi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1914. Nephew of the late Hamdi Pachachi and of Muzahim Pachachi (q.v.).

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Educated at Victoria College, Alexandria and London University.

Returned to Bagdad in 1938 and was appointed to the Ministry of Economics in which he rose to be Director-General by 1944.

He was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations in 1946 and visited London and America in 1948 to try to obtain support for the proposed Iraqi Oil Refinery at Baiji. Early in 1950 he quarrelled with his Minister, Dhia Jaafar, and tendered his resignation. His resignation was not accepted and he was appointed Director-General of Oil Affairs in June 1950. In this capacity he was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company in the summer and autumn of 1950. In March 1951 he again became Director-General of Economics. He again visited the United Kingdom in connexion with tenders for the oil refinery and the Iraq Government's gold case against the Iraq Petroleum Company. Played a leading part in the negotiations of 1951.

Nadim has not a very strong personality but he is an exceptionally intelligent and competent official whose rapid rise was not entirely due to the influence of his family. He is friendly and co-operative. In addition to his official position he is a landowner and farmer on a large scale. Shows signs of wishing to enter politics, and if he does so will be a great loss to the Civil Service. He divorced his first wife (a Pachachi) in 1947 in order to marry a cabaret artiste. He divorced his second wife in 1950. He speaks excellent English.

93. Dr. Naji al Asil

Bagdad Sunni, born about 1895. A graduate of the Constantinople Medical School in Ottoman times, he first became prominent in 1922 as semi-official Hashimite representative in London. After Ibn Saud's conquest of the Hejaz he became destitute and was deported to Iraq in 1925.

Employed in the Iraqi Military Medical Service from 1926, he was appointed Iraqi Consul-General and chargé d'affaires in Jidda in 1931 and transferred to Mohammerah in 1932. Acting Director-General of Foreign Affairs 1933-34; Counsellor in Tehran 1935; Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1936.

Minister for Foreign Affairs under Hikmat Sulaiman 1936-37, he went into retirement after that Cabinet's resignation until 1944, when he was appointed Director-General of Antiquities. Appointed permanent Iraqi delegate to the United Nations Organisation by the Sadr Cabinet in February 1948, he was recalled in June 1948 and returned to the Antiquities Department. Appointed an Active Member of the Iraq Academy in November 1949. He organised the Avicenna Festival in Iraq in March 1952.

A polished and intelligent but ponderous man, he is a close friend of Hikmet Suleiman (q.v.) but is not now on close terms with the active politicians. He began well in the Antiquities Department but later his work was affected by his personal financial difficulties. He speaks English well.

94. Naji Shaikat

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1891, brother of Sami Shaikat (q.v.). Educated Istanbul and became a reserve officer in the Turkish Army. Joined the Arab revolt at Aqaba in 1916.

He returned to Bagdad in 1919 and from 1921 to 1928 was Mutasarrif of various southern liwas, ending with Bagdad 1924-28.

He first became a Deputy in 1929; Minister of Interior under Abdul Muhsin Saadun in 1928 and again in 1929; Iraqi Minister at Ankara 1930-31; Minister of Interior under Nuri Said 1931; Prime Minister 1932; Minister of Interior under Jamil Madfai 1933; again Iraqi Minister at Ankara 1934. In this capacity he accompanied Taufiq Rustu Aras,

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the then Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on an official visit to Iraq in 1937. He was then offered a portfolio in the Government of Hikmat Sulaiman, but declined because of his objection to Bekr Sidqi's influence. Minister of Interior under Nuri Said 1938, but resigned in April 1939. Minister of Justice under Rashid Ali March 1940.

After the collapse of France he became a strong advocate of reinsurance with the Axis and, with Rashid Ali's approval, he went to Istanbul in September 1940 to establish contact with the German Ambassador, Herr von Papen. He resigned from the Government in January 1941, but became Minister of Defence in the unconstitutional cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. During the Rashid Ali rebellion in May he went to Turkey to try to enlist Turkish support for Rashid Ali's cause, and remained in Turkey after the collapse of the rebellion. He was tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. He spent the war years between Berlin and Rome, receiving a Minister's salary from the Reich Government. In the summer of 1945 he was arrested in Italy, sent back to Iraq and imprisoned.

He was pardoned by the Regent in May 1948, but has not yet returned to social or political life.

95. Najib al Rawi

Sunni of Bagdad, born about 1898; brother of Ahmed al Rawi (q.v.). Educated at the Bagdad Law School, he worked for a short time as a clerk in the Revenue Department under the British Administration. He has a large practice as a lawyer and was President of the Lawyers' Association in 1942 and again in 1947.

He entered politics as a protégé of Nuri Said in 1930 and was Deputy for Dulaim in the Parliaments of 1930, 1934, 1937, 1943, 1947 and 1948. He resigned his seat with the Opposition Deputies in March 1950.

Minister of Education under Tawfiq Suweidi 1946; Minister of Justice under Mohammed al Sadr in 1948; Minister of Education in the succeeding Governments of Muzahim al Pachachi, Nuri Said and Ali Jaudat, June 1948 to February 1950. He represented Iraq at the Paris Session of U.N.O. in September 1948. Appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo in August 1950.

Politically he is a trimmer and has a foot in several camps, though he is generally regarded as primarily a Palace man. He is friendly to the British connexion but is not altogether trustworthy. He is married to one of the Daghestani sisters and speaks a little English.

96. Nasrat al Farisi

Sunni of Bagdad, born about 1890. Educated Bagdad Law School.

He was conscripted for the Turkish Army before he had graduated, and served as a warrant officer during the 1914-18 war in which he saw service against the Russians at Hamadan and against the British at Kut.

After the war he completed his legal studies in Istanbul and returned to Bagdad about 1922.

He served for several years in the twenties as legal draughtsman in the Ministry of Justice.

First Deputy for Bagdad in 1926 and again in 1932, and in most of the Iraqi Parliaments since then. He resigned his seat with the Opposition Deputies in March 1950.

Director-General of Foreign Affairs 1935. Iraqi delegate at Geneva 1937 to 1938. He was appointed Iraqi Minister at Ankara in April 1943 but did not proceed. In 1945 he was a member of the Iraqi delegation at San Francisco.

Minister of Finance under Naji Shaukat 1932 and again under Jamil Madfai 1933. Minister of Economics under Jamil Madfai, June to October 1941. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Nuri Said

June to October 1943. In the Cabinet of Muhammad Sadr of 1948 he was first Minister without Portfolio, then Minister of Interior and finally Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was closely associated with the formation of the United Popular Front in May 1951. Resigned from the Front in May 1952.

Nasrat is more of a Turk than an Arab, although he was known as an Arab nationalist in the twenties when he was a member of the Sha'ab party of Yasin al Hashimi. He is honest, intelligent and cautious. His approach to political questions is legalistic and theoretical. When considering any course of action he sees the difficulties more clearly than the advantages and is inclined to be obstructive. This characteristic made him one of Iraq's worst Ministers of Interior. He is a sincere reformer who believes in parliamentary democracy and resents the abuses of it which are normal in Iraq. He resigned from Nuri's Cabinet in 1943 as a protest against the Regent's interference in the elections. The nationalist views of his younger days have been modified by experience, but he is still a firm opponent of what he regards as undue British influence exercised through Nuri and the Palace. His wife is prominent in Ladies' Red Crescent activities, and both speak good English. He is personally friendly to the British.

97. Nuri al Qadhi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1893. Graduated from Bagdad Law School in Turkish times, and in 1914 was a judge in Basra. During the first world war he served as a reserve officer with the Turkish forces.

He joined Iraqi Government service in 1921 after serving as judge in the Muntafik under the Civil Administration. Vice-President of the Civil Courts in several provinces, including Bagdad, 1925, and Mosul, 1937. Director-General of Waqfs, 1931, Head of Legal Drafting Department, Ministry of Justice, 1936. Director-General Ministry of Justice, March 1940. Secretary-General to the Council of Ministers, December 1941 and Head of the Diwan of the Council of Ministers in May 1950.

He accompanied Nuri Said to Ankara for the negotiation of the Iraqi-Turkish Treaty of 1946. Minister of Education, 1946, under Arshad al Umari, he afterwards returned to his post with the Council of Ministers. Appointed a member of the Development Board in June 1952.

98. Nuri Sa'id

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888, son of an accountant of Mosul descent. Educated at Military College, Istanbul and served in the Balkan war.

He was one of the founders of the Arab Nationalist Society, Al Ahd, in 1913 and joined the Arab army in the Hejaz in 1916. He served in this army as C.G.S. under his brother-in-law, Jafar al Askari. At that time he was described as a good strategist, clever and hard working, but rash and hot-headed under fire. He won the D.S.O. in 1917 and was appointed an honorary C.M.G. in 1919.

After the 1914 war he remained with Faisal in Syria and accompanied him to London and Paris in 1919 and 1920. He was opposed to Faisal's break with the French.

He returned to Bagdad in February 1921 and soon after became C.G.S. and Director-General of Police, retaining these appointments until 1922.

He has been nine times Minister of Defence, in 1922 (Acting), 1923, 1925, 1926, 1928, 1929 (twice) 1933 and 1941 (Acting), in Cabinets headed by Jafar al Askari, Abdul Muhsin Sa'adun, Rashid Ali Gailani and himself. Nine times Minister for Foreign Affairs, in 1930, 1933 (twice), 1934, 1938 (Acting), 1940 (Acting), 1942 (Acting), in Cabinets headed by Rashid Ali Gailani, Jamil Madfai, Ali Jaudat and himself. He has also been Prime Minister in 1930, 1931, 1938, 1939, 1941-43, 1946, 1949, 1950 and 1951.

His achievements in diplomacy are also impressive. He negotiated and signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930; he negotiated the Bon Voisinage Agreement with Nejd and the Hejaz, 1931. He signed the Extradition Treaty and a Treaty of Commerce with Turkey in 1932 and negotiated and signed the Economic and Commercial Treaty with Turkey in 1946. He represented Iraq at the London conversations in January 1939, which eventually resulted in the issue of the 1939 White Paper on Palestine, and he led the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations General Assembly which decided the partition of Palestine in 1947. He was a member of the Iraqi delegation which signed the unratified Portsmouth Treaty with the United Kingdom in 1948.

After the Bekr Sidqi military coup of October 1936, during which Jafar al Askari was murdered, Nuri retired with his family to Egypt. He returned a year later after Bekr Sidqi had been murdered and Hikmat Sulaiman's Government had fallen, but left again soon after and spent most of 1938 in Syria, Egypt and London, where he held a number of inconclusive conversations with politicians on the Palestine problem. In December 1938 he returned to Iraq and became Prime Minister as a result of a military demonstration organised on his behalf by Taha al Hashimi and Hussain Fawzi, against the Government of Jamil Madfai. In January 1941 he resigned from Rashid Ali's Government, in which he was Minister for Foreign Affairs, because of Rashid Ali's increasing inclination towards the Axis Powers. In April 1941, shortly before the army overthrew Taha al Hashimi and set up the unconstitutional Government of Rashid Ali, Nuri withdrew to Transjordan, where he remained until he was able to return with the Regent in June. He became Prime Minister in the autumn of the same year and remained in power until June 1944. During this period he collaborated closely with His Majesty's Ambassador in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda in Iraq and it was due to his initiative that Iraq declared war on the Axis Powers in January 1943.

He accompanied the Regent on his travels to America and Europe during the summer of 1945, and to England in 1946. On his way home on the second occasion he had talks in Syria and Turkey in the hope of removing the difficulties between these countries.

He formed a Cabinet in November 1946 to carry out elections, and included in it some younger men and representatives of the newly formed National Democratic and Liberal Parties. Nuri's ideas about free elections did not agree with theirs, and they resigned after about a month protesting that Nuri and Saleh Jabr were preparing to exert undue Government influence on the elections.

Nuri collaborated with Saleh Jabr in the negotiation of the Portsmouth Treaty during 1947 and shared with him the nationalist resentment which was fermented against it in January 1948. Within a year, however, he demonstrated his mastery of the Iraqi political scene by returning to power as Prime Minister in January 1949. He succeeded in improving public security and in withdrawing the army from Palestine without incident. He took a very firm line with the organising committees of the Communist Party, five members of which were hanged. But he failed to do much to improve the financial position of the Government in spite of a personal visit to London. He was much disappointed by his failure to obtain an advance of royalties from the Iraq Petroleum Company. During the troubled period which followed Colonel Zaim's *coup d'Etat* in Syria in the spring of 1949, Nuri worked hard, but unsuccessfully, for Iraqi-Syrian union. He resigned in December 1949.

In the summer of 1950 he went to London where he negotiated a temporary increase in oil royalties with the Iraq Petroleum Company. In 1951 he

visited Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan. Accompanied the Regent when the latter visited Kuwait and Bahrain in the spring of 1952 and Spain in May.

Nuri dominates Iraqi politics. Death or exile have removed the few politicians of his generation such as Yasin al Hashimi and Rashid Ali Gailani who could hope to rival him, and of the younger men only Saleh Jabr offers any serious challenge to his supremacy. While it is true that an agreement between Nuri and Saleh Jabr would be in the best interests of Iraq, there are no signs of a rapprochement between the two and their political rivalry continues unabated. Nuri showed again in February 1952 how completely he still dominates the political scene by his masterly handling of the oil agreements in Parliament. Nuri's intelligence, vigour and courage have not yet begun to fail and he can still deal as unscrupulously and ruthlessly with his enemies as in the past. Nevertheless, his outstanding skill in political intrigue and his fearless advocacy of the British connexion have made him widely distrusted both inside and outside Iraq.

His talents are in negotiation and political manoeuvre and his interest in Arab and world politics. His dream is of an Arab Kingdom unified under a Hashimite monarch. This kingdom would exclude Egypt and Arabia and would be closely allied with Great Britain.

He is uninterested in the details of domestic administration and his long periods of power have contributed little to Iraqi social or economic progress. Not personally corrupt, he condones corruption in others (his son Subah is notorious in this respect) and his nephews and marriage connexions can usually count on obtaining Government employment.

He enjoys his food and drink, has a keen sense of humour and is excellent company. He speaks English, German, French and Turkish.

99. Nuruddin Mahmud

Kurd, born in Mosul in 1899. Educated in Ottoman military schools, he was commissioned in the Turkish army in 1917 and in the Iraqi army in 1921.

A graduate of Camberley and Quetta, he was Iraqi Military Attaché in London in 1935 and became Lieutenant-Colonel in 1937. Promoted Colonel in 1939, he was appointed Ministry of Defence member of the Iraqi State Railways Board, and in 1940 he became Director of Military Operations.

In 1941 he opposed Rashid Ali's rebellion and after its collapse he took over command and initiated the Anglo-Iraqi armistice. Commander 2nd Division (Kirkuk), 1941-43; Assistant C.G.S., 1943; promoted Major-General and appointed Commander 1st Division (Diwaniya), 1944. In 1943 he visited the Western Desert battlefields, and in 1946 he attended the victory celebrations in London. In 1948 he was promoted Lieutenant-General and commanded the Iraqi forces in Palestine, where he was involved in the inter-Arab jealousies which prevented the establishment of an effective Arab High Command. In 1949 he returned to command the 1st Division. Appointed C.G.S. in July 1951. He is probably the best Iraqi general officer. His understanding of modern war leaves much to be desired, but he is fully alive to the importance of training and his directives are carried out. He combines severity and a certain rugged kindness in proportions which make him on the whole more feared and respected than well liked in the army. Although ambitious, he does not dabble in politics. He speaks English and Turkish well and his sympathies are steadily pro-British.

100. Rafail Petros Butti

Christian of Mosul, born 1901. Educated at the Assyrian Orthodox School, Mosul, and at Secondary School, Bagdad. He later attended night classes and graduated from the Bagdad Law School, 1929.

Served in minor posts in the Ministry of Interior from 1925 to 1929. Contributed to the newspaper *Al Iraq* while still an official and after his resignation published *Al Bilad* in partnership with Jebran Malcon (q.v.). As a journalist he was consistently anti-British, but in Iraqi politics he frequently changed sides. He supported Nuri Said from 1921 to 1929, with occasional lapses. He supported Yasin al Hashimi from 1930 to 1935, Bekr Sidqi 1936 to 1937, and Rashid Ali 1938 to 1942. He was interned in 1942 but released in 1943 and resumed publication of *Al Bilad*. He went to Egypt in 1944 and remained there until 1948.

He was Deputy for Mosul in 1935, for Basra in 1939 and for Bagdad in 1948, in which year he attended the inter-Parliamentary Conference at Rome. He joined the Istiqlal Party in 1948 and was considered as one of its leaders. He resigned from the Majlis with the other Opposition Deputies in March 1950 and from the Istiqlal Party in May, because of its decision to contest the by-elections occasioned by the resignations. Appointed Press Counsellor at the Iraqi Legation in Cairo in February 1951.

Butti is a capable and fearless journalist but he is unscrupulous, venal and quite unreliable.

101. Rashid Ali al Gailani

Bagdad Sunni, born 1892. A distant relation of the Naqib. A Waqf clerk in Ottoman times, he fled to Mosul with the Turks after the capture of Bagdad and practised as a lawyer after the fall of Mosul.

Appointed judge, 1921, he soon showed his ability. Minister of Justice under Yasin al Hashimi, 1924-25, he resigned over the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession. President of the Chamber of Deputies, 1925-26. Minister of Interior under Jafar al Askari, 1926-28.

Again elected Deputy in 1930, he resigned (with others) in 1931 in protest against the conduct of Nuri Said's Government, and became a prominent member of the nationalist Hizb al Ikha al Watani. Chief Private Secretary to the King 1932-33.

Prime Minister from March to October 1933 he was appointed Senator in 1934. He helped to organise the Euphrates disturbances which forced Ali Jaudat to resign in spring 1935, and became Minister of Interior in the Cabinet then formed by Yasin al Hashimi.

In 1936 he fled to Istanbul after Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat*. Returning to Iraq in 1937, he opposed Jamil Madfai's Government and was deported to Anah for a short time in 1938.

Prime Minister from March 1940 to January 1941, he moved steadily towards a closer understanding with the Axis. He kept close contact with the Italian Legation in Bagdad, supported the intrigues of the Mufti of Jerusalem, sponsored the overtures made by Naji Shaukat (q.v.) to the German Minister in Turkey, and encouraged the pro-Nazi press. Forced to resign by British pressure in January 1941, he returned to office through a *coup d'Etat* in April, installed Sharif Sharaf in place of the Regent and, backed by the Iraqi Army, refused to allow more than one brigade of British troops in Iraq.

In May 1941, when hostilities broke out between the Iraqi Army and the British forces in Habbaniya, he tried to unite the country against Britain but failed to get substantial tribal support. After the defeat of the Iraqi forces he fled to Persia, Turkey, and finally to Germany.

He was tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to death in 1942. Recognised by the Axis as legitimate Prime Minister of Iraq, he conducted an anti-British campaign by radio throughout the war.

In 1945 he escaped through the German lines to Prague and thence, with a false passport and the unwitting assistance of Allied military transport, to Marseilles, from where he sailed to Beirut. He

arrived at Riyadh in September 1945, declared himself to Ibn Saud and was granted asylum.

He is still in Riyadh, an extra thorn in Saudi-Hashimite relations. His health is now said to be declining rapidly. Ibn Saud is said to be tired of him, but schemes to move him elsewhere have not so far been satisfactory, and seasonal rumours that the Regent had pardoned him have proved untrue. He still has admirers in Iraq, particularly in the Istiqlal Party, and it is by no means certain that Iraq has seen the last of him.

102. Rauf al Bahrani

Bagdad Shia, born 1897. Educated at the Bagdad Law School, he was appointed to a clerical post in the Ministry of Finance in 1922 and rose—it is said not entirely by merit—to be Director-General of Customs and Excise in 1935.

Minister of Finance under Yasin al Hashimi 1935-36. Again Director General of Customs and Excise 1938-40. Minister of Finance under Nuri Said 1940; of Social Affairs under Rashid Ali 1940-41; and again of Social Affairs in Rashid Ali's rebel Government in April-May 1941.

After Rashid Ali's overthrow he fled to Persia, where he was arrested by British forces in autumn 1941 and sent for internment to Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq for trial in 1944, he was condemned to three years' hard labour and sequestration of his property.

After his release he engaged in business and gradually reinstated himself until in May 1950 he was appointed Director-General of Income Tax.

Although he talks the conventional Arab nationalist language, he was a tool rather than an associate of Rashid Ali. Early in 1950 he made himself known to a member of this Embassy and would like to rehabilitate himself in British eyes. He speaks no English.

103. Rauf al Chadirchi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1884. Educated at Istanbul and at Berlin and Geneva Universities. Before the war he was successively a clerk in the legal drafting department of the Turkish Ministry of Justice, a professor of law at the Turkish Law College, Qaimmaqam of Diyala, and adviser on foreign affairs to the Turkish Governor of Bagdad. Immediately before its fall he was the Mayor of Bagdad. He went to Berlin shortly before the occupation, and later to Switzerland. He was not permitted to return to Bagdad until 1920.

In Bagdad he practised as a lawyer and took no part in Nationalist agitation, but was asked to go with his father when the latter was deported to Istanbul in August 1920. He returned in 1921 and took up his law practice, obtaining much of the business of foreign firms owing to his knowledge of languages. Professor at the Bagdad Law School 1922, Dean 1923.

Deputy for Hilla 1924, he opposed the 1922 Treaty. Minister of Finance under Abdul Muhsin al Sa'adun, Minister of Justice under Jafar al Askari 1926. Iraqi Minister to Ankara 1929. He resigned in 1930 and returned to Bagdad as legal adviser to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Iraqi Minister in London from 1936 to 1939 when he resigned. He generally spends the summer months in England.

Rauf has a charming and kindly personality and looks on the intrigues and enthusiasms of Iraqi politics with an indulgent contempt. He is universally popular and consequently well informed, but will not often talk about politics. He speaks English, French, German and Turkish. Is badly crippled with arthritis. In April 1952 he surprised Bagdad society by marrying Majda, the stepdaughter of Daud al Haidari (q.v.).

104. Sa'ad Umar

Born in Kerbala in 1917. Shia. Son of Umar Haj Alwan, one of the Kerbala representatives on the Constituent Assembly. Educated at Kerbala and Bagdad. Graduated in the Law College about 1941. Thereafter he practised as a lawyer in Kerbala until 1947, when he became Deputy for Kerbala. He was not re-elected in 1948, but was put in in a bye-election later in the year. Minister for Social Affairs in Ali Jaudat's Government of December 1949, and of Education in Tawfik al Suweidi's Cabinet in February 1950. A member of Nuri Pasha's Constitutional Union Party November 1949.

In the Chamber of Deputies after he had failed to substantiate allegations of corruption which he had made against four Cabinet Ministers, he was suspended for the remainder of the parliamentary session.

A protégé of Saleh Jabr, who was a friend of his father. He owns a little property in Kerbala. He is full of large ideas but very inexperienced and unintelligent.

105. Sadiq al Bassam

Bagdad Shia, born about 1895. Educated at the Bagdad Law School, he practised as a lawyer for several years.

Elected Deputy for Kut in 1930, he supported Yasin al Hashimi and was a member of the Ikha al Watani Party. Minister of Education under Yasin al Hashimi 1935-36. Minister of Economics under Nuri Said 1939-40 and of Education under Rashid Ali in 1941.

Remaining inactive during the 1941 disturbances, he was Minister of Justice 1941-42 and of Communications and Works December 1943 to June 1944 under Nuri Said; of Finance under Muhammad as Sadr, January to June 1948; and of Defence under Muzahim Pachachi from June to October 1948. A Senator from 1941, his appointment was not renewed in 1949. A founder member of the United Popular Front, May 1951.

Sadiq is a xenophobe with violent prejudices and ill-concealed fanaticism. As Minister of Defence in 1948 he was mainly responsible for the fierce sentences passed on Jews by the courts martial and for encouraging anti-Jewish feeling. He does not like the British, and his policy is often indistinguishable from that of the Istiqlal Party. He speaks Arabic only. His private life is disreputable.

106. Said Haqqi

Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born 1883. Educated Military Academy, Istanbul and gazetted an officer in the Turkish army 1903.

He joined the Iraqi army on its formation in 1921 and reached the rank of colonel. He resigned about 1930 as a result of a disagreement with Taha al Hashimi, then C.G.S. He has subsequently held posts as Director-General of Jails, Director of Civil Aviation and finally, in about 1939, Keeper of the Privy Purse at the Palace. Resigned in June 1951.

Minister of Defence under Arshad al Umari in 1946, for lack of a suitable alternative Kurd, he afterwards returned to his post in the Palace.

He leads a quiet life and politically and socially is almost unknown. He speaks no English.

107. Saleh Haidar

Shia of Bagdad born in 1914. After completing his secondary school education in Bagdad, he went for a year to the American University of Beirut and from 1933-36 to the London School of Economics where he took a degree in economics. Assistant Collector of Customs, 1936-37. In 1937 he returned for a year to the London School of Economics for further study. On his return to Iraq he studied land problems and went back again to his London School of Economics from 1939-42. Ph.D. of

London University, 1942. In 1943-46 he held various appointments in the Ministry of Supply, and in 1946-48 in the Ministry of Finance.

Member of the Iraqi Delegation to the San Francisco Conference 1945. Acting Director-General of State Domains, 1948. In the same year he was seconded from the Ministry of Finance and made Deputy Governor of the National Bank of Iraq. In 1950 he went to Washington and London in connexion with the negotiations for the International Bank loan to Iraq and the Scarce Currency Agreements. His appointment as Deputy Governor of the National Bank was suddenly though not unexpectedly terminated in June 1952.

A supporter of Saleh Jabr, he is intelligent, but conceited, and he does not get on well with his colleagues. He also has the reputation of being untrustworthy. He was on very bad terms with the Governor of the National Bank, Abdul Ilah Hafiz (q.v.), who refused to deal with him or give him any work to do. He appears to suspect that British influence was to blame for this treatment, but he is on friendly terms with members of the embassy staff. He speaks excellent English.

108. Saleh Jabr, K.B.E.

Shia, born about 1897 in Nasiriya. His father was a carpenter, originally from the Beni Zaid tribe of Shatta. Educated in Nasiriya, he became a clerk in the Najaf court in 1919.

By 1924 he had risen to be head clerk in the Ministry of Justice. He entered the Bagdad Law College the same year, and after graduation in 1927-28 he was appointed as a judge and served for over two years in the Middle Euphrates.

Elected Deputy for the Muntafik in 1930 and 1934, he was Minister of Education under Jamil Madfai November 1933 to February 1934. Mutasarrif Kerbala 1935-36. Appointed Minister of Justice under Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936, he resigned in June 1937 over the Euphrates disturbances and left the country. He returned after Hikmat's resignation and was appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise.

Minister of Education December 1938 to February 1940 and then of Social Affairs until March 1940 under Nuri Said. Mutasarrif of Basra from June 1940, he supported the Regent when his Royal Highness fled to Basra in April 1941 to escape from Rashid Ali. Arrested by Rashid Ali, he narrowly escaped a heavy sentence and was released on condition he left the country. He withdrew to Tehran and returned after Rashid Ali's fall.

Minister of Interior October 1941 to October 1942, of Finance until June 1943, and again of Interior until October 1943 under Nuri Said. Minister of Finance June 1944 to February 1946 and Acting Minister of Supply August to December 1944 under Hamdi Pachachi. During Pachachi's absences he acted as Prime Minister and was expected to form a Government when the Pachachi Cabinet resigned. He was not, however, chosen, and spent much of the summer of 1946 in England.

He was appointed honorary K.B.E. for war services in 1946.

After a short time as Minister of Finance under Nuri Said in November 1946 he became the first Shia Prime Minister of Iraq after the elections of March 1947. Forced to resign in January 1948 by popular demonstrations against the Portsmouth Treaty, he spent much of 1948 abroad, but gradually recovered his position during 1949 and became Minister of Interior under Tawfik Suweidi in February 1950. He was not invited to join Nuri Said's cabinet in September 1950 and he spent the winter months abroad. His relations with Nuri improved in the spring of 1951 but efforts to bring him into the cabinet did not succeed. In June he was granted permission to form the Popular Socialist

Party. Saleh now seems determined to wrest the political leadership in Iraq from Nuri and the rift between the two has widened since 1951. This rivalry has been intensified by the supporters of both sides. Unfortunately Saleh is much under the influence of Saiyid Abdul Mahdi (q.v.) and as a result his party has become more and more identified with extremist Shia sectarianism. For purely political reasons he and his party opposed the oil agreements in Parliament in February 1952.

Saleh's merit has justified his rise from obscurity to be the first Shia Prime Minister and most powerful Shia politician in Iraq. He has a strong personality and is capable, energetic and courageous. His influence in the Euphrates area is greater than any other man's and many of the better young officials are his admirers. On the other hand, as he showed when Prime Minister, he is dictatorial, secretive, pompous and vindictive; and thus he makes many bitter enemies.

As an administrator Saleh Jabr left a good name, though he was too aloof to make many personal friends. As Prime Minister he concerned himself too much with long-range economic planning and foreign policy, neglecting his colleagues and his enemies and the necessary short-term economic measures. This neglect was the ultimate cause of his fall.

His sympathies are with Britain, but he is a hard bargainer for the interests of his country. His great disappointment in foreign affairs was his failure in 1947 to persuade the Arab League to impose oil sanctions on the Americans as a reprisal for their pro-Zionist policy. He is an ardent advocate of Arab Unity and in particular of the Fertile Crescent Plan.

His first wife died in 1936 and in 1942 he married the strong-minded and meddlesome daughter of the late Addai al Jeryan, chief of the influential Albu Sultan tribe of Hilla. During the war her interference lost him much support when the Albu Sultan were divided, but in recent years he has regained, and profited by, the full support of the Hilla district.

He speaks English.

109. Salih Saib al Jubburi

Sunni of the Jubur tribe of Mosul, born in 1898. Commissioned in the Turkish army in 1916 and in the Iraqi army in 1921, he was appointed instructor in the newly formed Small Arms School in Bagdad. During this appointment he attended a small arms course at Hythe, and later attended courses at the Iraqi Staff College and the Staff College, Camberley. A personal friend of Bekr Sidqi and a supporter of the 1936 *coup d'Etat*, he was retired after the assassination of Bekr Sidqi and appointed Assistant Director-General of the Iraqi State Railways. In 1941, after Rashid Ali's flight, he was invited to rejoin the army and was appointed G.O.C. 3rd Division. In 1944 he succeeded Ismail Namiq (q.v.) as Chief of the General Staff. He still holds this appointment. He was promoted lieutenant-general in 1945 and general in 1950. On handing over the office of the Chief of the General Staff in 1951 to General Nuruddin Mahmud (q.v.), he became a Senator.

He neither drinks, smokes nor gambles, and is said to be just and honest; but he had neither the ability nor the personality to be a good C.G.S. and his impotence as a leader was displayed in the 1948 Palestine campaign. He speaks English.

110. Salman Sheikh Daud

Bagdad Sunni, born about 1900. Once a lawyer and journalist, he was one of the first Iraqis to attack the Axis openly and independently in speeches and in the press after the outbreak of the Second World War. He was a member of the delegation of Iraqi journalists who visited Britain in 1945 and is Bagdad representative of the Arab News Agency. He was elected Deputy in 1943, 1947 and 1948.

Wealthy and given to women and drink, he has become a wreck of a man. He is on intimate terms with members of the staff of the United States Embassy and was the only Deputy to speak in support of the ratification of the Point Four Agreement when it was first presented to Parliament. Formerly a critic of Nuri Said's Governments he is now the boon-companion of Nuri's less reputable associates. He has very little political influence. He speaks some French.

111. Sami Fattah

A native of Mosul of Kurdish origin, born in 1905. Educated at the Teachers' Training College in Bagdad, he taught in Iraqi schools from 1922 to 1925.

In 1925 he joined the Iraqi Army and was sent to Sandhurst in 1926. Commissioned in the Iraqi Army in 1928, he was attached to the newly formed Royal Iraqi Air Force and returned to England for training with the R.A.F. When he came back to Iraq he was appointed to the Royal Iraqi Air Force, in which he has served ever since.

He graduated from the Iraqi Staff College in 1937 and in 1941, after the Rashid Ali rebellion, he was appointed Commander of the R.I.A.F. He has held this appointment ever since (with the rank of Brigadier), except for a short interlude in 1948 when he was sent to Europe on a secret arms purchasing mission which was a complete failure.

He is an energetic and jovial man, a good disciplinarian, and one of the Iraqi army's best leaders. He has made every effort to improve the training and equipment of the R.I.A.F. He speaks English well and his sympathies are pro-British.

112. Sami Shawkat

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1893. Brother of Najib Shawkat (q.v.). Graduated from Military College of Medicine, Istanbul, 1916. Joined the Arab army in Syria in 1919.

Appointed to Iraqi Health Service 1921; Director-General of Education 1937; Director-General of Public Health 1936; again Director-General of Education 1939.

Minister of Social Affairs 1939 and of Education 1940 under Nuri Said. He was re-appointed Director-General of Education in April 1940 and retained this position through the disturbances of 1941 until 1943, when he became Director-General of Social Affairs.

Resigned from Government service in 1945 and started the newspaper *Ba'th al Qawmi*, which was violently nationalist, anti-Communist and anti-British and was suppressed in 1946. In 1949 he started a political party named *Islah*, together with a few retired officials. Elected Deputy for Kut in the by-elections of June 1950.

He is earnest, obtuse and fairly honest, with an exaggerated sense of his own importance. He speaks Arabic and Turkish only.

113. Shakir al Wadi, M.V.O.

Bagdad Sunni, born 1894. An officer in the Turkish army from 1915 to the Armistice, he joined the Iraqi army in 1921.

Promoted captain in 1928, he was attached for training to British units in the United Kingdom in 1929. In 1930 he was promoted major and made A.D.C. to King Faisal, on whose staff he served during His Majesty's State visit to Britain in 1933. He was promoted lieutenant-colonel and attended the Staff College, Camberley, in 1935.

Returning to Iraq in 1936, he was appointed G.S.O.I. in the Kirkuk Division, of which Bekr Sidqi was the G.O.C., and was the latter's right-hand man in the 1936 *coup d'Etat*. Appointed military attaché in London after the murder of Bekr Sidqi in 1937, he was dismissed and placed on the retired list a few weeks later, and soon began to take part in political intrigue.

Appointed second secretary in the Iraqi Legation in Tehran in 1939, he later fell under the influence of the German Legation there and as *chargé d'affaires* in 1941 he dutifully carried out the instructions of Rashid Ali's rebel Government.

Consul at Jerusalem 1941-44. First secretary (and sometimes *chargé d'affaires*) in the Iraqi Legation in London 1944-46. Appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1946.

Minister of Defence under Nuri Said November 1946 to March 1947; under Saleh Jabr March 1947 to January 1948; under Muzahim Pachachi October 1948 to January 1949; under Nuri Said January 1949 to December 1949; and under Tawfiq Suweidi from February 1950 and under Nuri Said from September 1950. He acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs from September 1950 to February 1951 and has acted in the same capacity since July 1951. He became a member of the Central Committee of the Constitutional Union Party in November 1950. Appointed Senator March 1949.

Shakir enjoys the personal friendship and confidence of the Regent, to whose influence he owes his frequent ministerial appointments since 1946. He is ambitious and fairly capable; corrupt, but popular in the army, for whom, through his influence with the Regent, he can get things that others could not. He is widely disliked in political circles, partly through jealousy and partly on account of his very disreputable private life. He speaks English well and supports Iraq's British connexion.

114. Dr. Shawkat al Zahawi

Kurd, born about 1898, the son of a colonel in the Ottoman army. Educated in Bagdad and at the Military Medical College in Constantinople, he joined the Iraqi Health Service in 1922.

He has specialised in pathology, on which he has written a number of articles. He is now Director of the Central Pathological Institute and Professor of Pathology in the Royal Medical College.

He was Minister of Social Affairs under Tawfiq al Suweidi for a short time in 1946.

In the Royal Medical College he is an incompetent intriguer, but since he is married to a daughter of the late Mohammed Fadhil Pasha al Daghestani, and therefore has connexions with Najib al Rawi (q.v.) and Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.), he cannot easily be unseated. He speaks English.

115. Taha al Hashemi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888. Educated at Istanbul and served in the Turkish army in Arabia and the Yemen during the First World War. Appointed to the Turkish General Staff 1920.

He returned to Bagdad in 1922, joined the Iraqi army and was given command of the troops in Mosul. C.G.S. 1923. He was on the staff of the High Commissioner for the frontier negotiations with Turkey after the Treaty of Lausanne 1924. When the post of C.G.S. was abolished he became tutor to the then Crown Prince Ghazi 1924; Chief of the Census Department 1926; and Director of Education 1928. In 1930 he again became C.G.S. In 1931 he visited the Imam Yahya and concluded the Iraq-Yemen Treaty of Friendship. He was in Turkey in October 1936 when the Bekr Sidqi *coup d'Etat* forced the resignation of the Prime Minister (Taha's brother, the late Yasin al Hashemi), and he did not return to Iraq until September 1937, after the murder of Bekr Sidqi.

Elected Deputy for Bagdad December 1937 and again in 1939. In December 1938, in collaboration with the C.G.S., Husain Fawzi (q.v.), he organised the military demonstration which caused the resignation of Jamil Madfai (q.v.) and replaced him as Prime Minister by Nuri Said. Taha became Minister of Defence in Nuri's Government and retained this portfolio in the succeeding Government of Rashid Ali

in 1940. He resigned in January 1941 and himself became Prime Minister in February. He failed to break the influence of the pro-Axis military clique, who overthrew him and set up the unconstitutional Government of Rashid Ali a month later. He then retired to Turkey, where he remained for the rest of the war, because Nuri Said was unwilling to allow him to return.

He spent much of the time after the war in Syria, but in May 1951 he played the leading part in the formation of the United Popular Front. He was elected President of the Front's Supreme Committee. He knows no English but speaks French, Turkish and Arabic.

116. Tahsin Qadri, K.C.V.O.

Sunni of Damascus, born 1893. He was with King Faisal in Damascus and accompanied him to Europe in 1920. Came to Bagdad with the King and was appointed A.D.C. in 1921.

Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1932, he accompanied King Faisal on his State visit to England in 1933. He resigned in 1936 owing to Princess Azza's scandalous marriage. Counsellor to Iraqi Legation, Tehran, 1936. Consul-General, Bombay, 1937. Director of Protocol in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in February and Consul-General, Beirut, in July 1939. He became, in addition, *Chargé d'Affaires* at Damascus when the Iraqi Government recognised the new Syrian Government in 1943. Accredited as Minister to Syria and the Lebanon in 1944. Acting Director-General, Foreign Affairs, 1945, Minister at Paris 1946. Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1947. In June 1949 he was temporarily appointed Minister at Tehran when the Regent visited Persia in that year, but returned to his post at the Palace a few months later.

Tahsin is sociable and clever and makes an efficient and agreeable Master of Ceremonies. He much enjoys his whisky and the company of European ladies. Politically he is a lightweight and in spite of his opportunities has little influence over the Regent. He is married to the heiress of Abdul Wahhab Pasha Qartas of Basra. He speaks Turkish, French and English. His ambition is to succeed the Amir Zaid as ambassador in London.

117. Tariq al Askari

Sunni, born in Aleppo in 1914. Son of the late Jaafar Pasha al Askari. Nuri Said is his uncle. Educated at King's College, Cambridge, from 1932-35 and took a degree in engineering. In 1936-37 worked as engineer with the Grampian Electricity Supply Company in Scotland. Engineer in the Directorate-General of Irrigation, 1937-42. Deputy for Kut, 1943-48. From May to October 1948 served with the Arab Legion in Jerusalem and held the rank of captain. Appointed Director of the Agricultural Section of the Development Board in April 1952.

Tariq is a member of the Higher Committee of Nuri's Constitutional Union Party. Intelligent, wealthy, able and witty, he is one of the few younger Iraqis with a balanced judgment. Although a sincere Nationalist he regards the shortcomings of his own countrymen with amused cynicism. He is a genuine friend and admirer of Britain and a believer in the British connexion. He is also friendly with the United States Embassy. Tariq speaks excellent English, Turkish and some French. His wife, a daughter of the late Jaafar al Pachachi, also speaks good English and appears in mixed society. They entertain frequently and well.

118. Tawfiq al Naib

Sunni, born about 1895. A student at the Law School in Bagdad at the outbreak of the First World War, he completed his studies after the British occupation and was appointed to a post in the Department of Justice in 1923.

From 1926 to 1943 he was a judge and served in many parts of the country, though the bulk of his service was in Bagdad. He gained the reputation of a strong and just judge without political ambitions.

Appointed Mutasarrif of Kut 1943, and transferred to Diwaniya 1944. Minister of Economics under Saleh Jabr from September 1947 to January 1948, and of Interior under Nuri Said from March to September 1949. Appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts in November 1949.

He is a quiet, retiring man who neither smokes nor drinks.

He was a good judge, but a poor administrator. He is impassive and unimaginative, and needs always the letter of the law to support a decision that others may enforce. Though not a member of Saleh Jabr's party, he is one of his principal supporters. He speaks no English.

119. Tawfiq Suweidi

Sunni, of a well-established Bagdad family, born about 1889. Educated at Bagdad, Istanbul and Paris, where he studied International Law, he was appointed interpreter to the Ministry of Education at Istanbul in 1913. In the same year he represented Iraq at the Arab Conference in Paris. During the First World War he was in Istanbul. After the armistice he joined the Arab Government in Syria and was appointed a judge at Damascus. He returned to Bagdad in 1921 and was appointed Assistant Government Counsellor and Director of the Law School.

Deputy from 1924. President of the Chamber 1929, he has held the following Cabinet posts: Education under Abdul Musin Sa'adun 1928; Foreign Affairs under Jamil Madfai in 1934; Justice in Jamil Madfai's twelve-day Cabinet of 1935; Foreign Affairs again under Madfai 1937; Foreign Affairs under Taha al Hashimi 1941. He was Deputy Prime Minister under Nuri Pasha for a short time in 1943 but resigned the following year when the constitutional validity of this office was called in question. He was Prime Minister in 1929, 1946 and 1950 and joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in February 1951. Resigned from the Cabinet in July 1951. Member of the Regency Council during the Regent's brief visit to Amman in June 1952.

Tawfiq was Iraqi Minister at Tehran in 1931 and has had considerable diplomatic experience. As Minister for Foreign Affairs he headed the Iraqi Delegation to Geneva in 1937, where he is said to have handled the Palestine and Assyrian questions with tact and moderation. He again represented Iraq at Geneva in 1938 and afterwards visited London to discuss the Palestine problem with the British Foreign and Colonial Secretaries. He was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945, and in 1948 he was one of the signatories of the unratified Portsmouth Treaty.

His elder brother, the late Naji Suweidi, was a prominent member of Rashid Ali's rebel Government but Tawfiq was not implicated in the movement. Nevertheless, he is not completely trusted by the Regent and was not appointed a Senator until 1947. The Regent also vetoed Nuri's proposal to include him in his Cabinet in the autumn of 1949.

Tawfiq is intelligent, subtle and not altogether honest, either politically or financially. In Arab affairs he generally follows the Egyptian lead and in Iraqi politics he is normally opposed to Nuri Said but has co-operated with him on occasion. He is popularly supposed to be a Liberal. It was he who permitted the operation of political parties in 1946 after they had been banned for many years, and for a short time in 1946 he was president of the Liberal Party. He also has some reputation as a nationalist, but it is doubtful if any of his political convictions are strongly held. He is a rich man, a landed pro-

prietor, who has also wide business interests, in many cases in partnership with Iraqi Jews. He is known to have used his political influence in favour of his business interests. He has a keen sense of humour, is excellent company and speaks French and English fluently but incorrectly.

120. Tawfiq Wahbi Ma'ruf, C.B.E.

Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born in 1887. Graduating from the Turkish Military College in 1904, he served in European Turkey and was a regimental commander and later a staff officer in the Ottoman army during the 1914-18 war.

After the war he joined the Iraqi army and was appointed Military Adviser to Sheikh Mahmud (q.v.) in 1923. Leaving Sheikh Mahmud when the latter's conduct became impossible, he was appointed Commandant of the Bagdad Military College with the rank of colonel. In 1929 he was sent on a course to the United Kingdom.

Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya for a short time in 1930, he remained unemployed for several years afterwards but was ultimately appointed Director-General of Surveys. He resigned from Government service in 1941 and made a comfortable fortune as a contractor.

Minister of Economics under Hamdi Pachachi 1944-46, of Education under Saleh Jabr in 1947, and of Social Affairs under Tawfiq al Suweidi in 1950. Made a Senator in 1948.

Appointed Honorary C.B.E. for war services in 1946. Elected second vice-president of Saleh Jabr's Popular Socialist Party in July 1951. Although at first an enthusiastic supporter of Saleh Jabr his faith in the party is beginning to weaken.

Tawfiq is keenly interested in Kurdish culture and has spent much time compiling Kurdish dictionaries and writing Kurdish grammars. To young Kurdish nationalists he pleads moderation, but he is not influential with them.

He is a kind man, frank, affable and an Anglophile being honorary vice-president of the British Institute Club and chairman of the Board of Governors of the British Council-sponsored Preparatory School in Bagdad. His achievements in office fall short of his excellent intentions, and he is not a man to sway his colleagues. He speaks English, Persian and Turkish as well as Kurdish and Arabic.

121. Umar Nadhmi

Kurd, born Kifri 1893. Educated at the Bagdad Law School, he was a civil judge before the 1914-18 war and Public Prosecutor to the Bagdad Military Court during the war.

He served as a judge again from 1921 to 1927, and from then to 1937 he was Mutasarrif in a number of provinces. Director-General of Revenues 1937-38.

Minister of Economics and Communications and later of Interior under Nuri Said 1939-40; of Communications and Works under Rashid Ali in 1940; of Interior under Taha al Hashimi in 1941 and under Nuri Said 1943-44; of Justice under Tawfiq al Suweidi in 1946, under Nuri Said November 1946 to March 1947 and under Mohammed al Sadr January to March 1948; and of Interior under Muzahim Pachachi 1948-49. Deputy Prime Minister under Nuri Said 1949. Again Minister of Interior under Ali Jaudat December 1949 to February 1950 and again in February 1951 under Nuri Said, whose cabinet he joined as Minister without Portfolio in December 1950. He has been a Senator since 1939.

He probably owes his rise to eminence to the friends he made in the provinces (especially in the North) where he served as Mutasarrif, to the support of Nuri Said, and to a cautious and dignified demeanour. He is detested by Saleh Jabr's party. He speaks no English. He enjoys the Regent's confidence.

122. Yahya Qassim

Sunni of Mosul, born 1913. Educated Bagdad Law College.

He joined Government service in 1936. Was appointed Superintendent in the Council of Ministers' Office in 1937 and later transferred to the Iraqi State Railways.

He was at that time an active Left-winger, and was reported to have a hand in the publication of the clandestine newspaper *Al Sharara*. In 1943 he was arrested for the distribution of Leftist literature and was discharged from the Iraqi State Railways. In 1944 he started the newspaper *Al Sha'ab* as the organ of the now defunct Leftist party of that name. He now owns and edits this paper himself, and it is no longer connected with any party. He visited England with a party of journalists in 1945 and became a convinced and outspoken admirer of the British people. In 1946 he joined the National Democratic Party but soon resigned owing to personal differences. He was taken up by Saleh Jabr in 1947 and accompanied him to London in January 1948 for the signature of the unratified Portsmouth Treaty. He again visited England in the summer of 1949 and 1952. In addition to journalism he practises as a lawyer and is paid a retainer by the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Yahya is a clever young man with a frank and friendly manner and a pronounced stammer. His newspaper is above the low level of the Bagdad press, and he has the courage on occasion to express unpopular opinions. He is completely loyal to Saleh Jabr, whom he regards as Iraq's main hope for the

future, but he is also on close terms with Nuri. He has not abandoned his Socialist leanings and is a sincere advocate of reforms, but he is now no revolutionary. He is married to a niece of the late Amin Zaki Suleiman and speaks good English.

123. Yusuf Abdullah al Gailani (Saiyid)

Sunni, born 1907 of the family of the Naqibs of Bagdad. Educated at Bagdad and Balliol College, Oxford.

He returned to Iraq in 1934 and was appointed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in which he became Director of the Political Section in 1945, Director-General in 1949, Acting Under-Secretary in January 1951 and Under-Secretary in 1952. He became a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Iraqi Foreign Service in November 1950. He was a member of the Iraqi Delegations to Arab League meetings in 1949 and 1950. Member of the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations Assembly, 1952.

Yusuf is intelligent and friendly, cautious and a little shy. He takes no part in politics and is well informed only on those questions of Iraqi foreign policy on which he is employed. He complains of the amateurish and emotional conduct of Iraq's foreign relations by his successive political chiefs, and is occasionally critical of the intervention of the Regent in the detailed conduct of foreign affairs. He is, however, a loyal, discreet and competent official. He speaks excellent English, and his wife, who is also a Gailani, appears in mixed society.

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No. 11

IRAQ: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS

Sir J. Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received 22nd September)

(No. 129. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
Sir, *17th September, 1952.*

With reference to my despatch No. 110 (1902/71/51) of 26th June, 1951, I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Bagdad.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

Enclosure in No. 11

Report on the Heads of Foreign Missions Bagdad, 1952

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports)

Afghanistan

Abdul Samad Khan, Minister (29th May, 1952).
Abdul Samad Khan has served in London, Paris and Rome. Before coming to Bagdad was Permanent Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

China

Shen Yueh, Chargé d'Affaires.
Shen Yueh represents the Formosa régime. Consequently I have no relations with him.

Egypt

Anwar Mohamed Zaki has been Chargé d'Affaires since 1st June, 1952.

The last Minister, Ahmed Mohamed Farrag, went on leave on that date, but has since been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in General Neguib's Government.

France

Claude Achille Clarac, Minister (22nd June, 1950).
*M. Clarac is a career diplomatist. He served before the war at Washington and Tehran and was in charge of the Consulate at Tetuan, which he handed over to the Free French after the Allied landings in 1942. He was subsequently in Lisbon and Chungking and in Indo-China as diplomatic counsellor to the High Commissioner. He was appointed Inspector-General of French diplomatic missions in 1947.

He gives me the impression that he will take more kindly to Bagdad than his predecessor. He speaks English well. (Written in 1950.)

*M. Clarac is an excellent colleague, intelligent, co-operative and blessedly unsullied by protocol. He is a close personal friend of several members of my staff. He seems to accept philosophically both the somewhat unenviable position enjoyed by his country in Iraq and the meagreness of the staff which the Quai d'Orsay allots to the French Legation here.

M. Clarac is a widower. (Written in 1951.)
The French Legation is likely to be raised to the status of an embassy now that this step has been taken in Damascus, Beirut, Amman and Tel Aviv.

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Holy See

Mgr. Armand Etienne Blanquet du Chayla, Apostolic delegate (20th November, 1948).

*Mgr. Du Chayla, the Latin Archbishop of Bagdad, was appointed Apostolic Delegate on 20th November, 1948. He is a Frenchman and a member of the Carmelite Order. His appointment represents a departure from the stand hitherto taken by the Iraqi Government that the Apostolic Delegate in Iraq should not be the national of a major Power. He is an agreeable and cultivated man, and it is always a pleasure to meet him. He has spent ten years in Bagdad.

Mgr. Du Chayla's diplomatic position is still not regularised. (Written in 1949.)

*Mgr. Du Chayla is a sick man. He has returned to France in order to have an operation. (Written in 1950.)

*He has returned to Bagdad but makes no secret of his opinion that twelve years' residence here is enough. Aristocratic and fastidious, he does not seem to have taken very kindly to Iraqis, whether of the Muslim or Christian persuasion. (Written in 1951.)

Indonesia

Dr. R. Tirtawinata, Minister (28th March, 1951).

*Dr. Tirtawinata, who has the personal rank of Ambassador, was Attorney-General in the Indonesian Government, but lost the post apparently because of his failure to secure the extradition of Westerling from Singapore, and of other short-comings. His appointment to Bagdad is therefore attributed to political motives.

In addition to an array of secretaries, Dr. Tirtawinata has a wife and a considerable family, to whom he is anxious to give an English education. He goes out of his way to be affable and friendly but does not strike me as a man of any great personality. He and his wife both speak English. (Written in 1951.)

Italy

Guelfo Zamboni, Minister (3rd November, 1951).
M. Zamboni, who came here from Moscow, was regarded by my late American colleague as both intelligent and charming. I have not yet discovered any great qualities in M. Zamboni myself, perhaps because I am so little of a bridge player.

Jordan

Abdullah Al-Zereykat has been Chargé d'Affaires since 1st January, 1952.

He goes out of his way to show courtesy to this embassy.

Lebanon

Kadhim al Solh, Minister (9th August, 1947).

*Kadhim al Solh is a cousin of Riad al Solh, Prime Minister of the Lebanon. Aged about 45, and a Sunni Moslem of Beirut, he is a graduate of the Damascus Law School. He started life as a journalist, until his paper was suspended by the French. Subsequently he organised a small but influential nationalist (but not anti-British) political party, the

G*

Nida al Qammi. He speaks good French and some English. (Written in 1948.) His wife is purdah.

*Kadhim al Solh does not seem to have acquired any influence with the Iraqis and I have seldom met him in Iraqi houses. (Written in 1950.)

He circulates in society more than he used to, but his personality does not become more impressive on closer acquaintance. I constantly find myself in the embarrassing position of forgetting who he is.

Netherlands

*M. W. A. A. M. Daniels, who had been Minister since 1947, and who resided in Beirut, has been transferred to Stockholm, and M. B. A. Piets, who had been serving as First Secretary resident in Bagdad since July 1949, presented a letter on 3rd June, 1951, as *Chargé d'Affaires en pied*.

M. Piets with his English wife, is a considerable asset to Bagdad society, though his official duties cannot be very overwhelming. (Written in 1951.)

He is now also accredited in Amman.

Persia

Hussain Quds Nakha'i, Ambassador (4th June, 1951).

Mr. Hussain Quds Nakha'i (No. 149 in Persian Personalities for 1950) has held various posts in the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and has served in Washington, London and Izmir.

The Iraqis regard him as a great improvement on his predecessor, though they are surprised at the rapidity with which he has reached ambassadorial rank. Reports preceded him that he was violently anti-British but my experience of him suggests quite the contrary. He is obviously unhappy about the present state of affairs in Tehran, and speaks warmly of his life in London, where he has served three times, the last time during the war. He speaks English fluently and is having his children educated in England. His wife is also there at present.

Saudi Arabia

Abdullah Al Khaiyal, Minister (9th February, 1947).

*After a period in the legation as a secretary and then as *Chargé d'Affaires*, Abdullah Al Khaiyal was appointed Minister in February 1947. He is friendly and intelligent, a genuine Saudi from Riyadh, but is disliked by the Iraqis, who suspect the legation of acting as an intermediary between Rashid Ali and his friends in Iraq. I would not trust him far. He has taken lessons in English from the British Council staff and has made considerable progress.

Last year he surprised Bagdad society by giving the first Saudi party to which ladies were invited. He went home for a month on leave in April for the first time in many years. (Written in 1950.)

He is a regular visitor to the British Institute and circulates a good deal in society.

Soviet Union

*There is no Soviet Minister accredited to Bagdad. Since April 1950 the legation has remained in charge of M. Sergei Nemchinov, who has the rank of First Secretary. M. Nemchinov came from Moscow, where he had been concerned with Middle Eastern affairs. He was born in Moscow in 1910, and has spent most of his life there. He taught history in the University of Moscow, specialising in the period up to the seventeenth century. During the war he went into the army, but owing to defective eyesight was not sent to the front: instead he served as a staff officer on training formations in Siberia. He does not appear to have been long in the Russian diplomatic service, but was for a few years in Cairo after the war. He is not an aggressive type of Russian and seems to want to make himself agreeable. He speaks English slowly and carefully. He is married. (Written in 1951.)

He is now complaining of some nervous disorder and says that he is asking for a transfer on grounds of health.

Spain

Juan Manuel de Aristegui, Minister (11th February, 1948).

*Formerly Spanish Consul-General in Jerusalem. He is stout and amiable and speaks passable English. (Written in 1949.) He is also accredited to Kabul. He is seldom here, and for most of the time since my arrival the legation has been in charge of M. Pedros Antonio Cuyas y Ortis de la Vega an uninhibited bachelor, who though far from stupid, provides the diplomatic circle here with most of its comic relief.

Turkey

Ahmet Umar has been *Chargé d'Affaires* since 4th July, 1952.

The former Minister, M. Rahmi Apak retired from the service on 13th July, 1952, and has not yet been replaced. The *Chargé d'Affaires* is a friendly and competent man, who speaks good French.

United States

The Hon. Burton Yost Berry, Ambassador, (25th June, 1952).

Mr. Berry was born in 1901, in Indiana. He is a career diplomat who has served in Istanbul, Tehran and Athens. Before coming to Bagdad he was in the State Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs.

Mr. Berry is a hard-working bachelor who dislikes being hurried and does his best to avoid the distraction of social life. He seems to have few interests outside his office, but confesses to being a numismatist. First contacts indicate that he will be a shrewd and co-operative colleague.

Representatives accredited to the Iraq Government but resident elsewhere

Belgium

There is at present no Belgian Minister accredited to the Iraq Government.

M. Laurent Janssen resides here as *Chargé d'Affaires*. He is a quiet but friendly and charming person, with a pleasant wife. They speak little English.

Denmark

Axel Sporon-Fiedler, Minister (7th April, 1949).

M. Sporon-Fiedler, who was formerly Danish Consul-General in San Francisco, is also accredited to Tehran, where he normally resides. He paid a short visit to Bagdad in April 1951, accompanied by his wife and another one in the summer of 1951, accompanied by a secretary.

Ethiopia

There is at present no Ethiopian Minister accredited to the Iraq Government. Petros Sahlou, *Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.* is resident in Cairo.

Greece

There is at present no Greek Minister accredited to the Iraq Government.

Constantine Himarios, *Chargé d'Affaires*, is resident in Beirut.

Mexico

There is at present no Mexican Minister accredited to the Iraq Government. Dr. Salvador Pardo Bolland, *Chargé d'Affaires*, is resident in Beirut.

Norway

Ernest Krogh-Hansen, Minister (14th April, 1949).

*M. Krogh-Hansen is accredited also to Turkey, Pakistan and Persia and is resident in Ankara. He spent two weeks here after presenting his credentials in the (vain) hope of concluding an Air Agreement rapidly. (Written in 1949.)

He has not been here since. (Written in 1950.)

He spent a day or so in Bagdad in May 1951 and seems a friendly person.

Sweden

Cunнар Jarring, Minister.

M. Jarring is also accredited to Tehran, and is never seen here.

Switzerland

Franz Kappeler, Minister (24th February, 1951).

M. Kappeler, who resides in Beirut, was formerly *Chargé d'Affaires en pied*. The only resident member of the staff is M. J. P. Jéquier. He and his Austrian wife are very popular in the foreign community.